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The aim of this dissertation is to reassess empathy from a Schelerian 
perspective, taking into consideration and keeping abreast with contemporary 
debates on the matter. Although Scheler’s best-known books (GW II, GW VII) are 
being widely examined in the current phenomenological discussions on empathy 
and we-intentionality, the complex view that emerges from his texts of different 
periods is still largely overlooked by current phenomenological discussions. My 
studies show that a clarification of the problematic concept of empathy can be better 
achieved by adopting adequate Schelerian instruments, so they have been applied 
when investigating the relations of empathy with the phenomena of body schema, 
expressivity and we-intentionality.  
Firstly, as Scheler grounds other-perception on the expressive possibilities of 
the lived body, I delve into the concept of body schema, which has been scarcely 
studied in Schelerian terms so far. After examining the interdisciplinary literature 
on the topic, I highlight the viewpoint which stems from Die Idole der 
Selbsterkenntnis and Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, since it lets us 
understand the body schema both as a pre-reflective dynamic structure allowing 
fluid interactions with the world, and as the first level of individuation. Moreover, 
I study two examples from the Formalismus – the “jail example” and the “example 
of the new-born” – and, to indicate an early distinction between the body schema 
and the body image, I compare the first case with the experience of solitary 
confinement and the second with up-to-date evidence from infant research. Through 
this inquiry, I draw attention to the body schema as the minimal form of self-
individuation necessary for ordinary experience, and as a space between self and 
others which both allows empathy and is shaped by it. 
Secondly, by shedding light on the interrelational aspect of the body schema, 
I argue that others highly contribute to its development, and interactions themselves 
depend on bodily expressivity and affective exchange. Infant research shows the 
newborn’s early – if not innate – acquaintance with the implicit grasping of the 
affective meaning of some expressions, which can be compared with Scheler’s 
thesis of a universal grammar of expressivity. To ascertain how universal this 
grammar is to be conceived, I carry out an analysis of Darwin’s and Ekman’s 
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accounts, and of the counterarguments to the universality of any expression. I 
dismiss such objections, state that a difference exists between universal 
spontaneous expressions and gestures, and claim that the universality of certain 
emotions extends beyond the visibility and expression of them (e.g. jealousy). This 
is followed by the claim that what is called the “direct perception” in the 
contemporary debate implies an axiological dimension for Scheler, a theory of 
values which gives a further nuance to the non-neutrality of perception. If we did 
not access expressivity and values directly, but through explicit attention and 
reasoning, our perception would become solipsistic and similar to schizophrenic 
autism. 
Thirdly, the inquiry into the roots of empathy (the lived body and 
expressivity), is followed by the study of the very concept of empathy. In order to 
reassess how Scheler can help define the difference between similar phenomena, 
his theory is compared to what is being discussed in current interdisciplinary 
debates. Although Scheler locates unipathy at the foundational level for empathy, I 
counter the view that sees the acquisition of an affective state as a requirement for 
empathy, for Scheler’s Nachfühlen presupposes detachment and awareness of the 
feeling pertaining to the other agent. Moreover, such a thesis does not fall into the 
solipsistic problems of the theory theory and the simulation theory; in particular, a 
focus on the latter points out that it causes egocentrism on the ethical level, and that 
even the embodied simulation – which states that empathy is bodily grounded – 
leads to multiple theoretical impasses. 
The final section deals with the question whether empathy or “sharing” is 
primary, and the attempt to understand the connections between the two. I take 
sharing to have a broader meaning than we-intentionality, and to start already from 
what Scheler calls “sharing without awareness” in unipathy and affective contagion. 
In this regard, the comparison with the theory of extended emotions can help 
understand that affects are not actually locked in the bodily dimension.  Scheler’s 
hotly-debated example of the grieving parents and the four group-forms that he lists 
are taken into account to prove that empathy can have a genetic role for we-
intentionality, but not always a constitutive one. The highest degree of 
interconnection (solidarity and absolute responsibility) also corresponds to the 
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highest individuation (the person). Lastly, I argue that the “co-execution” 
(Mitvollzug) of personal acts (GW II; Cusinato 2015b, 50; 2017, 48) represents a 
unique kind of sharing, and read it as the ethical direction that is essentially absent 
in empathy, although sharing becomes possible thanks to the non-solipsistic roots 






In questa tesi, riesaminerò l’empatia da una prospettiva scheleriana in costante 
dialogo con i dibattiti contemporanei sul tema. Nonostante le opere più conosciute 
di Scheler (GW II, GW VII) siano prese in considerazione dalle teorie 
contemporanee sull’empatia e sulla we-intentionality, la complessa visione che 
emerge da testi di periodi diversi rimane ampiamente trascurata dalle presenti 
discussioni fenomenologiche. Sostengo che una chiarificazione del problematico 
concetto di empatia possa trarre vantaggio dall’adottare adeguati strumenti 
scheleriani, e li applico per indagare le relazioni con i fenomeni dello schema 
corporeo, dell’espressività e della we-intentionality. 
In primo luogo, dato che Scheler fonda la percezione dell’altro sulle possibilità 
espressive del corpo vivo, indago il concetto di schema corporeo, che è stato finora 
scarsamente studiato in termini scheleriani. Dopo aver esaminato la letteratura 
interdisciplinare sull’argomento, esploro il punto di vista che emerge da Die Idole 
der Selbsterkenntnis e Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, che porta a 
comprendere lo schema corporeo come una struttura dinamica e preriflessiva, la 
quale permette di interagire in maniera fluida col mondo, e come il primo livello di 
individuazione. Inoltre, considero due esempi dal Formalismus – l’“esempio della 
prigione” e l’“esempio del neonato” – per indicare una prima distinzione implicita 
tra lo schema corporeo e l’immagine corporea, e confronto il primo caso con 
l’esperienza nelle prigioni d’isolamento e il secondo con l’infant research. Tramite 
quest’indagine, arrivo a concepire lo schema corporeo come una forma minima di 
individuazione necessaria per l’esperienza quotidiana, e come uno spazio tra sé e 
gli altri che permette l’empatia e allo stesso tempo è plasmato da essa. 
In secondo luogo, cerco di fare luce sull’aspetto interrelazionale dello schema 
corporeo, poiché gli altri contribuiscono al suo sviluppo, e le interazioni stesse 
dipendono dall’espressività corporea così come dagli scambi affettivi. L’infant 
research mostra una precoce – se non innata – familiarità e comprensione implicita 
del significato affettivo di alcune espressioni, aspetto che può essere confrontato 
con la tesi di Scheler della grammatica universale dell’espressività. Per determinare 
quanto universale sia da pensare tale grammatica, intraprendo un’analisi delle teorie 
di Darwin ed Ekman, e degli argomenti contrari all’universalità delle espressioni. 
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Respingo tali obiezioni sostenendo una differenza tra espressioni spontanee 
universali e gesti, e affermo che l’universalità di certe emozioni si estende oltre la 
loro visibilità ed espressione (es. la gelosia). Per quanto riguarda Scheler, sottolineo 
che quella che viene chiamata la “percezione diretta” dal dibattito contemporaneo 
comporti per lui una dimensione assiologica, una teoria dei valori che aggiunge una 
sfumatura ulteriore alla non-neutralità della percezione. Se non accedessimo 
direttamente all’espressività e ai valori ma avessimo bisogno di attenzione esplicita 
e ragionamento, la nostra percezione diverrebbe solipsistica e simile all’autismo 
schizofrenico. 
In terzo luogo, dopo aver indagato le radici dell’empatia (il corpo vivo e 
l’espressività), prendo in considerazione il concetto stesso di empatia e riesamino, 
comparando la sua teoria con i dibattiti contemporanei interdisciplinari, come 
Scheler possa aiutare a definire la differenza fra fenomeni simili. Nonostante 
Scheler collochi l’unipatia al livello fondativo per l’empatia, rigetto la prospettiva 
che vede l’acquisizione di uno stato affettivo come un requisito per l’empatia, dato 
che il Nachfühlen di Scheler presuppone distacco e consapevolezza dello stato 
affettivo come appartenente all’altro agente. In aggiunta a ciò, tale tesi non ricade 
nei problemi solipsistici della teoria della teoria e della teoria della simulazione; in 
particolare, mi concentro sull’ultima per evidenziare che essa può condurre 
all’egocentrismo sul piano etico, e che anche la simulazione incarnata – la quale 
afferma che l’empatia sia fondata sul corpo – conduce a varie impasse teoretiche. 
Infine, mi chiedo cosa sia primario fra la condivisione (“sharing”) e l’empatia, 
e cerco di comprendere le connessioni fra le due. Considero la condivisione come 
avente un significato più ampio rispetto a we-intentionality, ed essa inizia già da 
quella che Scheler chiama “condivisione senza consapevolezza” nell’unipatia e nel 
contagio affettivo. In questo senso, il paragone con la teoria delle emozioni estese 
permette di comprendere che gli stati affettivi non sono rinchiusi nella dimensione 
corporea. Prendo poi in considerazione il dibattuto esempio scheleriano dei genitori 
in lutto e le quattro forme di gruppo che egli elenca, per giungere alla conclusione 
che l’empatia possa avere un ruolo genetico ma non sempre costitutivo per la we-
intentionality. Il più alto grado di interconnessione (solidarietà e responsabilità 
assoluta) corrisponde anche alla più alta individuazione (la persona). Sostengo che 
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la “co-esecuzione” (Mitvollzug) di atti personali rappresenti una particolare forma 
di condivisione, e la leggo come la direzione etica che è costitutivamente assente 
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What is empathy and why has it been and is still the hub of tangled 
interdisciplinary discussions? In this dissertation, I shall develop and defend the 
thesis that empathy can be fruitfully reassessed from a Schelerian perspective, 
keeping at the same time a constant dialogue with the relevant contemporary 
debates. So far, most analyses on Scheler in the contemporary debate on empathy 
have taken into account his best-known texts – the Sympathie-Buch above all – 
while the complex view that emerges from other works written in different periods 
has been overlooked by many philosophers of empathy.  
Phenomenology concerns the phenomena themselves, so this dissertation is 
not meant to be an exegetical contribution. Yet, an original account of empathy that 
adopts Schelerian instruments should also display an adequate knowledge of his 
main theories, in order to deal with alternative past and present-day hypotheses.  
Specifically, the chapters are centered on four aspects considered of core 
importance to understand the empathic phenomena: the lived body as the first level 
of self-individuation and interaction with others (chapter 1); expressivity, affective 
perception, values and emotions (ch. 2); the definition of empathy, and its 
distinction from similar phenomena (ch. 3); “sharing” in its multiple forms, and its 
possible connections with empathy (ch. 4). 
The first chapter deals with the following question: how can a phenomenology 
of empathy claim that our first encounter with others is possible thanks to the lived 
body? If interaction and expressivity allow to communicate even pre-reflectively, 
an investigation of embodiment becomes necessary. The first step is to analyze the 
concepts of body image and body schema, which have not been extensively studied 
in Schelerian terms so far. In the literature on the body schema, it has been widely 
ignored that Scheler introduced that concept quite a long time ago («das Schema 
unseres Leibes» GW II, 409), in fact the sketch of a distinction between schema and 
image is already envisaged in his works. The body schema is taken into account 
both in the early ones where the concept of an impulsive structure prevails, and in 
the later ones where Scheler focuses on the Bilder as anticipatory schemata of 
experience (Cusinato 2008, 130-142).  
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Starting from Scheler’s theory, the thesis of a pre-reflective form of embodied 
individuation can be found in Cusinato, who conceives the body schema as the first 
form of individuation, not only with reference to the possibilities of movement of 
the lived body, but also to its expressive possibilities:  
 
every organism individualizes itself through the schemata of 
possibility of movement, interaction and expression of one’s own 
lived body (Leib). In this sense, it can be supposed that to each 
individuation process corresponds a specific form of expressive-
body-schema. In the primary individuation, the expressive-body-
schema coincides with the impulsive structure of the organism, 
which determines the possibilities of movement and interaction with 
the environment; in the secondary individuation, it corresponds to 
the «body-image», meant as a socially recognized image; in the 
tertiary individuation, it overlaps with the ordo amoris, to be 
conceived then as an order of feeling that expresses itself in the body 
and thanks to the body (e.g. in the feeling of shame). It is essential 
here to intend the expressive-body-schema not only as a schema for 
motor possibilities, but also as a schema for expressive possibilities. 
(Cusinato, [2014] 2017b, 235-236). 
 
And in fact, reassessing the body schema in Scheler brings to a twofold result: 
on the one hand, it clears up some of the theoretical ambiguities in the literature on 
the body schema, and on the other hand, it dismisses the criticism often addressed 
to his theory of the ‘undifferentiated flux’.  
To clarify how to understand the two terms of ‘body schema’ and ‘body 
image’, I refer to past and present interdisciplinary literature, where, however, I find 
puzzling and contrasting views that alternate excessive differentiation with blur 
between subpersonal and experiential dimensions. I therefore argue that Scheler’s 
view can help resolve such impasses, and scrutinize the development of the body 
schema in his works, like Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis (GW III) and Die Stellung 
des Menschen im Kosmos (GW IX). By reading Scheler, one discovers that the body 
schema constitutes a form of primary individuation that already involves 
consciousness – though not a reflective one. I also aim at highlighting the successful 
application of such body schema to some pathological cases of sensory neuropathy 
and schizophrenia, where an explicit attention to the body (body image) leads to 
disturbed experiences. If – as Guido Cusinato asserts, drawing on Max Scheler and 
Bin Kimura – schizophrenia is to be conceived as a relational disorder which 
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inhibits the direct perception of one’s own and others’ expressivity, then the relation 
with one’s own body is clearly affected. 
I then examine the body schema as it emerges in the Formalismus (GW II), 
particularly from two examples. The first one can be called the “jail example”, as it 
concerns the lived body in the isolation of a prison, hence the comparison with the 
experience in solitary confinement (Guenther 2013), and the conclusion that the 
body schema is not a static structure, but rather a dynamical one that is built and 
modified through social interchange. The other example, “of the new-born”, also 
confirms the primary individuation of the body schema and so refutes the several 
criticisms against Scheler’s ‘undifferentiated flux’. Furthermore, this example is 
compared to the basic self-other differentiation proved by empirical studies in infant 
research (Rochat 2003, Fogel 2011, Meltzoff&Moore 1977, 1983, 1990, Welsh 
2006). Such a space between self and others ultimately sets the possibility for 
empathy, which contributes to shape the body schema. 
The second chapter starts with the investigation of the deep interrelation 
between the body schema and the role of others in its development. Unlike animals, 
a human neonate is born with an underdeveloped bodily structure (neoteny), and 
this requires care from others in order to grow in its plasticity and unique 
possibilities (Cusinato, 2017b). Such interactions depend on expressivity and 
affective exchange. A certain trend in infant research has also revealed that the 
newborn displays an innate tendency to sociality and an early kind of 
communication, one that is bodily-affectively understood (Trevarthen 1997, 2011; 
Stern 2005; Lavelli and Fogel 2002). Such evidence has never been explicitly 
compared with Scheler’s account. However, it is directly connected with his theory 
of the primacy of the body schema, as well as with the universal grammar of 
expressivity, a topic that I have chosen to study in order to set the bases for the 
discussion on empathy (GW VII, addressed in Cusinato 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017).  
As a consequence, I try to answer the question of how universal such a 
grammar is by critically assessing Darwin’s analysis of expressivity in mankind and 
animals, and Ekman’s theory of basic emotions. Such hypotheses are however 
controversial, so I question counterarguments from the literature against the 
universality of expressivity (Jack et al. 2012, Parkinson, Fisher and Manstead 
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2005). After this inquiry, the conclusion is that universality pertains only to some 
spontaneous expressions that must be kept distinct from gestures, and that the 
universality of certain emotions extends beyond the visibility and expression of 
them (e.g. jealousy). The way expressivity is “metabolized” depends on the levels 
of individuations, that are the ones of the lived body, of the psychological/social 
ego, and of the person (Cusinato 2017b). 
If according to Scheler, emotions themselves are present in expressions, how 
does the grasping of them happen? Here the very concept of perception is 
problematic in the variations mentioned by Scheler of direct perception 
(unmittelbare Wahrnehmung), other-perception (Fremdwahrnehmung) and value-
ception (Wertnehmen) (cf. Cusinato 1999, 167-175; 2011). Although in the 
contemporary debate it is mainly read as “direct perception” (e.g. Gallagher 2008), 
it should be remarked that Scheler intends perception as never wertfrei (neutral, free 
from values), which leads here to a discussion on his theory of values (GW II, GW 
VI, GW VII). The axiological dimension adds a further dimension to the 
contemporary Interaction Theory (supported by Gallagher&Varga 2014, Gallagher 
2008, Gallagher&Zahavi 2008, De Jaegher 2009, Krueger 2011). The comparison 
between this account and Scheler’s proves that four of IT’s five main claims are 
shared: the contrast of IT versus simulation theory and theory theory, the direct 
perception claim, the centrality of expressivity, the importance of the context – 
while the enactivist variation of IT is more problematic.  
Last, I read schizophrenia in the light of a mental experiment that shows us 
what a neutral perception incapable of grasping expressivity means: when the 
relationship with the others’ bodies is impaired and we lose contact with their 
leiblich character, i.e. their expressive field (Cusinato 2015b, 77-78), we fall into 
an irremediable solipsism, where the world and others become unpredictable and 
scary. 
As the first encounter with others occurs thanks to our lived bodies and the 
universal grammar of expressivity, the main subject of the third chapter is whether 
the concepts of expressivity-grasping and empathy can be equated. Does a wasp 
have empathy if she stings a spider in the right spot to paralyze it? And when 
someone goes to a party and unwillingly acquires the cheerful mood from others’ 
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expressivity, is it a case of empathy? The examples are to be kept distinct, but 
presuppose an implicit expressivity-grasping, which has been argued to be the 
ground for empathy. The Sympathie-Buch (GW VII) can help us define the concept 
of empathy, distinguish it from similar feeling-functions, and contrast some past 
and current theories that have misunderstood its phenomenal nature. 
I examine therefore Scheler’s definitions of Sympathieethik (the ethics of 
sympathy), Gefühlsansteckung (affective contagion), Einsfühlung (unipathy, 
literally “feeling as one”); Mitgefühl or mitfühlen (affective co-feeling), Einfühlung 
([projective] empathy), and especially Nachfühlen (affective re-feeling), also 
referred to as nachleben (re-live) or nacherleben (re-experience), which is the 
concept that best individuates the idea of empathy supported in this dissertation. 
The distinction among affective contagion, unipathy and empathy is particularly 
significant, since it implies that when agency is blurred – as in the first two 
phenomena – there can neither be any proper ‘thou’, nor any awareness of sharing, 
as will be argued in the last chapter. Among the foundational laws of sympathy, 
Scheler locates unipathy at the ground level, for his metaphysical theory of the 
universality of expressivity presupposes an All-leben shared by all living beings.  
Does this imply that empathy presupposes an acquisition of the target’s 
affective state, as in unipathy and contagion? The reply is negative, since 
Nachfühlen is a feeling-function – it intentionates another’s feeling, without the 
transmission of its content. Consequently, I contest the opposite theory by Jacob 
(2011), that targets either affective contagion or co-feeling. Although the 
recognition of the affective quality from our unipathic belonging is essential for 
empathy, Nachfühlen presupposes detachment and clear awareness of the feeling 
pertaining to the other agent. The wasp is able to grasp expressivity, nevertheless, 
according to Scheler, it has no awareness of two distinct subjects: it is only a matter 
of instinctive identification. Such aspects, features of empathy-Nachfühlen prove 
that unipathy/contagion cannot be present in empathy, that is not a co-feeling either, 
since even a sadist can empathize with her victim and an antisocial person with 
others. 
When reassessing Scheler’s arguments, it is important to notice that empathy 
is all but a matter of self-projection onto the other, the view that instead stems from 
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both the theory theory (Wimmer&Perner 1983, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 
1985, Nichols&Stich 2003, Decety&Cowell 2014) and the simulation theory, 
which are still prevailing, despite the expansion of a phenomenological/direct-
perception account (Cusinato 1999, Gallagher&Zahavi 2008, Overgaard 
forthcoming, Zahavi 2011). As it concerns the theory theory, it is argued that a 
theory used to interpret others should be grounded on the repetition of elements 
already found in previous experiences. Yet, the meaning of such experiences must 
be rooted in value-ception – in its turn rooted in the universal grammar of 
expressivity – to avoid a regressus ad infinitum where one can only be acquainted 
with oneself. However, the main focus is on two aspects of the simulation theory. 
First, it ultimately hides solipsistic premises, and Scheler states in the Sympathie-
Buch that the ethical implication of it is egocentrism: to project what we simulate 
onto the other provokes a “usurpation of agency” (Slaby 2014). Second, I examine 
Gallese’s version of ST that seems more coherent with what I have asserted so far, 
as it claims to be based on the body (embodied simulation) and to entail a 
phenomenological level. Yet, I shed light on multiple problems: on the 1) 
functional/neuronal levels, 2) on the problem of a ST/TT interpretation of the mirror 
system, and 3) on the phenomenological level. 
Given that the unipathic level is foundational for empathy, what is primary 
between interaction and sharing? In the fourth and last chapter, I consider the 
relation between empathy and “sharing”, a topic that has been debated only recently 
and that arouses multiple, even contradictory interpretations of Scheler’s theories 
of Miteinanderfühlen and of the essential group-forms (Cusinato [2014] 2017b; 
Schloßberger 2016; Schmid 2009, 2015; Salice 2015; Szanto 2016). Following 
Cusinato’s widening of the concept, I give “sharing” a broader meaning than “we-
intentionality”, and argue that the phenomena of affective contagion and unipathy 
have been overlooked in the contemporary debate or taken into account only for 
their role of group-reinforcement. In contrast, Scheler considers such phenomena 
as “sharing without awareness”. Although it is quite a minimal form of sharing and 
is experienced from an “I”-perspective (that is, without the Searlian sense of us), it 
also presupposes the minimal form of individuation, coherently with the fact that 
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the higher in values-sharing the group-form is, the more subjective individuation a 
person undergoes. 
The topic in the next section is the very recent debate on extended emotions 
(Krueger&Szanto 2016; Krueger 2014; León, Szanto, Zahavi 2017). As a 
consequence of this new viewpoint, another interpretation of the forms of affective 
phenomena from a Schelerian perspective would be to claim that they are – in 
Krueger (2011)’s terms – scaffolded by bodily expressivity and the consequent 
visibility. Yet, the involuntary transmission of a feeling can also be included in the 
hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions, as for Scheler the grammar of 
expressivity is shared by humans with all the realm of nature. So the claim that 
sharing entails even minimal forms without we-awareness is reinforced, and affects 
can be conceived as co-dependent on others and not as locked in our lived body.  
The case of the grieving parents before their dead child (GW VII) is more 
complex than sharing without awareness and is Scheler’s most discussed example 
in the we-intentionality debate. It raises harsh discussions on whether there is a 
token-identity emotion (Schmid 2009) or not (León, Szanto, Zahavi 2017), and on 
the consequent primacy either of the we-mode or of empathy. I argue that empathy 
may play a genetic role but there is a further bond that gives the protagonists 
involved a strong sense of ‘we’, because they share some previous narratives, 
experiences, etc. I also dismiss the objection that an emotion is shared only if the 
same happens to the bodily feelings. Those parents’ emotion is being directed 
towards the same situation in the same affective mode, yet the feeling is 
“metabolized” (Cusinato 2008) in different ways, depending on their personal order 
of values, cultural background and experiences, 
The last section is the examination of the theory of essential social unities that 
Scheler exposed mainly in the Formalismus and in the Sociology of Knowledge. 
After proving the intrinsic sociality of any human being through the example of 
Robinson, Scheler lists four group forms, namely the mass, the life-community, 
society and the community of persons. While the first concerns sharing without 
awareness, the second recalls the grieving parents’ example, and this brings back 
attention to the relation of sharing with empathy. Therefore, I take into account a 
different form of sharing, joint attention (Tomasello 2008). When it arises in a 
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bottom-up mode, sharing does not stem from empathy, it only plays a role, for 
instance in building the common background, or in the verification of the other’s 
expression. 
Differently, in society there is no proper shared experience, but only an 
explicitly-set shared commitment: this is why it needs the original we-experiences 
of the life-community in order to exist. The last to be examined is the highest form 
of sharing, the one that Scheler defines as a personalistic system of solidarity. 
Challenging the stance of critics against his alleged reference to a “collective” and 
“encompassive” person, this level corresponds instead both to the highest degree of 
interconnection (solidarity and absolute responsibility) and of individuation (the 
person). The last part discusses the “co-execution” (Mitvollzug) of personal acts 
(GW II, Cusinato 2015b, 50; 2017, 48), including acts of love, and reads it as the 
possible ethical direction that is essentially absent in empathy, but is nevertheless 






1. Grounding empathy on the lived body. Leib and Leibschema 
In order to pursue any embodied interaction with alterity, one has to grasp 
another’s intentions or emotions through visual, auditive, tactile acquaintance, in a 
never-neutral quality of perception that already contains information, prior to any 
dualistic split between physical and mental elements.1 When one sees, for instance, 
an infant with contracted inner corners of the eyebrows, closed eyes and a wide-
open mouth she immediately recognizes it is crying. The same happens whenever 
she hears the newborn crying without actually seeing it, just by recognizing what 
that auditory experience means; or, in a tactile example, when the baby can be 
soothed by being held by her mother and feels care and warmth in her hug. These 
are all cases of emotions perceived thanks to the bodily dimension: in order to 
describe a third alternative to the theory theory (TT) and the simulation theory (ST) 
– the main accounts on empathy that I will attempt to refute – a renewed focus on 
the bodily dimension is needed.  
In his effort to keep a “Diary of a Body”, Daniel Pennac defined this peculiar 
way of describing his own body as «(…) not a treatise on physiology, but my secret 
garden, which is in many ways our most shared territory» (Pennac 2012, 13). It is 
a dimension that is not present as first and foremost to one’s own perception, but 
rather a shared territory continuously exposed to the gaze of others, and at the same 
time a performative structure that allows someone to pay attention to the world, 
while becoming usually marginal in experience. 
How do I move in the environment without explicit attention to my 
movements? How can I grasp the joy in your smile? And how is it possible for us 
even to interact prior to any linguistic communication? When one is involved in a 
task or focuses on something, including the empathic grasp of others’ expressivity, 
one’s own body acquires a quality in experience that can be described by the 
metaphor of transparency. There is a tendency to almost forget about the existence 
of one’s own body and to move with a fluid movement towards the desired 
destination or object. One might be concentrated on the goal, like holding a glass 
                                                         
1 I will deal with this aspect more extensively in the next chapter. 
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of water, on something occurring in the surrounding environment as a bird that 
suddenly flies near the window, or even walk deep in thought and at the same time 
avoid all or most hindrances with no need of explicit attention. For example, one 
could cross a room while thinking about a challenging philosophical problem and 
avoid a table or a chair without a cognitive focus on the body. Besides, others will 
be able to catch our intention from our hand reached out towards a glass, or our 
emotion in the involuntary smile when we see the bird at the window. This 
sensorimotor engagement with the world without an explicit effort in movements 
and expressivity-grasping is possible thanks to what has been called the body 
schema. Differently, the step of making our body become an object of observation, 
reflection or emotional directedness corresponds to the temporary transition from 
the condition of bodily transparency to what can be defined as body image. Yet, the 
distinction between the two dimensions is not always clear-cut, due to a partial 
overlapping of both into experience and, above all, to the conceptual confusion 
present in the fields of neurosciences, psychiatry, and phenomenology. 
The concept of body schema was born between the end of the 19th century and 
the beginning of the 20th, with the first theorization of an “absence of schema” 
(aschématie) in Paul Bonnier’s works on medical disorders, and the “postural 
schema” theorized by Head and Holmes which combines proprioception and a 
neural map of the body. In the field of psychiatry, an eminent example is Paul 
Schilder, who was influenced by and influenced Scheler, nevertheless causing a 
certain puzzlement about the distinction between schema and image. In the field of 
phenomenology, authors like Merleau-Ponty and, more recently, Shaun Gallagher 
have taken a very active part in the debate, in the effort to discover its role in 
experience. 
Yet, although the Formalismus-Buch’s influence is explicitly recognized in 
Schilder’s The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, Scheler is rarely quoted 
for his phenomenological theories concerning the problem of Leib and everybody’s 
spatial relation to her own body, topics that are usually related to Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty. It has often been neglected that Scheler was most probably the first 
phenomenologist to use the still-debated term of body schema and among the first 
ones to introduce the concept of Leib, and few scholars acknowledge the role of 
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embodiment developed by him. With some exceptions, even fewer thinkers remark 
the presence of the concept of body schema in his works, a notion that clearly 
emerges when digging into his more and less known texts.2 It has even been claimed 
by one of the major Husserlian scholars in Italy that «the important point that 
differentiates Husserl’s account from Max Scheler’s one (…) is the insistence on 
the necessity of the lived body» (Costa 2014, 124, my translation).  
Howbeit, Scheler’s attempt to requalify the body and the body schema tends 
both to contrast a certain Cartesian dualism (GW IX) and to respect the 
phenomenon of our ineluctable embodiment, that shapes the way we perceive the 
other human beings, the world around us and our body itself. Already since the 
Idols of Self-Knowledge (GW III), published in 1912, Scheler adopts the distinction 
of Leib and Körper and stresses the priority of the first one in perception, due to the 
originary givenness of it over the abstraction of a pure physical dimension.3 While 
in this text he sketches a first and implicit characterization of the body schema in 
describing the normal phenomenology of goal-directed movements, a proper use of 
the term emerges with the phrase «das Schema unseres Leibes» in the Formalismus 
(GW II, 409), where a differentiation between body image and body schema 
emerges from some specific examples, as I will show. In Scheler’s third period,4 
                                                         
2 These exceptions are today Guido Cusinato and Roberta Guccinelli, who are the authors of a careful 
analysis of Scheler’s conception of the lived body connected to the impulsive structure and to the 
selective attention coming from it, together with mention of the presence of a body schema in 
Scheler’s theory. See Cusinato (for a theory of the ‘imaginific’ body, 2008, 130-141; 2015, 61, 69-
71) and Guccinelli (2013, XVII-XCVIII). A contemporary of Scheler, both influenced by and 
influencing him, was Paul Schilder, who explicitly referred to him in The Image and Appearance of 
the Human Body ([1935] 1950). The work by Lorscheid (1962) represents a systematic overview on 
Scheler’s account on the body. 
3 Before the phenomenological movement, the distinction between Leib and Körper can be traced 
back to the beginning of German idealism. Fichte poses a difference between an animated, unitary 
Leib that is the possibility for the entrance into the world and for freedom, and a physical, 
“necessary” (notwendig) Körper (Fichte, 1962-2012, especially 360-423). Cf. also Grätzel (1989). 
4 I adopt Cusinato’s division of Scheler’s production into three periods, according to his most 
important publications, namely: the first period (by 1912), the intermediate one (1913-1921, which 
includes the Formalismus and Vom Ewigen im Menschen) and the last one (1922-1928, which 
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the topic is discussed especially in Erkenntnis und Arbeit (GW VIII) where the 
selective role of perception is pinpointed, and in Die Stellung des Menschen im 
Kosmos, in which he extensively investigates the role of the body schema for 
mankind and animals, correlated to an elementary level of “retroaction” or 
“feedback” (Rückmeldung). 
In order to show the relevance of Scheler’s theory for the debate and for the 
phenomenological dimension itself, first of all I am going to provide an overview 
of the literature concerning the problem of the body schema, with a particular focus 
on the impasses emerging from the conceptual confusion in the use of the term, 
though denying that the term should be eliminated. Once having highlighted the 
theoretical problems in the debate, I will proceed to scrutinize Scheler’s 
contribution in the mentioned works, and to enhance the efficaciousness of his 
description in the light of contemporary cases of disruption of the pre-reflective 
dimension of movement-control.5 
 
1.1 At the roots of the body schema. An overview of the 
literature 
Where does the concept of body schema stem from? In 1905, psychiatrist and 
neurologist Paul Bonnier defined a set of medical disorders as “aschématie”, a term 
that, he writes, derives «from schema, topographic representation, posture» 
(Bonnier 2009, 401). It describes a pathological condition in which «some parts of 
ourselves cease to be part of the idea we have of our body» and «the anesthesia [is] 
limited to the topographic idea, the spatial representation, the distribution, the form, 
the posture» (ibidem). However, Bonnier’s concept can be traced back to 1893, 
when, although in different terms, he had used the phrase “sens des attitudes” in his 
work Le Vertige to shed light on the reciprocal orientation of the bodily parts to one 
                                                         
contains works like Wesen und Formen der Sympathie and Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos). 
Cf. Cusinato (1999, 36). 
5 I discussed a preliminary version of the following topics at the phenomenological seminar of the 
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, on 1st November, 2016, and at the 
Scheler Colloquium that took place from 17th to 19th November, 2016 at the Maynooth University. 
I am grateful to both audiences for comments and critical assessments. 
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another and in relation to the whole (Bonnier 1893, 38). He first refers to spatial 
localization, focusing ambiguously both on the localization of bodily parts, internal 
organs included, and on neurological psychology, besides stating that different 
kinds of sensations are localized in different cerebral regions.  
Yet, soon after he highlights the experiential dimension of a – we could say – 
pre-reflective bodily control which enables orientation with respect to the objects, 
the environment and our position in it, and the localization of sensations in the body 
itself (e.g. a pain or a movement, Bonnier 1893, 38). When this schema is disrupted, 
because of “labyrinthine dizziness” or other types of pathology, his patients report 
strong and increasing lack of sensory-field localization, suspension of any sensation 
of personality, loss of consciousness, spatial hallucinations with agoraphobia, a 
feeling of the body –  or some parts of it – becoming huge (Bonnier 2009 [1905], 
402), a sensed absence of body or even the impression to be divided in two. 
Ultimately, such conditions involve aschematie, hypo-, hyper- or paraschematie. 
Though the range of pathologies appears so differentiated that it cannot lead to a 
unitary notion of body schema, it is important to pinpoint some of their 
characteristics. First, the relationship to the body is tightly connected to the 
psychical dimension and to the personality, something that will become more 
evident in Schilder and in Gallagher who envisage a libidinous or emotional aspect 
of the body image. With an interesting non-dualistic perspective, Bonnier defines 
this particular aspect as «the intraorganic localization, which is the attribution to a 
somatic personality extended and distributed in space» (Bonnier 2009 [1905], 403). 
Secondly, the loss of schema is connected to the loss of spatial localization, an 
aspect that will be crucial for Head’s postural schema.  
In fact, one of the first definitions to become quite well-known in medical, 
neurological and philosophical contexts is the one originally created by Henry Head 
and Gordon Holmes who elaborated such concept in their Sensory disturbances 
from cerebral lesions. The terms were “schema”, “schemata”, “postural schema”, 
and the notion that is being discussed here was described as a «combined standard, 
against which all subsequent changes of posture are measured before they enter 
consciousness» (Head&Holmes 1911-12, 187) and «organized models of 
ourselves» (Head&Holmes 1911-12, 189). Similarly to Bonnier’s focus on the 
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reciprocal orientation of bodily parts, it includes a schema for the registration of our 
posture or movement and one for the localization of a stimulated surface of our 
body. When Head takes up the concept again in the second volume of Studies in 
Neurology, he describes pathologies that may involve one’s relation to her own 
body connected to cortical lesions. However, he underlines two main features of 
any body schema, the first being that it is continuously built up in a dynamic way, 
in relation to postural changes and previous physiological dispositions. For Head, a 
“direct perception of posture” would be impossible, since the grasping of the 
localization of any bodily part is always relative to something that has preceded it 
(Head 1920, 722). The second aspect to be pointed out is that the focus on the 
neurological aspect leads the author to problematic theoretical claims, as the body 
schema is stated to be grounded entirely behind the threshold of consciousness: 
«[r]ecognition of posture and movement is obviously a conscious process. But the 
activities on which depend the existence and normal character of the schemata lie 
for ever outside consciousness; they are physiological processes with no direct 
psychical equivalent» (Head 1920, 723). It is right to relate some pathologies of the 
body schema to observed cerebral lesions, but if there is no direct psychical 
equivalent and at the same time impaired experiences are entirely determined by 
physiological substrates, isn’t this theory wavering between reductionism and 
dualism? 
Only few years later, psychiatrist Paul Schilder titled a book Das 
Körperschema, a notion he defined as «[t]he spatial image that anyone has of 
herself. It may be assumed that this scheme includes the individual parts of the body 
and its mutual spatial relation to one another» (Schilder 1923, 2).6 He had 
apparently read Head, not only because he quoted him at the very beginning, but 
also because of the clear influence on the qualities of spatiality and the mutual 
relation of bodily parts that were present in the neurologist’s definition. However, 
as I will examine further in Scheler’s conception, the terms Leib and Körper in 
phenomenology refer to two distinct aspects of the body, the first implying a mere 
physical and mechanical side, while the second indicates the body in its animation 
and ‘being alive’. In his second work on the topic, The Image and Appearance of 
                                                         
6 I owe my interest in this author to Guido Cusinato. 
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the Human Body published in 1935, Schilder recognized his terminological 
inaccuracy and quoted Scheler’s Formalismus to reassess the difference between 
Leib and Körper that the German phenomenologist had introduced in his works 
already in 1912, in Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis. He might also have adopted the 
expression «das Schema unseres Leibes», used in the Formalismus-Buch to 
describe a perceived structure that would remain present even in the absence of any 
sensory activity (GW II, 409). Schilder writes: 
 
We are here in better accord with the philosophers, especially with 
Scheler (…). He uses for this inner body the German word ‘Leib’. 
In his opinion the ‘Leib’ is independent of the sensation of the inner 
organs; it is different from single sensations and different from any 
other object. He emphasizes that our body (Leib) is always given to 
us as a unit with some more or less vague structure (Schilder 1950 
[1935], 283). 
 
Schilder theorizes an interesting perspective of multiple body schemas that are 
continuously built, destroyed and built again in order to find unity: they change 
dynamically with experience, contacts with others and the emotional (or 
“libidinous”) relationship with our body.7 Despite such valuable descriptions of 
ordinary bodily phenomenology, he misreads Scheler’s account. He is imprecise 
when he describes the Leib as “inner body”, or claims that, according to Scheler, 
the body schema arises from inner perception. In the next sections, I am going to 
argue through the analysis of Scheler’s texts that the Leibschema is a unity that is 
certainly independent from sensorial contents, but not confined in a merely internal 
sphere. Moreover, Schilder is criticized by Gallagher (1986) for using the terms 
“body schema” and “body image” as interchangeable, as he asserts openly in the 
first pages of his The Image and Appearance of the Human Body: «The image of 
the human body means the picture of our own body which we form in our mind, 
that is to say the way in which the body appears to ourselves (…) Beyond that, there 
is the immediate experience that there is a unity of the body. (…) We call it a 
schema of our body or bodily schema (…). The body schema is the tri-dimensional 
                                                         
7 In Gallagher’s account, this dimension becomes the emotional aspect of the body image (Gallagher 
2005a), though it should be noticed that the relationship between image and schema is often quite 
intertwined: for instance, we move clumsily when embarrassed or insecure, more fluidly when self-
confident about our body. Gallagher’s distinction appears in this sense too neat. 
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image everybody has about himself. We may call it ‘body-image’» (Schilder 1950 
[1935], 1). He does tend to leave the difference between representation, pre-
reflective and subpersonal dimensions indistinct, but this is probably due to the fact 
that in everyday experience these dimensions influence one another and cannot be 
distinguished completely. 
Merleau-Ponty is the best-known phenomenologist in the investigation on the 
body schema, so I chose to give only a short sketch of his account on the theme, 
that has a conceptual importance but which I consider as already well-known both 
in philosophy and in psychology. Following the path traced by psychologist Piaget 
(but also by Scheler, since he quotes him in Les relations avec autrui chez l’enfant), 
Merleau-Ponty investigates a schéma corporel conceived as an evolving image that 
develops since infancy. Other aspects of the same body schema are viewed through 
categories of Gestaltpsychologie, that is through the concept of “form” configured 
as an undivided perception of one’s own limbs, with the addition of some 
dynamicity. This opens to possible and actual tasks in a so-called spatialité de 
situation and so lets the world become an espace orienté where we move and act. 
Through an efficacious metaphor, Merleau-Ponty conceives the body schema as a 
pre-reflective experience, a transparent background that enables the individual to 
focus on the world and actions rather than on the body itself: it is «the darkness in 
the theatre necessary for the clarity of the performance, the ground of sleep or the 
reserve of vague power against which the gesture and its purpose stand out» 
(Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1976, 117, my translation). 
No doubt, thanks to the different conceptions of the body schema in the 
literature from Bonnier onwards, the notion is rather vague and ambiguous. It has 
been even suggested to substitute or eliminate it, on the grounds of its being too 
equivocal to explain neurological correlates of experience, of gathering too many 
medical/neurological pathologies without due differentiations, or of being too 
static, so unsuitable to define a pre-noetic background that makes us usually move 
without an explicit effort. Haggard and Wolpert (2005), for instance, further puzzle 
the debate since they mistake the neural with the experiential levels and create 
another term, “body scheme”, to define their concept. When analyzing the concept 
of body schema from a neuroscientific perspective, they claim that the brain 
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contains multiple representations of the body aroused firstly by inputs from the skin 
and proprioceptive receptors correlated to a map of the body and its segments. Their 
account appears somewhat unconvincing, since they start with the differentiation 
between body schema and body image, conceived as «two different higher-order 
body representations» (Haggard&Wolpert 2005, 261). Soon after, however, they 
claim that the body schema rarely reaches awareness, and so raise a question about 
the difference between the neural dimension and the sphere of consciousness, that 
means, implicitly or explicitly, something that can reach the threshold of felt 
experience. Their lack of clarification about the possible bridge between the two 
dimensions is baffling, too: the concept of “neural representation” meets with 
problems with its application of an experiential concept to a non-experienced level 
(the neural one). Therefore, when they write that «a common body scheme is used 
to represent both one’s own body, and the bodies of others» (Haggard&Wolpert 
2005, 263), their more neutral term “body scheme”, instead of the long-debated 
“body schema”, is confusing, phenomenologically inconsistent, and does not avoid 
theoretical impasses. 
Among the authors willing to eliminate the term “body schema”, Poeck and 
Orgass (1971) assert that this concept is not inclusive of all the pathologies gathered 
under that name, because they are based on different neuropsychological disorders. 
Yet, on the experiential level, some pathologies present a split between a pre-
reflective dimension (schema) and an explicit one (image), and I will quote some 
empirical cases in the light of Scheler’s account on the topic.  
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone criticizes the terms body schema and body image as 
they, more than focus on movement tend towards a static direction that does not 
clarify how feelings, cognition and experience are rooted in kinetic dynamics. This 
last is a new attempt to redefine the experiential dimension outside the controversial 
body schema debate, since she proposes the definition “corporeal-kinetic-
patterning” (Sheets-Johnstone 2005). Her attention to the kinetic dynamics pertains 
to a correct description of the human bodily experience, but are we sure that the 
body schema does not imply such a conceptual shade? A sharp differentiation 
between schema and image is not possible, since the schema itself goes through 
changes when we learn new movements by explicit attention, but it is not clear how 
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any sort of pre-reflective experiential unity could emerge from simple kinetic 
patterns. Viktor von Weizsäcker’s develops an enlightening conception of the 
difference between intuitions in physics and in biology in Der Gestaltkreis (von 
Weizsäcker [1940] 1997): in biology, the investigation is not only about movement, 
but about a movement accomplished by oneself. The subject and the related 
movement are to be viewed as an encounter between organism and environment 
that can be reduced neither to physiological, anatomical spatiotemporal data, nor to 
the mere motoric dynamism. This means that, if we were to consider only 
movement to define the fundamental qualities of the lived body, as Sheets-
Johnstone does, her corporeal-kinetic-patterns could be easily applied to particles 
or to inanimate Körper, too. There is no automatic connection between the kinetic 
and the affective dimensions, if a subject of experience is absent. 
Sheets-Johnstone presents also an argument versus the subpersonal reduction 
in the concept of body schema. Her calling into question an objectification of the 
body in a neural map is phenomenologically incorrect for an investigation that, as I 
have written, should follow an experiential and phenomenological path instead of 
being limited to mere cerebral mechanisms. Yet, this does not imply that body 
schema and body image are not adequate concepts to describe the roots of 
experience, especially when referred to pathological cases. She concludes her 
chapter by quoting Stanghellini’s theory of bodily-objectification (it can be defined 
as Körper-ization) and the lack of sense of animation and of ‘being alive’ in 
schizophrenia (Stanghellini 2006). She claims that this concerns a more basic 
dimension than the one pointed out in the two target concepts. It is well-known that 
schizophrenia involves not only direct disturbances in the bodily dimension, but 
also the problematic self-individuation and encounter with otherness that start with 
the embodied presence (this is not highlighted in Sheets-Johnstone’s text). I find it 
quite evident that in such a psychiatric disorder the immediate and transparent 
ground that allows normal movements is impaired, often in association with the 
abnormal perception of one’s own body (depersonalization, de-localization of 
organs, changes in the experienced body size, and so on).8 That is, the body-
schematic aspect is impaired. I am going to show that in Die Stellung Scheler points 
                                                         
8 On this topic, see for instance Mishara (2005), Gallese&Ferri (2013), Graham et al. (2014). 
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to the body schema as the primary individuation for all animals, and, similarly to 
Stanghellini’s (2003) reference to an objectified body, in Die Idole he describes the 
pathological way of moving in the world as one not centered on a fluid, pre-
reflective body schema. There is no need, therefore, to substitute the above-
investigated terms, since: 1) the body schema is not static and describes a pre-
reflective normally experienced dimension, including movement; 2) Sheets-
Johnstone’s “corporeal-kinetic-patterning” does not refer to an experiential subject; 
3) evidence in the psychiatric literature proves that in schizophrenia the impairment 
concerns movement, but, more than that, also the objectification and a lack of 
individuation that are both grounded on the body schema. 
Although Shaun Gallagher is the first philosopher to state a sharp difference 
between the body schema and the body image (cf. below), a similar conception by 
Donald Purdy (1968) is mostly ignored.9 In a chapter entitled The Bodily Self and 
Psychological Space, he posits a transitive and an intransitive awareness of one’s 
own body, that is, a “bipolar” awareness where one’s bodily self can either be the 
object of perception (transitive aspect) or the ground for the perception of external 
objects. Intransitive awareness corresponds to the pre-reflective body schema – the 
background darkness necessary for the clarity of the show, to use the metaphor by 
Merleau-Ponty, which is always present in our interaction with the world, without 
the need for our body to be thematized. Interestingly, in fact, the intransitive use is 
necessarily present in the transitive one but not vice versa (Purdy 1968, 95). 
Transitive awareness, on the other hand, has similarities with the body image since 
the bodily self becomes «phenomenally, an “objective” thing, like a chair or a 
football or any other environmental object» (Purdy 1968, 97). Yet, such an 
awareness can be bipolar since the two sides are necessarily connected in one’s 
owned body – in the unity of what Purdy calls ‘haptic interperception’ (Purdy 1968, 
95). In other words, his analysis proves to envisage Gallagher’s distinction but with 
the insightful recognition of a close interconnection between the two characters, 
which is mostly missing in Gallagher’s theory.  
 
                                                         
9 I am thankful to Alessandro Salice for this bibliographic suggestion. 
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In this section I have exposed the diverse conceptions of the topic, and 
explored the reasons why ambiguities still exist, due to a kind of interchangeable 
use of the two terms ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’, as well as to the insufficient 
differentiation among reflective, pre-reflective and sub-personal levels. It is true 
that in our ordinary experience the two aspects influence each other without always 
reaching the level of explicit attention. A body schema progressively developed 
through explicit attention and learning is essential for a child to achieve the way to 
move fluidly, and it is also habitually experienced that this schematic dimension 
changes in daily life when we get self-confident in a certain sport or kind of dance, 
for instance.  
However, if Shaun Gallagher tends to overlook this connection, he points out 
a possible phenomenological difference. He examines the impasses in the previous 
and contemporary literature (Gallagher 1986), showing the necessity of a univocal 
characterization. Is it possible – he wonders – that the body schema is at the same 
time a conscious representation, a thematized image, a physiological image and a 
neural map? Some years later, he defines the body image as an «intentional content 
of consciousness that consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes and beliefs 
pertaining to one’s own body» (Gallagher 2001, 149), and as «a complex set of 
intentional states and dispositions – perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes – in which 
the intentional object is one’s own body» (Gallagher 2005a, 25). At a different and 
more basic level, the body schema is a dynamic system of sensory-motor functions, 
which implies «a set of tacit performances – preconscious, subpersonal processes 
that play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement» (Gallagher 2005a, 
26, emphasis added). This leads to close-to-automatic movements and allows one’s 
attention to focus on other tasks or objects. A very simple example is that, when 
one is deeply intent on reading a novel and wants to grasp a glass of wine on the 
table, she does not reflect on her arm stretching, the fingers extending, the single 
muscles contracting or decontracting. Yet, does Gallagher not fall back into the 
same ambiguous trap when he describes the schema as a neural (supersonal, not 
experienced) and preconscious (again, not experienced) dimension?  
I share Zahavi’s criticism to the impasses in Gallagher’s distinction, which 
includes a pre-reflective body awareness and a nonconscious physiological process. 
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A twofold imprecision can be detected here: the first is that he uses what Zahavi 
judges too narrow a concept of consciousness and also includes subpersonal, neural 
processes in what he calls an «active, operative performance of the body» 
(Gallagher 1986, 548-49; see also Gallagher 2005). The second is that, like most of 
the scholars who explored the problem, Gallagher did not even mention Scheler’s 
works, although Scheler was, as far as I know, the first phenomenologist to 
introduce the term body schema, and his account can provide a rich theory that 
involves lived dimension, perception of the world and of other living beings, and 
individuation. Gallagher quotes convincing evidence to prove the historic 
vagueness of the two terms, as it has been ascertained through the overview in the 
present chapter, but a sketch of such distinction between a pre-reflective system of 
sensorimotor capacities (schema) and an intentional attitude toward the body as an 
object (image) was already foreseen in Scheler’s The Idols of Self-Knowledge and 
in the Formalismus-Buch, and in some parts of The Human Place in the Cosmos 
and Knowledge and Work. 
 
1.2 Scheler: the false certainty of self-knowledge, the Leib and 
ordinary/pathological embodied experiences 
1.2.1 An early sketch of the body schema 
Some weeks before his death, in 1928, Scheler gave a conference paper to the 
publishing house Otto Reichl in Darmstadt – a text that was later published with the 
title Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (GW IX). There, Scheler referred to an 
elementary level of individuation as opposed to the spiritual level that can be 
achieved by the person, namely a dimension linked to the “retroaction” or 
“feedback” (Rückmeldung) that corresponds to the animal Leibschema and its 
contents. An animal is individuated 1) thanks to the separation of its sensorial 
system from the motoric one and 2) thanks to the continuous retroaction of its body 
schemata and of its sensible contents.10  
This point is particularly important since it highlights that the lived body, 
thanks to a Schelerian view, connects the fields of the structure of drives in the lived 
                                                         
10 Cf. Cusinato, 2000, 12-17. 
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body and expressivity. In other words, the self and the forms of sympathy. What is 
then the role of the first-personal quality of experience in the animal body schema? 
There are some statements in Die Stellung that seem at a first glance to contrast 
even with a minimal individuation, and that sketch the animal as immersed in the 
flow of the world, without the capacity to attribute an “I” pronoun to itself. Even 
the animal’s impulsive structure (Triebstruktur), which orients it in the world 
through the perception of values in objects (e.g. the attraction for a certain kind of 
plant as a source of food), is perceived as a dynamical flux coming from the things 
in the environment (GW IX, 35). The Leib is the first core that directs value-ception 
and our posture in the world, as well as the perception of the expressive field (cf. 
Cusinato 2008, 130-142). 
One of the characteristics that distinguish mankind from animals, in fact, is 
self-consciousness (Selbstbewußtsein, GW IX, 34). Scheler’s words, especially the 
ones related to the basic embodied phenomenon of the impulsive structure, are 
certainly not so clear. Does he mean that there is no minimal, bodily individuation, 
and that an animal is just an unconscious part of its environment? Then, how to 
explain, for instance, that an animal can feel a threat to its own individual existence? 
I argue that Scheler’s differentiation between consciousness (Bewußtsein), that 
pertains to all animals, and Selbstbewußtsein (which I translate as explicit self-
consciousness), that pertains only to mankind, is still underpinned by a bodily self-
awareness. In some following lines, indications can be read of an ontic center that 
builds itself its spatial-temporal unity and individuality (GW IX, 35). 
According to Scheler, the animal exists on a self-referential level of life, and 
is not able to differentiate itself from the milieu and to retroact on a second stage, 
where the effect can retro-act to its own cause or, in other words, create a “world” 
that exceeds the environment. It is the stage which allows a human being to achieve 
the “re-flexio” or explicit self-consciousness that individuates a personal center 
(GW IX, 34 ff; cf. Cusinato 2008, 86-89). Nevertheless, the animal differentiates 
itself from the plant, which is the first example mentioned by Scheler of an 
animated, living being. In addition, the animal has sensations and consciousness, 
that is, it can undergo a centralization of the retroaction of its variable organic states. 
It is individuated, though on a first level, thanks to the body schema. Differently 
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from the human beings, however, the animal cannot have objects. It is not able to 
objectify its Leib and its movement, both in the visual and in the conceptual sense. 
This implies that it can neither turn the perception of its body into a body image nor 
explicitly think of itself as an “I”.11 I skip here the discussion that refers to the 
personal sphere, in order to refute the notion that only the highest level constitutes 
the human being as such, as a dualistic interpretation of Scheler would claim. 
Scheler provides indeed fruitful hints by showing how to understand the embodied 
dimension that is an intrinsic element to explain normal, everyday interactions and 
our relationship with the world and others. When this level is impaired, pathological 
conditions arise. 
The above-mentioned contemporary debates draw attention to this text, part 
of Max Scheler’s late production, that approaches the problem of the body and the 
body schema in an explicit way, but the roots of his theory should be traced back to 
more than ten years before. Although research studies on the Leib focus mainly on 
Husserl to discuss the origins of the concept, Scheler introduced the same term at 
the very beginning of the phenomenological movement, in 1912 in Die Idole der 
Selbsterkenntnis.12 The harsh criticism to the Cartesian dualism in Die Stellung can 
be foreseen there in the basic claim that «Leben und Leib» (life and lived body) 
constitute «an ultimate elementary fundamental class of phenomena» (GW III, 
231). The alleged reliability of internal perception in comparison with the external 
one is nothing more than an illusion, based on the fact that, while external 
perception concerns an object, the internal is directed to the echo of that object in 
the subject. It does not necessarily regard my-self or the ownership of, for instance, 
                                                         
11 When he discusses the immersion of the animal in its environment that makes it perceive its 
impulsive structure as dependent on it, Scheler makes the example of a primitive man. He is so 
immersed in the flux of the tribe (what Scheler calls later Einsfühlung, in GW VII) that he uses the 
impersonal form (“this thing is a taboo”) instead of the first-person pronoun (“I loathe this thing”); 
cf. GW IX, 35. I claim that this is a further sign of Scheler’s use of Selbstbewußtsein as an explicit, 
reflective, or even linguistic self-consciousness, different from a more basic embodied self-
awareness. 




an emotion, as it happens in emotional contagion, when an emotion is experienced 
by subjects in whom it was not authentically originated.  
Moreover, external and internal perceptions do not touch the psychical sphere, 
but concern the “I” only through an “internal sense”: sensorial data, including the 
ones coming from this internal sense, depend on the lived body. As a consequence, 
internal perception can be directed to the body too. Scheler states that the Leib 
should be clearly distinguished from any Körper: the (owned) Leib is a matter of 
fact, an immediate evidence that recalls the transparency of the aforementioned 
body schema, since it is given immediately to one’s internal and external 
perception, without any need of attribution or doubt about it being the same. Here 
is the excerpt from the German version:  
 
Wie irrig ist, äußere und innere Wahrnehmung auf den Leib relativ zu 
setzen, das zeigt am besten die unumstößliche Tatsache, daß der «Leib» 
– ein Tatbestand, den man doch vom «Körper» scharf scheiden möge – 
uns sowohl in inneren wie äußerer Wahrnehmung gegeben und 
unmittelbar, nicht durch Zuordnung, uns als «derselbe» gegeben ist. 
(GW III, 242-3). 
 
Scheler goes on stating: «it is “the same hand” that I see here and in which I 
find this ache» (GW III, 243). The hand might be a misleading example, because 
of its “touched-touching” character, which recurs in Husserl’s Cartesian 
Meditations and in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the hand touching another hand in 
the discussion on the body schema, in Phenomenology of Perception. I maintain 
that here Scheler is trying to focus on something different: in currently-debated 
terms, it can be called sense of ownership.13 Here, the body schema is already 
associated with the body image, and this seems to emerge during development, as 
I am going to prove thanks to the example of the newborn in the Formalismus. The 
                                                         
13 This concept crosses the definition of body schema as part of the features that allow normal 
movements and the relation to our corporeality. I envisage the sense of ownership as the first-person 
character of experience, that is, a pre-reflective certainty «that I am the one who is undergoing an 
experience» (Gallagher 2000, 15). It is usually taken for granted, as the following example by 
Wittgenstein shows: «there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To 
ask “are you sure that it’s you who have pains?” would be nonsensical» (Wittgenstein [1969] 1998, 
67). About the possible roots of a sense of bodily ownership, cf. Tsakiris (2011). 
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main point is that this example concerning the body schema means to demonstrate 
an immediate coincidence of pain, ownership and unity which is experienced as a 
primary fact without any more or less explicit associations.  
While preserving the immediately present qualities of ‘being owned’ and 
‘being the same in its unity’, as they might be called, the body in external and 
internal perception is given respectively as Körperleib (for instance, when we watch 
our arm) and Leibseele (which also includes sensations from single organs) (GW 
III, 243). More than a dualistic distinction between the soul and the body, this theory 
of internal and external perception can so be seen in accordance with the notions of 
body image and body schema. It is the immediate evidence of ownership and 
sameness as part of the schema’s tacit performance and of perception as 
individuating a body image (generally, the body as an intentional object). This also 
explains why later on, in the Formalismus, Scheler insists on the body schema as 
the residuum of the lived body without organic sensations (GW II, p. 409), being 
itself an intrinsic unity and the basis of any organic sensation. 
In a way that anticipates Gallagher’s conception of the body schema and the 
body image, he recognizes that the Leib is usually a pre-reflective background 
which does not need to be explicitly represented, thematized or perceived, as 
mentioned before. In everyday life, the schematic structure of our body is translated 
into quasi-automatic movements that need neither noetic attention nor visual 
contact, and one’s attention can be focused on other tasks that do not imply the body 
as an object. Scheler writes that 
 
normal volition aims for the realization of the desired content 
directly, e.g. to leave the room. Any volition of the means necessary 
for this purpose, like “step up to the door”, “press the handle”, the 
execution of the movements necessary to the aim, and so on, is 
subordinated to that finalistic content and occurs through quasi-
automatic impulses, insofar as no specific hindrance comes up (GW 
III, 258). 
 
Here he claims that, phenomenologically, we experience a prevailing focus on 
the external world rather than on our body, that is why we can move fluidly when 
we are involved in a task. This is also proved by the fact that, when we bump into 
an obstacle, we tend to impute the cause of our collision first to it and only after, in 
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case the obstruction cannot be eliminated, attention turns towards our bodily 
dimension.14 Any theory based on the necessary representations of one’s own 
movements and on the memory of the same movements performed previously, 
refers to an anomalous condition. As we read in Die Idole, does a child who is 
learning to write a letter need to represent her movement, in order to copy the 
teacher’s way of writing it? Usually, the child gets to know the “sensations of 
movement” only through the realization of the very intentions of movement: in 
other words, the kid does not need to observe her bodily sensations to perform that 
new task.  
According to Scheler, only a supervening break of the natural link between 
the intentions of movement and what is seen, leads to the necessity of this kind of 
representation. Otherwise, it implies a split between the willingness of an action 
and the fulfillment of it, an anomalous condition of the body schema, which is the 
ground of any bodily action. This condition can range from an ordinary lack of 
coordination between intention and action in wrong movements, to more or less 
permanent diseased conditions. 
 
 
1.2.2 Reading Scheler’s Die Idole  through pathologies affecting 
the body schema: the cases of sensory neuropathy and schizophrenia  
Scheler’s intuitions prove valid also regarding pathological cases, as he 
himself asserts. Impairments that concern the body schema can be much 
differentiated, and some hints about their variety are present in the paragraph on the 
literature overview. Scheler’s mention of the normal and pathological volition 
described through the bodily dimension and of the body schema as a principle of 
individuation (in GW IX), seems to explain the modifications on the bodily level in 
cases of neuropathy and schizophrenia and to support the sketch of a distinction 
between “schema” and “image” in his works.  
                                                         
14 For instance, in case of eyestrain, it has been noted that the reader tends to attribute the cause of 
it to the difficulty of the text or to the diminished light, before realizing that the condition is actually 
due to eye fatigue. Cf. Buytendijk (1974, 62) (quoted in Gallagher&Zahavi 2012, 134). 
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There is an emblematic example of body-schema disturbance in Pride and a 
Daily Marathon. Jonathan Cole writes about Ian, a patient affected by sensory 
neuropathy which impairs his feelings of movement, touch and bodily position 
and causes abnormal consequences to his proprioception and to the bodily structure 
that we usually take for granted when moving inside the world: 
 
He could feel nothing from the neck. Nor could he feel his 
mouth and tongue. Not only couldn’t he feel anything to touch, 
he had no idea of where the various bits of his body were without 
looking at them. He could not feel anything with his arms, his legs 
or his body. That was frightening enough, but he had no 
awareness of their position either. It wasn’t that the muscular 
power was affected, since he could make an arm move. But he 
had no ability to control the speed or direction of the movement. 
Any movement happened in a totally unexpected way. It was 
pointless to try (Cole 1995, 12). 
 
After Ian got affected by sensory neuropathy, he could not feel his body from 
the neck downward, the nerve damage making him lose proprioception except for 
the sensations of temperature and pain. If we read this case through Scheler’s 
reasoning, Ian could surely try to represent his bodily movements, but that would 
not help him move: the core explanation concerns the body schema. As my analysis 
has highlighted, one of the main features attributed to the body schema is 
localization. Because of this serious flaw, i.e. without the implicit knowledge of the 
presence and position of his own body and without reflective or visual attention, 
how could Ian regain his motion capacity? During the years, by a lot of 
rehabilitation and a great cognitive effort, he has learnt again to walk, to use tools, 
even to handle eggs, but only after the preliminary step to watch his limbs move or 
to make an imaginative effort in the case of gestures. Gallagher and Cole (1995, 
377) claim that the part of Ian’s body schema that has not been impaired by sensory 
neuropathy includes inputs from vestibular, equilibrial sources, and visual 
proprioception, a subpersonal processing of visual information while moving in the 
environment. Therefore, if Scheler’s description of standard volition is right, Ian’s 
fluidity of normal movements is now damaged, since it requires great effort of 
explicit attention, thinking, and the visual control of his limbs.  
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In order to explain Ian’s ability to move despite his condition, Gallagher and 
Cole claim that the patient has integrated some motor programs into the body 
image, which does not have the quasi-automaticity of the body schema but has 
allowed him to move with a less conscious effort after years of practice. Scheler’s 
description confirms that the split between an overdeveloped body image and the 
body schema when accomplishing even simple purposes is far from the direct 
realization of the desired content. The «set of judgments or internal motor 
commands» (Gallagher&Cole 1995, 382) is not comparable to the ordinary 
experience of enactive engagement with the world. However, a memory of the 
bodily localization might still persist since Ian’s phenomenological reports prove 
that he does not need to control every single muscle cognitively, 
(Gallagher&Cole 1995, 382), as he claims to focus on the fact of moving one single 
arm or finger.  
Schizophrenia is another pathological and more evidential condition that 
illustrates the importance of the Leibschema in the Schelerian sense. To be sure, a 
PhD thesis in philosophy cannot provide the definitive answer to such a complex 
pathology, since it is still a widely debated illness with a variegated number of 
forms, symptoms and triggers (DSM V, 99ff). The heterogeneity of the 
manifestations does not allow a univocal explanation. Yet, what I propose is to read 
some of its associated features in the light of Scheler’s phenomenology, and in 
particular, inappropriate affective responses, depersonalization, derealization, and 
social cognition deficits (DSM V, 101). This may help clarify the bodily (this 
section) and the relational (section 2.6) sides of the problem, at least in some of its 
core experiential dimensions. 
 
Starting from the first version titled Über Selbsttäuschungen, Die Idole der 
Selbsterkenntnis mirrors Scheler’s interest in psychiatry, further shown by the fact 
that he attended medicine courses in Munich and Berlin. When in Munich, he also 
got into contact with the group of psychiatrists led by Wilhelm Specht and 
published in Specht’s journal «Zeitschrift für Pathopsychologie».15 
                                                         
15 Cf. Cusinato (2017). 
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In Die Idole, he describes some psychoses as having a common anomaly in 
the way of experiencing one’s own body compared to the normal purpose-oriented 
actions quoted above. In pathological cases, the world is given as their 
representation, and usually attention is focused on bodily states (the body as an 
object, so the body image). A sort of transposition of idealism, that Scheler criticizes 
for falsely claiming that the world is our representation (GW III, 256) can be 
individuated in his description of the ordinary condition lived by those psychiatric 
patients, who lose the immediate relation to the world in its autonomous existence 
and focus on themselves. In the anomalous attempt to press a handle, their attention 
will not be addressed to the task, but to the movement itself, that is to separate 
contents which are the object of an explicit tendency (GW III, 260). The patients 
feel the desired purpose as something to be achieved, detached from the activity, 
and the normal non-mediated sequence of attention world-us is inverted. In normal 
perception, expectations guide us, grounded on pre-reflective “familiarity” and 
“certainty” that things will appear in such and such a way, that an action will have 
such and such consequences, and so on. Thanks to this basic attitude, we do not 
usually think about and judge what is going to happen, or in what way we should 
move to accomplish the purpose. For instance, if I find myself in front of a car 
speeding along the wrong side of the street, I expect it to be real, to have 
adumbrations that I would see from another point of view, and also fear it is 
dangerously going to run me over, so I immediately realize the car does something 
against my habits and shared social norms. In my attempt to avoid it, I will not 
reflect on my bodily limbs to verify if they work in their usual way, nor will I ponder 
whether the world I am interacting with is illusory or real. 
The meaning is implicit in what we perceive. When we start to jump back, the 
consequences of our movement are pre-reflectively foreseen, and we do not need 
to thematize them. When those pre-reflective certainties about our personal 
corporeal sphere and the world are lost in ordinary situations – so when there is no 
interaction with external objects that would make us resort to a reconfiguration of 
action, or reaction at least – there is a lack of what phenomenology calls the natural 
attitude, that is said to be defective or missing in schizophrenia (Blankenburg 
2001). From a slightly different perspective, this appears as a focus on the body 
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image which is abnormal in comparison with the normal use of the quasi-automatic 
body schema. In the next chapter I will argue that the dimension of Leiblichkeit and 
the one of expressivity are lost in schizophrenia and so impair an otherwise taken-
for-granted component of perception. Some psychiatrists name this abnormal 
condition hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection.  
In a significant article that analyses ipseity disturbances in schizophrenia, Sass 
and Parnas (2003) associate the tacit awareness of the kinesthetic and 
proprioceptive aspects of the body schema with the pre-reflective self-awareness, 
that is usually present in intentional acts. Since this bodily dimension is the medium 
for the sense of ownership, any disturbance in it also affects the relation to the self 
and the world. As Sass writes, «a fragmented and alienated sense of the lived body 
tends to disrupt the world-directedness as well as the normal fluidity and flow of 
affective experience and expression, leading to a sense of disharmony, artificiality 
and distance, both in the patient’s own experience of emotion and in the expression 
visible to others» (Sass 2004, 135-6). Moreover, contrary to Scheler’s description 
of the normal purpose-centered and quasi-automatic action, referable to the focus 
on interaction with others too, the body schema in schizophrenia is apparently 
altered and this affects one of the basic qualities of ordinary emotional experience:  
«[w]hen bodily states and processes replace persons and situations as the focus of 
awareness, the affective experiences in question are deprived of an essential 
component of normal, targeted emotional meaning» (Sass 2004, 136). Therefore, 
according to this thought-provoking trend, there are two intertwined aspects that 
characterize one’s relation to her owned body in schizophrenia. One is 
hyperreflexivity, an explicit-consciousness feature that usually pertains to bodily or 
object-observation, and the second is the related diminished self-affection, that 
seems to consist in a diminished sense of Leiblichkeit. In such a condition, the 
experienced vitality of oneself and the sense of agency and cohesion, or unity, of 
the self are severely impaired (Sass and Parnas 2003, 428). Ipseity is connected to 
this basic feature of awareness, and for Sass and Parnas «the experiential sense of 
being a vital and self-coinciding subject of experience or first-person perspective 




Despite this high-level attention to normally quasi-automatic aspects, the 
schizophrenia spectrum, as defined in the last DSM, often results in a loss of control 
over one’s own bodily or reflective aspects. This happens in cases of delusions of 
control, thought insertion or thought withdrawal (DSM-V 2013, 87), and also in 
abnormal motor behavior in any form of goal-directed action, ranging from 
unpredictable agitation to diminished reaction to the environment in catatonia 
(DSM V 2013, 88). The DSM V mentions a somatic type of disturbance that 
involves bodily sensations or functions, too and enumerates, among the associated 
features of schizophrenia, bodily- and self-related disturbances like 
depersonalization, derealization, somatic concerns, abnormalities in sensory 
processing, and anosognosia. 
Sass and Parnas criticize the absence of the notion of self in the diagnostic 
criteria (in the DSM IV, but this omission is not resolved in DSM V either), while 
it is an essential aspect that is lost in schizophrenia. In ordinary experience, «the 
sense of self and the sense of immersion in the world are inseparable; we are self-
aware through our practical absorption in the world of objects» (Sass and Parnas 
2003, 430). This very tacit, embodied self-individuation – so it might be called in 
Schelerian terms, referring to the body-schema individuation – is contained in every 
experience, but is missing in hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. The 
schizophrenic patient needs to thematize her own first-person perspective and is 
then split between Leib and Körper. As in Ian’s case, the body schema has become 
an object of explicit attention, abnormally under the sphere of the body image.16 In 
sensory neuropathy as well as in some cases of psychiatric disorders like 
schizophrenia, the fluidity and easiness that characterize actions and expressions 
thanks to the body schema are absent and can originate delusions of influence (Sass 
and Parnas 2013, p. 432).17 
                                                         
16 Sass and Parnas acknowledge that, in schizophrenic hyperreflexivity, the body schema slides into 
the body image. I agree with their definition of the schema as «an implicit or background awareness 
of one’s own body as a sensorimotor subject» (Sass and Parnas 2013, 430), yet it is not clear how 
an unconscious (i.e. out of consciousness, therefore out of experience) representation could be 
objectified or objectifiable (ibidem). 
17 Cutting (2009) investigated psychopathologies from a Schelerian perspective. He speaks of 
hyperreflectivity in different terms using Scheler’s metaphysical concepts of Geist and Drang and 
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While Ian Waterman’s condition does not allow him to move in a fluid way 
physically, schizophrenic patients cannot do it in the world of social contacts and 
self-relation. They perceive themselves and others as discrete elements with a faded 
sense of alive-ness or, as I am going to elaborate further in the next chapter, as a 
lack of expressivity. In the excessive self-reflection and impairment of the 
Leiblichkeit, the world and others are not directly significant for them. In my 
opinion, hyperreflexivity and the impaired affective dimension can also be read as 
a problem in relationality, both with oneself and with others. A lived body is never 
isolated from the environment, and though the body schema constitutes 
individuation at a primary level, it should not be understood in a solipsistic way as 
an unalterable core. It is not just a transcendental first-person perspective, but the 
structure for bodily sensations and perception, a quality which can be modified 
through interaction and sharing. 
 Such a clarification agrees with an interesting theory by Matthew Ratcliffe 
(2017), who explains schizophrenia in relational terms and related to a “sense of 
distrust”. This is the definition of the schizophrenic loss of the primitive, pre-
reflective reliability, consequently of the expectation that things happen in such and 
such a way. In the cases I have analyzed so far, reliability could mean the trust that, 
for instance, I will reach that spot in the room without any effort and visual attention 
to my limbs (impaired in the case of Ian Waterman) or that I am the author of my 
thoughts (impaired in some cases of schizophrenic delusions with thought insertion, 
cf. Gallagher 2015). 
However, for Ratcliffe the problem at stake, the question of a minimal self, is 
connected to, but not coincident with, the one of the body schema. This last has 
been stated to concern a primary individuation and to contain some innate seeds in 
interaction and imitation, so Ratcliffe’s claim of a socially constituted basic 
                                                         
claiming that this pathological condition is comparable to Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, in 
which one suspends her vital or animal center of experience, that is, the spheres of reality, dynamics, 
of ‘having life’ in general. This might be another way of expressing the phenomenon that Sass and 
Parnas call diminished self-affection. Using a Schelerian framework, Cutting envisages some 
unperceived spheres of value in schizophrenia that imply affective experiences different from the 
ordinary ones. Since I have not explained the concepts of value and value-ception yet, I mean to take 
them into account in the following chapters. 
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dimension of the self has to be defined more in detail. Assuming that an originary 
individuation is connected to the body schema –  and the body schema, as stated by 
Scheler, does not depend on sensory activity but rather originates it – then this 
structure is primary and only modified by the encounter of others. In other words, 
the body schema is modifiable, but it is first of all innate and its primary existence 
does not depend on socially shared contexts. It can change by interactions and 
learning, for instance when we learn a new movement, or when a person raises an 
emotion that makes us move with a different quality, like a cheerful mood that 
modifies our gait. In the paragraphs concerning solitary confinement and infant 
research, I will consider Zahavi’s notion of the minimal self and give my 
interpretation of the primacy of a lived-body individuation, by means of reference 
to Scheler and some empirical evidence. 
Despite its objection to the primacy of a relational self, Ratcliffe’s definition 
takes an interesting course when it analyzes its social aspect. Without using the 
more neutral terms of commonsense (Blankenburg) or natural attitude (Husserl), 
that imply an already given dimension, Ratcliffe indicates the same taken-for-
granted bases of experience and expectations and focuses on affectivity and 
relationality. Is there any connection, in this sense, between Ian’s case and 
schizophrenia? Is relationality involved in both situations? It might be objected that 
in Ian’s case there is no we-dimension involved: his body just does not respond to 
his will. A counter-objection is, instead, that he relies on previous corporeal habits 
but after his illness he distrusts the normal anticipation of movement. It may not be 
a kind of relationality that involves other human beings, but one with his own body, 
that seems to “betray” his normal protentions. Trust is in fact an intentional feeling: 
we trust something or someone. Ratcliffe’s hypothesis is that after traumatic events 
«[a] habitual confidence and sense of continuity is replaced by a pervasive sense of 
unpredictability, uncertainty and threat» (Ratcliffe 2017, 162), and this has a major 
influence in the many cases of schizophrenia where some traumas happened before 
the illness manifested itself.  
Schizophrenia could be conceived as a relational pathology, just as Bin 
Kimura’s view of that same illness as an aida (between-ness) pathology. I draw 
inspiration from the proposal to compare Bin Kimura and Max Scheler for a 
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phenomenological psychopathology by Cusinato (2017, 2018), where he argues 
that understanding schizophrenia as a disturbance in the ‘aida’ also implies that the 
interrelational dimension of expressivity is involved. In other words, according to 
his theory, the layers of the ordo amoris and of emotional sharing are at stake in 
such a pathology.18  
Kimura ([1992] 2013, 58ff) stresses that the “common sense” is an implicit 
background, shared by a community and continuously shaped by practical 
interactions among its members. This can be compared to the “sense of distrust” 
that Ratcliffe describes as the deceived primary expectations that modify a person’s 
way of perceiving in schizophrenia. The most interesting point in Kimura is that he 
explains this pathology by bringing up an impairment in the intra-personal relation, 
too. Why and how is this view connected to a relational body schema in 
schizophrenia and to Scheler’s concepts taken into account so far? 
Kimura ([1992] 2013) points out a not-yet-objectified embodied dimension 
and stresses its importance as a basis of one’s individuation and relation to 
otherness, a relation that is profoundly impaired in schizophrenic patients. Such 
intra-subjective individuation is defective in schizophrenia. This kind of “self-
differentiation”, though Kimura does not use this definition, first occurs on the 
bodily level. He explains that there are two levels of embodied “self” in the 
Japanese language: mizukara, “something that originates from my body” or “from 
my flesh”, quite similar to the notion of sense of ownership, and onozukara, that 
means “from itself” in its anonymity and spontaneity, connected to the 
manifestation of the flux of nature (Kimura [1992] 2013, 3-4). Kimura states that 
such interrelation shows the difference in the concept of self between the European 
languages and Japanese: in Japanese, it implies so strong an interdependence of the 
self and nature that the “self” does not presuppose identity to itself (Kimura [1992] 
2005, 4). It takes place through a negation of itself, that is constantly established by 
the interpersonal encounter and, in general, by the participation to the constant 
movement of nature: the subject is something that has to be continuously regained 
(Kimura [1992] 2005, 37).  
                                                         
18 I will go back to the interpersonal disturbances in schizophrenia in the next chapter. 
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The two concepts of mizukara and onozukara do not correspond completely 
to the distinction between body image and body schema, they refer to an internal 
experiential differentiation inside the body schema alone. Kimura remarks that the 
aida (the between-ness), which is the Japanese term for the background from which 
all relations emerge and individuals can encounter one another, is also intra-
personal, as the double bodily aspect described shows. Individuation occurs through 
the bodily level (Kimura [1992] 2005, 37), and an intra-personal individuation is 
just what is defective in the schizophrenic patient. A person affected by this 
pathology undergoes an impaired relation to her-self, from the body-schematic 
dimension, up to the more complex psychological ones. Only an intra-subjective 
aida is able to relate to another intra-subjective aida; the schizophrenic patient falls 
prey to the solipsism of a non-completely formed individuation, and even her body 
schema, may be split and perceived as something alien from her own “self”.  
So far, I have highlighted that the phenomenology of normal and impaired 
volition supported in Scheler’s Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis goes towards a 
definition of the concept of body schema, as a pre-reflective and quasi-automatic 
element that underlies ordinary experience and without thematizing the body in 
order to reach a goal. It is possible to apply it to two cases in which the body schema 
seems to be impaired in its pre-reflective character. This provokes an abnormal 
reliance either on a visual body image (Ian Waterman and his sensory neuropathy) 
or on a hyper-reflexivity that hinders the fluidity of movements coming from the 
taken-for-granted bases of experience (schizophrenia). As Scheler asserted, (GW 
IX) the body is the ground for self-individuation or, in other words, for an intra-
personal aida. Only some years later in the Formalismus, however, Scheler referred 
to the term “body schema” explicitly, and the mentioned cases of its impairment 
can help to understand his theory. 
 
1.3 «Das Schema unseres Leibes». The body schema in Scheler’s 
Formalismus 
I have highlighted some pathological conditions of the body schema lacking 
the spontaneous, quasi-automatic aspect which constitutes the bodily “knowledge” 
for our actions, since an abnormal body image substitutes the schema. It has been 
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observed that Scheler’s thesis on goal-directed movements is confirmed by the case 
of Ian who, after suffering from sensory neuropathy, is compelled to use a cognitive, 
explicit attitude that requires judgments, visual control or imagination to perform 
even the most habitual tasks like walking. Likewise, schizophrenia can be regarded 
as an ailment of the body schema in which the taken-for-granted roots of movement, 
that should remain implicit, are the object of hyper-reflection, and cause a reduced 
sense of “self”, a diminished self-affection. From a different but complementary 
point of view, this might be read in a relational way as an impaired intra-personal 
bond to oneself, owing to a detachment from one’s own embodied roots. 
Such evidence finds further theoretical grounds in what Scheler writes about 
the body schema in his Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 
some years later. As he asserts, «we can express almost as a law that the biological 
automatisms (psychical too) become disturbed and ill, when they are performed 
deliberately (bewußt) and are accompanied by explicit choice and attention (von 
bewußter Wahl und Aufmerksamkeit)» (GW II, 290, my translation).19 This explains 
why both in schizophrenia and in Ian’s sensory neuropathy movements become less 
fluid, due to the fact that they undergo an explicit attentional effort. 
As mentioned in the introductory part of the chapter, it is in this book that the 
phrase «das Schema unseres Leibes» (GW II, 409) can be traced for the first time 
in Scheler’s production. It has been shown that in Die Idole, Scheler points out the 
notion that the body schema is the background for our movements and perceptions, 
and it works by remaining non-thematized but also the “same” in its unity. This last 
aspect is highlighted in the Formalismus, where he gives a clearer but negative 
definition: it is a structure that exists for us in its unity and would continue to exist 
even in the absence of any sensation. The experienced unity of our lived body 
cannot arise from sensorial data like vision or touch plus some “organic sensations” 
                                                         
19 I chose to translate the terms bewußt and bewußter as “deliberate”, in order to avoid the 
ambiguities between ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ mentioned before. It has been remarked that 
Scheler speaks of “quasi-automatic” processes, that can therefore be inscribed in the pre-reflective 
dimension, and not in the non-aware one. If it is true that Scheler does not ascribe all knowledge to 
consciousness, it should also be remarked that the non-conscious and ecstatic knowledge is usually 
referred to plants, therefore to the living forms that do not go through the primary individuation of 
the Leib. Cf. GW IX.  
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(Organempfindungen, GW II, p. 398). The body schema, in other words, is there 
prior to any kind of observation of the body image. Otherwise, we would never be 
sure about the ownership of our “image”. Therefore, it is wrong to state that one 
simply adds proprioception to the owned body taken as a Körper.  
What Scheler says in Wesen und Formen der Sympathie about the encounter 
of embodied others, can also be applied to what I am going to explain: «Only to a 
surgeon or to a natural scientist can anything be given in this fashion, i.e. to 
somebody who abstracts artificially from the primarily-given phenomena of 
expression» (GW VII, 21). Our body is not given to us as ‘physical 
body+animation’, so to speak: we do not add proprioception to an owned body 
observed as a Körper. The unity of our lived-body (Leibeinheit) is «an immediate, 
clear content, given as materially identical and as a whole».20 This can clarify why 
the body schema is an originary structure that configures the possibilities of any 
sensation and primary individuation. 
In the Formalismus, Scheler expands the example of the hand that he had 
sketched in Die Idole (GW III, 243, cf. p. 34), and he does so in order to discuss the 
body schema (GW II, 399). If the body schema is what originates sensations and 
perceptions, our body is given to us both as a unity of internal consciousness (i.e. 
as the existence and the conditions of one’s own body) and as an external perception 
of one’s own Leibkörper, that we can perform for instance through vision or touch. 
The unity of the body schema implies that the Leib is not simply a physical body 
with animation added: according to Scheler, such a thesis would mean to «throw 
away the lived body by performing a volt (den Leib wegzuvoltigieren)» (GW II, 
398). Here the hand is also connected to the “touched-touching” problem. It is a 
neat differentiation between the schema and the image: he states that there is a 
process of learning which concerns the link between the “internal consciousness” 
of one’s lived body (i.e. the existence and shape of it, the movement of fingers, 
pain, and so on) and the (same) thing that one is touching with the other hand and 
to which her optic image corresponds. One learns the connection between her pre-
noetic aspects of proprioception, pertaining to the body schema, and the optic image 
                                                         




of her hand, pertaining instead to the body image. This can be verified in the rubber-
hand illusion, where the sense of touch deceives the felt “ownership” by confusing 
the person about the optic image of her hand.21 
As Scheler specifies, the aspects that need to be learnt are two: 1) 
coordination: the coordination of homologous parts of the two sides of the lived 
body, in which, however, the immediate identity (unmittelbare Identität) of the 
whole body is already given both internally and externally; and 2) the relation 
between the phenomena (Erscheinungen) and their “real” (dinglich) meaning, or 
between them and their function as symbols (e.g. of the thing “hand”. GW II, 399). 
A partially positive definition is given below: we do not need to learn the body’s 
unity, and the lived body comes to evidence as independent of any organic 
sensation, as «a completely unitary [einheitlicher] phenomenal state of affairs, and 
as the subject of «feeling» in such and such condition (So- und 
Anders«befindens»)» (GW II, 399). It not clear whether Scheler refers to the body 
schema or to the lived body, or and if there is a radical difference between the two 
terms. Howbeit, even if there is some imprecision in dividing the Leib from the 
Leibschema, I state that Scheler suggests the way to find some transcendental 
characteristics of the body schema, that are its unity and its first-person perspective 
on the general condition of the body. 
Although the terminology of these elements remains vague in Scheler’s 
Formalismus there are two remarkable examples from which the theoretical 
distinction between body schema and body image can be detected.  
1) I call the first mental experiment the “jail example” (GW II, 400). If 
someone spends her whole life in a prison, her hand is potentially seen 
with the same regularity as the jail walls. But – Scheler states – this would 
in no case imply that she could mistake the walls for her own lived body. 
She would already have the experience of a distinction between her own 
Leib (since the body schema is an originary matter of fact that represents 
the first individuation for every animal) and any Körper, that applies to 
her own “physical” body (whose perception, as stated, is the result of an 
                                                         




abstraction from the lived dimension) and to the room partitions. I am 
going to discuss this claim by comparing it with Lisa Guenther’s 
phenomenology of solitary confinement that shows a more complex set of 
problems. In such an extreme case, the body schema seems to reveal a 
necessary relational dimension, since the Leiblichkeit and its first-personal 
experience become impaired by the lack of interpersonal contacts. 
Scheler’s example may be considered naïf when contraposed to the 
evidence coming from actual experience in intensive confinement, but 
according to my research his general theory is not called into doubt. In 
fact, solitary confinement and its effects on one’s embodied dimension 
indicate that the body schema is not a static structure, but a dynamical one, 
built and modified through social interchange.  
2) The mental experiment mentioned here indicates an already incorporated 
recognition of one’s own body image: the observed hand is perceived as 
pertaining to one’s own body. Body image and body schema overlap in 
normal experience. Nevertheless, only the body schema is innate, although 
subject to variations: for Scheler, the link between the schema and the 
image seems to be learnt through experience. This phenomenological 
claim can be detected in his “example of the newborn” (GW II, 402). 
When a child sees her feet for the first time, she tries to hit them, as if they 
did not pertain to her own body, and she needs to learn that the optic image 
(das optische Bild) of the bed sheets is distinguished from the optic image 
of her body. How could she accomplish this task, if she did not have a 
body-schematic dimension beforehand? How would she presuppose the 
differentiation between her own bodily sphere and the environment, if she 
did not have any proprioceptive experience? What she learns to distinguish 
is which optic image pertains to one sphere or to the other. That is, the 
body image – its visual aspect, at least – is not yet formed and connected 
to the schema. After studying Scheler’s claim I discuss some insights 
present in the lively debate on intersubjectivity in infant research. I mean 
to highlight that Scheler provides important keys to go into such a topic, 
and that the body schema is confirmed as an originary phenomenon, a 
51 
 
unitary structure that constitutes the ground for any sensation, the bodily 
optic image included. 
 
1.3.1 The “jail example”. Solitary confinement,  the body 
schema, and minimal self 
Scheler’s example of a person living in a jail all her life presupposes an 
originary and tacit distinction between the living and non-living dimensions (Leib 
and Körper, cf. above), especially between the owned lived body (the hand) and the 
physical, non-owned and non-living one (the wall). It has been stated that the body 
schema corresponds to a pre-reflective structure that forms the background which 
allows attention to be focused on a purpose and not on the body itself. The body 
schema is “innate”. According to Scheler, it constitutes the first individuation for 
any animal, when, metaphorically, it raises its head from the ecstatic condition of 
total immersion in the flow of the environment, and creates an Umwelt. Besides, 
the Leibschema is animated and is primarily attracted to animation and what is alive, 
as Scheler states in Wesen und Formen.22 The Leiblichkeit of our body is part of the 
common sense through which we interact with the world, and there is no need to 
reflect on it if pathological conditions do not arise. Hence the logical consequence 
would be that we could be put in any kind of prison and still we would never mistake 
the walls for a limb of our body, despite the fact that our visual contact with both 
happens with the same frequency. If the body schema is the primary structure of 
animal individuation, and we are born with it, then no confinement should affect 
                                                         
22 I have quoted a passage on expressivity that sees the Körper as an abstraction from the expressive 
Leib, given artificially to the scientist or the surgeon (GW VII, 21). The body in this sense is 
perceived as similar to a machine, and observed or scrutinized as an engine or robot might be. On 
the contrary, the Leib-perspective has an intrinsic dimension of spontaneous movement, and at the 
same time our experience shows that, when something moves, we tend to focus on the movement 
rather than on motionless objects. Animation is a primary phenomenon, as an essential component 
of the Leib, and therefore it is not an addition to a physical, körperlich level; this is why Scheler 
argues that «(…) “learning” is an increasing de-animation (Ent-seelung) – not an animation 
(Beseelung)» (GW VII, 233). A child does not have to learn that the world is animated, only that not 
all in the environment is alive. I will deal with this subject in the second chapter (section 2.2).  
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our perceptual system up to the point of making it lose that bodily distinction with 
others and the environment.  
This is consistent with Scheler’s theory of the body schema. It seems the 
normal prosecution of what remains silent in experience and is not affected by any 
extreme situation and is the challenge of the mental experiment of the jail. Is this 
really confirmed by experience, though? Let us analyze what happens if a person is 
physically confined in a room with no possibility to encounter other human beings 
or if her sensory stimulation is reduced to the minimum level, because of total 
darkness and silence. What occurs when her experience brings to the elimination of 
all sensory stimuli, animation and relational dimension? Lisa Guenther investigated 
solitary confinement from a phenomenological perspective, and her book Solitary 
Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives demonstrates that the body schema is 
no more an experiential certainty when someone is in such extreme conditions.23  
Guenther’s claim is that the implicit experiential features of being the owner 
of pain or not, of distinguishing between perception and hallucination, and even 
one’s fundamental sense of being alive or dead becomes blurred in the absence of 
relational dimensions or in being treated as Körper in overcrowded spaces. That is 
what prisoners experience in intensive confinement. The body schema proves to be 
much more dependent on otherness than suggested by the jail example. First of all, 
while Scheler states that the walls are undoubtedly an inanimate body that is 
perceived in a different way from our Leib, it seems that the affective relation that 
we entertain with such boundaries changes many fundamental aspects of our 
embodiment: 
 
[i]n nonincarcerated space, walls tend to function as supports for 
embodied personhood: constitutive limits that carve places out of 
pure depth, both stabilizing and continuing the dynamics of 
embodied, relational consciousness. Walls offer protection and 
privacy; they mediate between inner and outer space. But what is 
the experience of walls like in a supermax unit, where the walls 
have no windows and the door does not open from the inside—
where the white or gray ganzfeld gives the eyes almost nothing to 
“gear” into, just a smooth homogeneous surface or, in older 
                                                         
23 I am grateful to Thomas Szanto for suggesting me this reading. 
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prisons, a pockmarked surface carved with traces of other 
inmates, now absent? (Guenther 2013, 182). 
 
If I imagine I share the condition of such a prisoner and experience complete 
solitude, I live an unusual experiential condition. I suffer from full sensorial 
deprivation (a ganzfeld), so I am surrounded by a monotonous, neutral, 
homogeneous surface with almost no objects to focus on. My possibilities of 
movement are reduced to few meters, affordances are almost absent, visual, vocal 
and tactile contacts with other human beings, usually guards, are limited to violent 
or emotionally neutral interactions, in which there cannot be any affective 
reciprocity. I also experience an almost contradictory absence of privacy, since the 
walls that should isolate and hide me from external sight are always open to the 
gaze of watchmen through video cameras. The prisoner is denied anonymity 
(Guenther 2013, 179), the possibility to withdraw from sensorial deprivation and to 
hide from external gazes, that walls or other physical barriers allow elsewhere. The 
walls are not just an inanimate thing from which the body schema of a prisoner 
differentiates itself, but provide an affective protection for the normal preservation 
of such body schema. 
A person in solitary confinement has to cope with a de-animated reality, too. 
I have remarked that Scheler significantly stresses the original leiblich animation 
that pertains to our mode of perception. In the Sympathie-Buch, he states that for a 
child «(…) “learning” is an increasing de-animation (Ent-seelung) – not an 
animation (Beseelung)» (GW VII, 233). If this is true, then solitary confinement, 
with its sensory deprivation and its lack of interrelational possibilities, makes the 
prisoner experience a constant de-animated condition that contrasts with the human 
originary perceptual constitution. So, what happens if a subject is put in an 
exclusively körperlich dimension, except for her own body?  
Apparently, she experiences something opposite to what Scheler describes as 
normal learning: a delusional Ent-seelung. Guenther describes the phases of a 
prisoner that tries to regain a relational dimension from the death-like condition she 
is living. First, the silence becomes unbearable, and it makes her fantasize about 
other prisoners. Then she starts imagining hidden figures who glare at her and even 
end by occupying her perceptual space in the cell and her sleep. The walls 
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themselves acquire a different affective quality, since they become dreadful and the 
ceiling an animated but impersonal gaze that does not leave her any time to 
experience some solitude (Guenther 2013, 21). If Scheler supports the stability of 
an implicit difference between the prisoner’s Leib and the surrounding Körper, it is 
clear that in solitary confinement hallucinations falsify at least the basic fact that 
the walls should be perceived as mere physical structures, in contrast with the 
owned body. A person who is left without any human contact seems to undergo a 
delusional process in order to regain this fundamental experience.24  
Not only the prisoner starts to imagine fictional other beings, but she is also a 
victim of other serious symptoms of mental impairment called by Grassian the 
“SHU syndrome” (SHU being the acronym for Security Housing Unit). Such a 
pathological condition is a specific mental illness caused by the sensorial and 
interrelational deprivations in solitary confinement. According to Grassian, it 
presents a set of seven symptoms that are not detectable in any other psychiatric 
illness. They are: a) hyperresponsivity to ordinary external stimuli; b) perceptual 
distortions, illusions and hallucinations, like the animation-related one described 
above; c) panic attacks; d) difficulties of thinking, concentration, and memory, 
sometimes even acute psychotic and confusional states; e) intrusive obsessional 
thoughts, and emergence of primitive aggressive fantasies against the prison guards; 
f) overt paranoid and persecutory fears; g) difficulties with the control of violent 
impulses towards oneself and others (Grassian 2006, 335-336).25  
What does such syndrome reveal about the relationality of our body schema? 
It proves that a solipsistic condition like the one in solitary confinement modifies 
the normal grounds of our sensations and perceptions.  Intrinsically, the  Leib  seems 
to need to deal with affordances and Scheler speaks of an impulsive structure 
(Triebstruktur) active in selecting stimuli from the environment according to a 
                                                         
24 When Guenther discusses Dicken’s description of prisoners in solitary confinement, she highlights 
that neither the contact with non-human animals nor some coloured painting of the walls are enough 
to preserve a person’s condition of mental sanity. (Guenther 2013, 22).  
25 Guenther (2013, 153) shares Sharon Shalev’s view that interprets compulsive self-harm as a way 
of feeling something rather than nothing, and ultimately as a way of establishing one’s own existence 
when there is no shared recognition of it.  
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value-ception (e.g. objects are perceived as useful or dangerous).26 Since the body 
schema and this impulsive structure are both characterized by Scheler as leiblich 
pre-configurations of experience (cf. e.g. GW II, GW VIII, GW IX), one may infer 
that in the absence of existing intentional objects, the prisoner’s perception has to 
focus on delusional situations. An almost complete de-animation of the surrounding 
world is such a deeply abnormal condition, that hallucinations might be an implicit 
strategy to “feed” the impulsive structure.  
The absence of regular bodily contacts with other human beings has, 
according to the experiences in solitary confinement, a peculiar effect on one’s self-
individuation as well. Even the embodied sense of “mineness” of some prisoners 
analysed by Guenther – simply the first-person perspective of any experience – 
seems to be eroded. The very individuation of the subjects who feel pain is blurred. 
They are not able to distinguish whether they are being harmed or harming 
themselves, or they recognize to be the experiential subject of an action only a 
posteriori. To exemplify this body-schematic impairment, Guenther quotes a 
description by Jack Henry Abbott, who spent twenty-three days in a blackout cell: 
«I heard someone screaming far away and it was me. I fell against the wall, and as 
if it were a catapult, was hurled across the cell to the opposite wall. Back and forth 
I reeled, from the door to the walls, screaming. Insane» (Abbott 1991, 27, quoted 
in Guenther 2013, 183). One could individuate in such reports a dualistic spilt into 
Körper and animation, almost a case of Cartesian cogito. As a matter of fact, 
perception becomes delusional, and to identify the certainty of one’s own existence, 
one has to infer it after the experience itself. Here, a systematic de-animation of 
one’s own Leib underlines the loss of the Schelerian vital-values dimension, and 
consequently the lack of the “owned” dimension of experience. 
To sum up, some of the most important radical changes that occur in 
experience in solitary confinement are, according to Guenther: 1) the prisoner is 
denied anonymity, because her body is always exposed to the gaze of others; 2) the 
emergence of hallucinations, like a delusional animation in the absence of any 
social and environmental stimuli; 3) the de-animation of one’s own lived body, that 
                                                         
26 Cf. also Cusinato (2008, 135-137). I will resume the Schelerian concept of impulsive structure in 
the next chapter. 
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is converted into a Körper, when the sense of “mineness” of certain experiences 
becomes blurred. 
Scheler’s example of the jail may undergo heavy objections, if one analyses 
some substantial modifications of the Leibschema in solitary confinement. The 
general description of the body schema provided by him is valid if one deals with 
normal experiences and the development from birth to childhood, as I will attempt 
to show in the next section. However, the weak point in this mental experiment lies 
in not highlighting possible unpredicted changes in the basic structure of our 
perception when all human contacts are denied. The essential (or not) aspect of 
relationality for the body schema may be an interesting topic for the contemporary 
debate on the minimal self. Some of Scheler’s claims must be examined now. It has 
been stated that, for Scheler, a prisoner could never mistake her hand for the room 
walls, even if she had the same protracted visual contact with both.  His certainty is 
due to the tacit distinction between the “physical” bodies and the “lived” ones. 
Moreover, in some pages following the example he asserts something significant 
concerning the first-personal quality of experience: 
 
Just as all the mental experiences are only lived “together” through an 
“I”, in which they are bound in a specific way that constitutes a unity, 
analogously all the organic sensations are necessarily given “together” 
in a lived body. (…) The state of affairs of the lived body makes it also 
the underlying, situated form in which all the organic sensations come 
into connection; thanks to it, they are the organic sensations of this lived 
body and not of any other one. (GW II, 401). 
 
The individuation that any lived body brings to a living being, therefore, gives 
experience a basic, intrinsically subjective character, that seems impaired in the 
quoted reports of solitary confinement. The prisoner locked inside Scheler’s prison 
does not mistake the walls for her own hand, yet she may not feel her hand moving, 
or any corporeal sensations as pertaining to her lived body, as it happens in the 
report of Abbott who screams and realizes only afterwards he was the acting 
subject.  
Guenther points out that a person’s «subjectivity is not merely a point but a 
hinge, a self-relation that cannot be sustained in absolute solitude but only in 
relation to others» (Guenther 2013, xiii). Such impairment of the sense of 
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“mineness” poses a radical question about the kind of subjectivity under scrutiny. 
If such a basic aspect of perception weakens or disappears in the absence of human 
contacts, does the body schema ultimately rely on a “minimal self”, or rather on a 
socially constituted one? In the second hypothesis, how could it arise from an 
undifferentiated and non-individuated phase? The bodily individuation which 
pertains to any animal being seems indeed to be nullified in the condition of extreme 
solitude and absence of perceptual stimuli. In order to find the response to this two-
faceted question, a more in-depth analysis of the concept of minimal self is required. 
By the term “minimal self” Dan Zahavi defines «the first-personal character 
of phenomenal consciousness» (Zahavi 2017, 195). It refers to a pre-reflective form 
of self-awareness (Zahavi 1999, 138) that constitutes any experience.27 No matter 
how implicit, pre-noetic and “self-forgetful” the subject is while walking towards 
the room door, having nausea, or when focusing on the bouquet of a complex wine. 
Even when our mind is intent on objects and situations, the reflexive (not reflective) 
character is inseparable from what we are feeling, seeing, smelling, thinking about. 
According to Zahavi, it is not possible to have an experience without an experiential 
subject and this is not just a “self-quale”, to be added, for instance, to the smell of 
ripe apples and pineapple in a Chardonnay. He argues that «all experiences 
regardless of their object and regardless of their act-type (or attitudinal character) 
are necessarily subjective in the sense that they feel like something for someone» 
(Zahavi, forthcoming). For this reason, he has recently called his perspective 
“experiential minimalism” (Zahavi, forthcoming), to claim that a non-subjective 
experience is – simply – no experience.  
The examination of the SHU syndrome makes me doubt whether the sense of 
being mine of an experience can persist in the absence of relationality.  In the last 
quoted text, Zahavi does not go thoroughly into the relation between the 
psychopathological loss of the first-personal character of experience and the role of 
others in it, when he mentions cases of schizophrenia and depersonalization. The 
instability of the first-person perspective, that he endorses from Parnas and Sass’s 
account, is defined by him as an impairment of the usual and familiar obviousness 
                                                         




of the “for-me-ness”, which is usually neither addressed to as an object nor doubted 
in normal experience. Such an exception to the first-personal quality, makes it 
prima facie unclear whether this can be explained by envisaging a more minimal 
level of selfhood that is preserved even in the absence of such “for-me-ness”, or by 
considering the self as relationally-dependent on its most basic ground. This is quite 
controversial when we study the case of solitary confinement in which the 
psychopathological condition emerges in non-ill subjects, apparently because of the 
lack of interpersonal contacts. 
 The recent developments in the debate on the minimal self highlight this 
tricky side of the problem as they involve two opposite claims, the primacy of a 
minimal self or of a socially constituted one. Scholars like Cusinato (2018, in press), 
Ratcliffe (2017), Ciaunica&Fotoupoulou (2017), Ciaunica (2017), Kyselo (2016) 
contrast the Zahavian notion of the minimal self (1999, 2014, 2017) as too weak on 
its relational side. The debate recalls an early-phenomenological rift: on the one 
hand, there is a certain way of interpreting Heidegger’s and Scheler’s concepts of 
Miteinandersein (Heidegger 1923; GW II) and undifferenzierte Strom (GW VII); 
on the other hand, the notion of a minimal, experiential self, akin to Husserl’s 
primordial sphere of the ego (Husserl 1973).  The role of relationality is no doubt 
of crucial importance.  Yet its striking consequences for perception and the “sense 
of mineness”, make me infer that the distinction between sense of ownership and 
sense of agency could still help, and would not clash with the experiential 
minimalism that Zahavi supports, or the primary individuation of the body schema. 
In the light of those two concepts, the “sense of mineness” (or for-me-ness) can be 
interpreted as composed of two parts, at least in pathological experiences. Gallagher 
defines the sense of ownership as the simple experiential level of being «the one 
who is undergoing an experience», while the sense of agency is «the sense that I 
am the one who is causing or generating an action» (Gallagher 2000, 15). 
Ultimately, the loss of a first-person perspective would be an impairment of the 
second concept, not of the first one. When the prisoner claims to hear someone 
screaming and realises only afterwards that it was he who did it, the scream is in 
any case first-personally experienced (it is me who hears the sound: sense of 
ownership) but not perceived as “mine” (it is not me who originated the sound: lack 
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of sense of agency). Therefore, a prima facie objection to Zahavi’s minimal self 
tends to disregard a “more minimal” distinction, that arises in pathologies or in the 
total absence of interpersonal contacts.  
To sum up, the investigation on solitary confinement led to a problematization 
of the relational dimension of selfhood, since the lack of sociality is directly linked 
to an impairment of some features of the body-schematic individuation and of the 
sense of agency. It has been proved that a minimal form of self is not destroyed. 
This dimension is not sufficient for a person to live experiences in the ordinary way: 
when the sense of agency is not given together with the sense of ownership in “my” 
actions, when the minimal self is detached from the relational one and my body 
schema does not encounter other lived bodies, then the roots of perception, of the 
shared world, and even of the self are seriously impaired. Though Scheler could be 
naïf or wrong about self-perception in jail, this does not invalidate what he claims 
to be a primary individuation through the body schema. A different reading can be 
that a depersonalised perception of one’s own hand could actually correspond to a 
detachment of the body schema from the body image. 
My analysis so far has not entailed that the minimal self and the body schema 
are equivalent: however, the concepts of sense of agency and sense of ownership 
clarify in what sense it is still true that thanks to the body schema «they are the 
organic sensations of this lived body and not of any other one» (GW II, 401). That 
is to say, in what sense my sensations remain “mine” – as in the contemporary 
phenomenological concept of sense of ownership – even in cases of 
depersonalisation. To claim that I hear someone screaming and I realize only 
afterwards that the agent is me, implies that I still need my body schema to have 
such an experience and that the experience is happening to me. My purpose is to 
prove that the primary individuation supported by Scheler is a convincing objection 
to those who interpret him in the light of a panpsychistic reading of his theory of 
the undifferentiated flux. If the minimal self is to be compared to the “conscious”, 
first-personal character of experience, then all animals possess it, whether they are 
reflectively self-conscious or not, as Scheler argues in Die Stellung. This concept 
can be best highlighted by his example of the new-born and I mean to verify this 




1.3.2 Not recognizing one’s own feet – Scheler’s example of the 
newborn, body schema and infant research 
Shortly after the jail example, Scheler provides further breeding ground to 
discuss the concepts of body schema and body image by a small paragraph on a 
newborn. As mentioned, this example claims that a newborn is surprised when she 
sees her feet for the first time, and at the beginning she seems not to associate the 
optic image of them with what has been called a “sense of mineness”, or to have 
the proper visual distinction between her feet and the bed sheets. But it is 
experientially sure that there is something primary on which such differentiation is 
rooted: «the difference between the spheres “lived body” and “external world” is 
presupposed since longtime; she “learns” to distinguish not these spheres 
themselves, but rather which visual things (Sehdinge) pertain to the one or to the 
other» (GW II, 402). After the investigation on the minimal self and the sense of 
ownership, the first-person perspective is not dismissed from such an account: it is 
not as if the infant lacked any bodily individuation before acquiring a stable 
perceptual image of her body. On the contrary, «the interconnection 
(Zusammenhang) of “I” and “lived body” is actually an essential interconnection 
(Wesenszusammenhang) for all finite consciousness – so not an inductive-empirical 
or associative connection». Scheler’s argument here is not distant from Zahavi’s 
minimal self, and it perfectly applies to the infant who knows pre-reflectively that 
her body is experienced in a different way from the external world. At the same 
time, in this example the distinction between body schema and body image 
(Gallagher would say in its perceptual aspect) shows that a basic individuation – a 
unique first-person perspective and a pre-noetic “knowledge” of one’s own lived 
body – is already present at birth, while an image still has to be learnt and formed. 
According to this interpretation, a neonate comes to the world self-
individuated, though an objection might be found in a specific sentence from the 
Sympathie-Buch. The child is immersed in a unipathic flux, so that she raises her 
mental head from this undifferenzierte Strom only slowly (GW VII, 241). Is this 
argument not in contrast with the bodily self-individuation then? The answer has to 
be negative, since it has been shown that the Leib involves a form of consciousness 
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already. In an interesting paragraph dedicated to Scheler, Merleau-Ponty criticizes 
him in the Sorbonne Lectures for reducing the problem of consciousness to a sort 
of pan-psychism, in which «there is no individuation of consciousness» (Merleau-
Ponty 1988, 44). Since the reasoning focuses on the uncertainty of one’s own 
consciousness for oneself and on the concept of expressivity, Merleau-Ponty most 
likely misunderstood some passages from Die Idole on the illusions of self-
knowledge. He seems to have confused explicit consciousness with a more minimal 
individuation, and some other claims from the Sympathie-Buch on other-perception 
and unipathy, not last the one that sees the infant as immersed in the influences of 
his acquaintances and of tradition. However, to suggest that the child «finds herself 
as a being who also, at times, has feelings, ideas and tendencies of his own» (GW 
VII, 241) does not imply that she has no minimal, pre-reflective consciousness, but 
that her psychic self is not yet completely developed and individuated. In other 
words, an explicit self-consciousness and a critical detachment from her social 
environment will emerge only with time.  
A more recent criticism that could also refer to Scheler’s theory is Talia 
Welsh’s (2006) about the claim of neonatal imitation in the experiments by 
Meltzoff and Moore. In their works, they made several attempts to verify the 
possibility that infants can imitate certain facial gestures, like tongue protrusion and 
mouth opening, from their first hours after birth to their third week 
(Meltzoff&Moore 1977, 1983, 1990). Their results demonstrate the presence of a 
body schema at birth, since a newborn could not otherwise be able to generate the 
same expression without having seen her own face beforehand: a pre-reflective 
localization of their facial muscles seems the most plausible hypothesis. Welsh 
maintains that to interpret Meltzoff and Moore’s results as effective imitation is still 
questionable, and even if it was proved, this would not be a necessary index of a 
primitive sense of self- or other- awareness.28 Yet, does she refer to the same basic 
self-awareness as the one discussed so far in bodily individuation? Her definition 
takes a different path: to be “self-aware” means for her 
 
                                                         
28 A well-argued defense of neonatal imitation and its importance for social cognition can be read in 
Vincini, Jhang, Buder, and Gallagher (2017). 
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[s]ome ability to recognize my own subjective experience as my 
subjective experience would lay the foundation for distinguishing self-
awareness from awareness. (…) I don’t think my cats understand that 
my feeding or not feeding them is based on my own internal decision-
making process». (Welsh 2006, 222) 
 
Her concept relies more on self-reflection, as she argues when denying it to animals: 
«[w]e have no reason to believe that cats have the kind of second-order reflection 
that would be constitutive of self-awareness – some kind of ability to reflect upon 
his desire for the bird as his» (Welsh 2006, 222). This capacity is linked to the 
theory of mind, that is, to a reasoning on others’ mental states. Plus, Welsh criticizes 
Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996) for their claim that infants’ behavior suggests both 
a body schema and a body image; but, as it can be deduced from the example of the 
newborn, Scheler denies any completely formed body image at birth.  
Does this kind of explicit self-awareness invalidate a body-schematic 
individuation? I state that Welsh underestimates the role of embodied 
consciousness, not only in the light of a Schelerian reading, but also because infant 
research demonstrates such corporeal differentiation between oneself and 
otherness. Rochat (2003) pinpoints five levels of self-awareness, that develop 
chronologically from birth to the age of 4-5. Level 1 corresponds to a self-world 
differentiation; level 2 involves a situated self, i.e. a sense of how the body is located 
in relation to others and to the environment; level 3 shows the emergence of a proper 
“me” in the second year, that means an explicit, representational self-awareness 
able to connect one’s body image in the mirror with the body experienced from 
within; level 4 and 5 involve a self lasting over time and an evaluative and cognitive 
self-awareness. Remarkably, Rochat is sure that a newborn does not come to the 
world with a level 0 of self-awareness, in a complete, confusional immersion in the 
environment (this would be an erroneous interpretation of Scheler’s 
undifferentiated flux, as well). On the contrary, he supports that neonates’ level 1 
of self-awareness already makes them non-cognitively distinguish between 
themselves and the world, between self- and non-self touch and stimulations of 
which they are the agents and the external ones (Rochat 2003, 722). In other words, 
there is an originary – though implicit – I-thou differentiation or, in Schelerian 
terms, a primary individuation. 
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In a similar way, Fogel (2011) attributes the infant an embodied self-
awareness (ESA), which is composed by 1) interoception or the capacity to 
experience feelings as coming from one’s own body (comparable to Scheler’s vital 
values, e.g. a general feeling of wellbeing) and the related emotions; 2) body 
schema, that involves sense of ownership, localization, pre-reflective boundaries 
that distinguish the owned body from the world. Yet, the infant is not a creature that 
lacks so much self-individuation that she is a neutral and impersonal part of the 
stream of life, and that in her attachment to the caregiver does not have first-
personal feelings until she acquires reflective and symbolic knowledge. 
 
The bodily individuation described, however, may risk being misinterpreted 
as a bodily, monadic solipsism. In the next chapter, I am going to prove that a one-
sided interpretation is misleading: according to Scheler, the primacy of the lived 
body applies not only to self-awareness, but also to other-perception, and this is 
why the concept of expressivity is a core argument for empathy. As infant research 
also shows, the bodily schema is not detached from an interactive and interrelational 
dimension made of neonatal imitation, affective attunement, co-regulation, and 
vitality affects. In order to motivate the intrinsic connection among the bodily level, 
expression and empathy, I will continue the discussion on infant research in the 
next chapter and highlight how Scheler’s theory of expressivity can be applied to 




2. The lived body as an expressive field: expressivity and perception 
 
2.1 More about infant research – the relational aspect 
A newborn comes to the world with an implicit body schema: she reacts to 
external stimuli, as she already implicitly acknowledges the difference between her 
lived body and the world, and she is able to imitate basic gestures much before 
recognizing herself in the mirror. Does this imply that the child is born completely 
self-sufficient, isolated like a monad, and that the body schema is a transcendental 
structure that does not undergo any changes during development and interaction? 
Although individuation has been shown to be a primary phenomenon, it is just one 
side of the problem, since interaction modifies the infant’s lived body and its 
capabilities greatly. Moreover, the newborn shows an innate tendency towards the 
interrelational dimension and, as some experiments in developmental psychology 
show, expressivity and expressivity-grasping.   
When a cub is born – for instance, a dolphin or a foal – it is usually already 
autonomous in its movements: it can walk or swim immediately after birth, that is, 
it has a sufficiently developed body schema. In contrast, a human neonate is born 
with an insufficient development of the cortical region, and that allows her a great 
learning plasticity, also dependent, however, on external stimuli (Cusinato, 2017b). 
Her body schema still lacks the capacity to walk, the coordinate movements to 
obtain food, and so on. In other words, she would not survive without other people’s 
care, and she could not have a proper cognitive, bodily and emotional development 
without interaction. This exclusively human condition has been called neoteny, 
after Bolk’s coined term in Das Problem der Menschwerdung, and it can be read 
both as an intrinsic flaw and as an intrinsic “world-openness”, in Schelerian terms.29 
So, what would happen if the child and the caregiver only communicated 
through explicit reasoning, and the body was only a clue to be cognitively 
interpreted? Caregivers could only guess what the child’s needs are, without 
directly understanding whether her crying means an unpleasant condition like 
                                                         
29 On the advantages of culture and social life for infant development thanks to the neotenic 
condition cf. Cusinato (2015). 
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stomach-ache, a request for food, help or something else. An infant would not learn 
to understand people’s intentions, emotions and thoughts prior to 4-6 years of age 
(Wimmer&Perner 1983), when a theory of mind is said to arise: therefore, she could 
not return one’s smile before that age, or engage in joint-attentional situations. She 
would not even be affected by any lack of affective regulation between herself and 
her caregiver; this, however, is proved to be untrue by the cognitive and emotional 
impairments in children that receive hostile or poor expressive responses from their 
post-natal depressed mothers (Murray, Cooper, Fearon 2014). Besides, it would not 
explain why newborns respond to tongue protrusion few hours after birth: even if 
we accept Welsh’s criticism that this phenomenon is not a proper imitation but just 
a way of exploring the world (Welsh 2006, 228), couldn’t it be an attempt to 
establish interaction? 
According to the theory of neoteny and to infant research, conversely, babies 
are sensitive to emotional regulation in interaction, and that they are attracted to 
expressions, bodily interactions and social learning. In other words, they are 
constitutively social. Trevarthen argues in favour of an innate intersubjectivity; 
even if this term is quite problematic from a Schelerian perspective – since it could 
misleadingly indicate a mere bridge between two already-formed subjects, and not 
a co-formation (Cusinato 2008, 246) – it refers to the innate tendency of infants to 
engage into communicative and cooperative relationships through bodily 
interchanges (Trevarthen 2011, 124). Trevarthen highlights that even before birth 
there are some organs and cerebral structures connected with human 
communicative expressions that grow during the early foetal stage, especially 
neural regions regulating eye movements, facial expressions and vocalizations 
(Trevarthen 1997). Therefore, infants  
 
perform actions that are adapted to motivate, and invest emotions in, an 
imaginative cultural learning (…). Their Intelligence is prepared to 
grow and be educated by sharing the meaning of intentions and feelings 
with other humans by means of many expressive forms of body 





According to him, infants are, in fact, particularly prone to act in emotional-
expressive ways (smiles, frowns, interested focus, etc.) as a “public” display of self-
regulation, and at the same time they show preference for only certain kinds of 
human signals, such as cadences of movements, colours, sounds or forms that 
correspond to people, and so on. This is said to be a way of provoking in caregivers 
reactions, such as synchronized negotiations of an arbitrary action, that is, neonates 
can start or engage in interactive, even teasing plays with adults. Such elements 
show a clear sensitivity to adapt to the behaviour of others and to the 
affective/rhythmic quality of an interactive experience, which is a sign of 
communicative intents. 
Trevarthen’s innate intersubjectivity is akin to Stern’s concept of “core 
intersubjectivity” (Stern 2005), present from birth and already presupposing a self-
other differentiation. Although intersubjectivity has been argued to be an 
ambiguous word, Stern’s distinction between a state of fusion and an implicit 
knowledge of the separation between the infant and the external sphere – i.e. the 
conditio sine qua non for intersubjectivity – might be compared with the claim of a 
body schema as a primary individuation. Remarkably, Stern ascribes to infants a 
sort of evaluative perception that erases the split between cognitive and affective 
ways of learning, and comes true in the “conforming” and “contrasting” patterns of 
experiences, including the social ones (Stern 1985, 42). That is, a non-neutral 
perception can be seen as the basis for what later becomes an “affect attunement”, 
by which Stern means the affective tonality of mutual interactions between an infant 
and a caregiver, that can be kept or coherently developed in interplay.  
This implies that both the baby and the adult have an implicit (affective) 
understanding of the affective quality that may match the shared context that has 
been established. Therefore, an infant does not primarily understand the single clues 
(e.g. the high speed, the rapid acceleration, the being addressed to me) and then sum 
them up to recognize the affect at stake (aggressiveness, or simply a “rush”). Stern 
uses the phrase “vitality affects”, indicating «those dynamic, kinetic qualities of 
feeling that distinguish animate from inanimate and that correspond to the 
momentary changes in feeling states involved in the organic processes of being 
alive» (Stern 1985, 156). Hence, such qualities do not only apply to basic emotions 
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– the Darwinian categorical affects, like anger, joy, and so on – but they can also 
express a way of feeling, instead of a specific content of feeling, e.g. the 
“explosiveness” of a smile, which is still an affective dimension but is not 
explainable through mere emotion (Stern 1985, 56).30  
Although according to Stern the affect attunement emerges only after the 
second month, it is plausible that an affective competence is present much before. 
For instance, Reddy, Hay, Murray and Trevarthen (1997) argue that a 3-week old 
is usually interpreted to be almost passive in communication, and yet she influences 
the caregiver’s response with her display of moods and attentiveness. Furthermore, 
from that stage she progressively develops the ability to respond adequately to the 
affective dynamics manifested in the rhythm and pitch variation in the other’s voice. 
Even if one does not count the “innate intersubjectivity” as an affective 
interchange, but just as an implicit acknowledgement of the affect and a consequent 
response, further complexity emerges after the first two months. In the so-called 
second-month transition, such marked inclination towards the expressive world of 
others and communication increases thanks to neural and motor development and, 
above all, to the different interplay that infants have with caregivers – also their 
being less hugged improves the chances of face-to-face interactions (Lavelli&Fogel 
2002).31 In this time span, researchers observe that there is a certain quality in 
communication that is bodily-affectively understood and tends to be implicitly 
synchronised: a “co-regulation” starts to arise, i.e. a dyadic relation in which infant 
                                                         
30 In this thesis, I consider “affects” as a general term that includes not only emotions (like joy, 
anger, and so on), but also what Scheler calls “affective qualities” and “affective states”, which can 
be perceived in a non-intentional way and can be non-intentional themselves (e.g. moods, cf. chapter 
3 on affective contagion). Since the debate has widely discussed the distinction between affects and 
emotions, I will not enter into detail. An example might clarify what Stern means. The fact that we 
perceive a rash, abrupt, quick movement towards us as a potential threaten (affective quality) does 
not imply that we grasp an emotion (anger) in the agent, as we would grasp the same dangerousness 
even if the movement was performed by a machine.  
31 According to Reddy, Chisholm, Forrester, Conforti, and Maniatopoulou (2007), the second month 
is also a crucial phase for the interest in the expressive world of the displayed self, since infants start 
to distinguish between contingent and non-contingent displays of the self (the abovementioned body 
image as seen on an external support like videotapes). 
68 
 
and caregiver coordinate their actions and are open to mutual influence, a process 
that originates new information. This affective, dynamic matching is seen for 
instance in postural modifications and vocal and facial gestures, and it shows an 
active engagement in communication by both partners.32 
 
To sum up, how should a Schelerian-based perspective on empathy read such 
findings in infant research? The above-mentioned theories and experiments tell us 
that not only is a neonate born with a body schema, but she also understands others 
through their body schemata. This is evidence of their grounding their implicit 
knowledge on the Leib and not on the Körper, that is, they do not perceive a sum 
of single elements that they would need to interpret inferentially, but rather pay 
attention to the gesture or the affective quality. Movement and some kinds of 
expressions seem to be directly grasped from the very beginning of life (neonatal 
imitation, innate intersubjectivity), and babies appear to be both prone to show 
expressivity and clearly sensitive to the expressive qualities in interaction (co-
regulation, affect attunement). Such results prove to be an impressive empirical 
demonstration of Scheler’s primacy of expressivity and animation. If one conceives 
empathy to be a form of direct grasping of the other’s affective states, emotions, 
and even meaningful actions, based on the lived body, then a careful investigation 
on expressivity and on the kinds of phenomena perceivable in expressions is 
required.  
 
2.2 Scheler and the primacy of Ausdruck. How to understand 
expressivity 
Imagine that all at once you can no more trust the meaning of what you see in 
others’ faces, movements, or actions: a smile becomes a random facial movement 
that can hide both joy and anger, a person’s unexpected approach with a knife might 
be a sign of love or of violence. You do not even perceive that a stranger on the 
street is tacitly asking you for more room on the footpath, the signals of which are 
her quick gait, the reduced distance between you and her, and her brusque manners 
                                                         
32 Fogel (1993). Cf. also Lavelli (2005) as it concerns a qualitative change in dyadic co-regulation 
with the 2nd-month transition. 
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– until she starts using language, yelling at you to let her pass. What would happen 
if you could not be sure how to interpret what you see in her body and behaviour? 
You might remain perfectly calm because you do not perceive the irritation in her 
tone and in her eyebrows’ inclination, or start panicking because you do not know 
how to react. After all, you cannot rely on expressivity, so you cannot be sure that 
she needs more space to walk, and her manners could mean hostility or attraction, 
a cheerful mood or distress. In any case, your interactions with the surrounding 
world and others would become unpredictable, or make the use of language 
necessary: no embodied interaction would be possible anymore. Even if you 
discovered some new rules to interpret emotions and actions, you would have to 
apply them reflectively at the beginning, and then take your time to incorporate 
them into habit.  
Contrary to such a picture, it has been shown that infants tend to react pre-
reflectively to some qualities of movements and facial features, and they imitate 
gestures after just few hours of age (Meltzoff&Moore, 1977, 1983). Therefore, if 
the certainty of expressivity disappeared, we would all of a sudden have to forget 
something that we have taken for granted since birth. We would also fall prey to 
dualism, according to which the res extensa and the res cogitans are irreparably 
split. Only a reasoning or a dialogue would tell us which emotion the other person 
is experiencing, and, to be sure, it could always happen that the other person is 
lying, and we cannot verify it through her behaviour or unusual attitude. In short, a 
trustworthy root for empathy and communication lies in the body, not in its 
körperlich dimension, but rather in its leiblich one, since it is the bearer of some 
directly perceivable emotions and intentions, or, as Scheler would have it, it is a 
field of expression. In order to ground the phenomenon of empathy on immediate 
and embodied encounters, a crucial theoretical step is to take Scheler’s theory of 
the universal grammar of expressivity into account.33 
                                                         
33 An important aspect to which Cusinato (2008, 2015, 2012b, 2017) has rightly drawn attention. In 
his view, it emerges clearly as the necessity to reassess the theory of expressivity for a radical 
interpretation of the theory of intersubjectivity. In fact, although Scheler’s account has been received 
in the literature as the ‘direct perception’ theory, the metaphysical aspect of the unity of life has been 
neglected (Cusinato 2015b). However, this does not imply that expressivity has to be reduced to the 
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The immediate grasping of expressivity is the ground on which everyday 
communication is based: I see the relief in a student’s face after her getting a good 
mark in the exam, the joy in my dog’s behavior when I come back home, even the 
danger when a fire risks to burn me and “invites” me to escape. Affects and 
emotions “paint” our body schema which is exposed to the gaze of others: when I 
see someone walking, the fact of the person’s having bent shoulders, a slow step, 
the eyes and lips slightly bent downward, is immediately an index of her mood, 
without any need of summing together clues or of making either an inference, or a 
simulation with our body. 
The German word Ausdruck (expression) means literally to “push out”. At a 
first glance, this term might suggest that movements and specific facial 
modifications are expressive because they represent – in the external, visible 
dimension – something that happens inside. Does the concept of expressivity entail 
a new dualism, then? Not at all: According to Scheler, the feeling comes to be 
present in the expression directly or, in other words, the proper expression is part 
of the emotion itself. This implies that we do not perceive in a split-driven manner 
– first a physical body and then an emotion – nor do we have to guess and make an 
inference about a person’s hidden, mental state, if she clearly shows it in her facial 
features, movements, tone of voice, and so on. We are indeed able to perceive the 
others’ emotions and intentions, since we grasp their lived body as a field of 
expression (Ausdrucksfeld) of their experience. It is possible to experience the 
feelings shown in expressions, though we cannot access the what-is-likeness related 
to the others’ body, that is, bodily states, organic sensations and sensorial feelings 
(GW VII, 250; GW II, 337). In a dense excerpt from Wesen und Formen der 
Sympathie, the primacy of expressivity and animation over perception is 
highlighted:  
                                                         
unique layer of the organism; rather, expressivity as a creative possibility generates singularity, that 
is, an ‘expressivity overflow’ (eccedenza espressiva) (Cusinato 2015). 
Following the insight of reevaluating Scheler’s expressivity, a partial attempt to clarify the 
connections between empathy and expressivity is in Bruttomesso (2015, 2016). I will extensively 
deal with the definition of empathy in the third chapter. 
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(…) expression is even the very first thing that man grasps in what 
exists outside him, and (…) he grasps any sensorial appearance only 
insofar and inasmuch as unities of psychological expressions (seelische 
Ausdruckseinheiten) can be “represented” in them (…): primarily 
among what is generally given is “expression”, and what we call 
development through “learning” is not a belated addition of psychical 
components to a physical world (Körperwelt) that is already given, 
“inanimate” (toten), and structured in rem, but rather a constant 
disappointment with the fact that only some sensorial appearances turn 
out to be functions of representation of expression – whereas others are 
not. In this sense, “learning” is an increasing de-animation (Ent-
seelung) – not an animation (Beseelung). (GW VII, 233) 
 
Some researches on neonates and pre-linguistic children have proved that they 
are attracted to certain gestures/expressions, and even to some qualities of 
movement, that tend to be kept or avoided in interaction. Scheler supports an even 
more radical claim, that could explain why children are particularly prone to follow 
gazes and movements, to imitate gestures, and to react with discomfort to still faces, 
i.e. faces that display no animation or expression (Murray&Trevarthen 1985). What 
is primarily given to our perceptual field is animation, and particularly the 
expressive dimension of it, so that when an infant interacts with an adult she does 
not add the characters of being “alive”, “animated”, “expressive” to a merely 
physical, machine-like body. Conversely, the consequence of Scheler’s claim is that 
the child even perceives any moving thing, like tree leaves shaken by the wind or a 
robot dog-like toy, as alive and what she needs to learn is that not every moving 
thing auto-generates its motion. During childhood, we slowly come to distinguish 
such aspects, but our perception retains the primacy of expressivity-givenness also 
in adult life. For instance, if an enraged person runs towards us with a knife and a 
threatening grimace, the emotion in her face and the danger of the situation 
immediately affect our attention threshold, while most probably we will never be 
able to remember precisely what she was wearing. The same usually happens when 
we like someone: if a handsome man or a good-looking woman enters the room, 
the salience of their attractiveness will “cover” the körperlich aspects like the skin 
smoothness, the wide shoulders, the perfect teeth which are not the prevailing and 
sufficient elements to explain why their allure is having such an strong effect on us. 
The other person is a field of expression, so what is primarily given in this case is 
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her/his elegance, allure, charm – only the retrospective gaze of a good novelist will 
presumably be able to detect some specific elements of that person that influence 
our salience-detection.  
In a well-known passage from the Sympathie-Buch, Scheler mentions the 
possibility of perceiving directly certain kinds of states that the other is 
experiencing.  
 
Certainly, we hold that we are directly acquainted (direkt zu haben) 
with joy in the laughter, with another’s grief and sorrow in her tears, 
with her shame in her blushing, with her plea in her begging hands, with 
her love in her affectionate gaze, with her rage in her teeth-grinding, 
with her threat in her menacing fist, with the meaning of what she means 
in her wording, and so on. If anybody told me that this is not 
“perception” (“Wahrnehmung”), since it “could not” be so, and it could 
not, as a perception is nothing but “a set of physical sensations” and 
there cannot be any perception of the other’s psychical sphere – and 
certainly any stimulus – I would ask her to avoid such questionable 
theories and to go back to the phenomenological facts. (GW VII, 254) 
  
Although the excerpt is often quoted in the studies on empathy, it has not been 
properly remarked yet that Scheler seems to provide a proto-distinction between 
specific phenomena that are perceivable in expression, namely basic emotions, like 
joy, more complex or culturally-influenced emotions (shame, love – if love can be 
considered as an emotion), gestures, even the ones that are culturally related to 
habits (the begging gesture, the fist), and finally the meaning of a sentence in 
someone’s words.34 The metaphysical level that grounds the possibility of 
expressivity-grasping is in fact the unity of life that allows living beings to 
understand the elementary roots of connection underlying the links between 
experience and expression. There is a universal grammar of expressivity which is 
the core of every language and of all living beings’ gesturality (GW VII, 22). This 
explains why – with Scheler’s examples – a landscape communicates a certain 
feeling, different species of animals are able to interact, even why we can 
understand the despair that we see in a person who is about to drown, and we do 
                                                         
34 Although Cusinato (2017, pp. 246-249) reinterprets Scheler for his theory that the universality of 
expressions is only the starting point after which a process of ‘singularization’ follows, in which 
emotions metabolize an increasing individuated expressivity. 
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this without having experienced or experiencing the same deadly anguish ourselves. 
Moreover, just as science abstracts the physical body from the primary-perceived 
lived one, it also makes a symbolic and functional abstraction of the expressivity of 
nature, which is instead perceived in the phenomenological attitude:  
 
despite such necessary, but artificial behavior of science, the nature that 
is given in the fully phenomenological way remains an enormous 
totality of expressive fields of cosmic-vital acts (ein ungeheures Ganzes 
von Ausdrucksfeldern kosmovitaler Akte), inside which any 
appearances have a connection of meaning (Sinnzusammenhang) that is 
above them and a-mechanistic, understandable through the universal 
mimicry, pantomimic and grammar of expressivity, and that mirrors the 
internal stimuli of the global life (Alleben). (GW VII, 112) 
 
Scheler’s theory of the universal grammar of expressivity can be further seen 
as validating the claim of the universality of certain emotions, since their 
expressions would not be decided randomly or under an overwhelming cultural 
influence. At the same time, they would not just be the product of a supposed social 
instinct nor would they emerge after living in a society. Scheler levels this criticism 
at Charles Darwin and opens here the way to the lively debate on the universality 
or relativism of emotions and their related expressions. In the next sections, I shall 
investigate the state of the art on this issue, and argue in favor of the universality of 
certain expressions, to be kept partially distinct from the notion of universal 
emotions and from the concept of ‘gesture’. 
2.3 The smile on your face  – Are expressions universal? 
Imagine that you receive an email from an old friend with whom you spent 
your childhood holidays. In a moment of nostalgia, she thought about you and 
started recollecting and writing all the episodes that you had lived together: playing 
hide and seek with other kids in the small town where you spent your summer, 
stealing a piece of coconut while the seller on the beach was not watching, talking 
about your first crushes when your parents could not hear… You cannot restrain a 
smile, and a person who enters the room might ask you: “what are you reading, that 
makes you smile like that?”. You suddenly realize that you have indeed that 
expression on your face, and try to hide it, while the embarrassment of being caught 
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smiling alone while recalling old memories might make you blush and look away 
from the other person’s gaze. The emotion has manifested itself on your mouth and 
eyes without your control, and now you are trying to restrain it by paying explicit 
attention to your facial muscles. If one assumes, as Scheler does, that expressivity 
is universally shared and that we can understand each other thanks to it, the other 
person should be able to catch the joy in your face even if she comes from an 
isolated tribe of the rainforest and has never met any other civilization before. That 
is, joy is a simple and universal emotion, and there are some elements in the related 
expression that can be recognized as that specific emotion by anybody.  
2.3.1 Charles Darwin and the analysis of expressivity in 
mankind and animals 
Scheler’s claim has a certain similarity to a Darwinian sentence, which says 
that when dealing with expressivity in human beings «we are particularly liable to 
confound conventional or artificial gestures and expressions with those which are 
innate or universal, and which alone deserve to rank as true expressions» (Darwin 
[1890] 2009, 52). Scheler’s interconnection between Ausdruck and emotion also 
matches well with Darwin’s claim that «[m]ost of our emotions are so closely 
connected with their expression, that they hardly exist if the body remains passive» 
(Darwin [1890] 2009, 249). 
Darwin examines some categories of basic animal emotions and their relation 
to evolution in his book The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, which 
has become a milestone for the theory of the universality of emotions. Darwin 
individuates three main rules connected to expressions in any animal being: 1) the 
principle of serviceable associated habits, 2) the principle of antithesis, and 3) the 
principle of actions due to the constitution of the nervous system. In partial 
contradiction with the universality of emotions, yet, Darwin supports a theory that 
highlights the emergence of expressions, reactions and reflexes also from habits, 
specifically from habits that are established for specific purposes, like satisfying a 
desire or relieving a particularly strong sensation. Such habits might therefore not 
only arise as a successful response to a need but they can be, in a Spencerian sense, 
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inherited and transmitted to the following generations. This would imply the 
existence of non-universal, yet innate expressions, in offspring.  
The result is that an expression remains associated with specific psychological 
or bodily states, and according to Darwin this is the explanation of its manifestation 
even if, at that moment, it does not have the purpose that started the habit. An 
example can be a man that acquires the habit of scratching his head when reflecting 
on a perplexing matter, and he does so as if he was experiencing an uncomfortable 
bodily sensation like the itchiness on his head (Darwin [1890] 2009, 33). After 
creating such a habit, he will pre-reflectively tend to repeat the gesture whenever he 
faces a cognitively-demanding problem, and the gesture is hence expressive of his 
concentration.35 
The second principle supported by Darwin is antithesis, which is connected to 
the first one since, when a state of mind opposite to a habitual expression is induced, 
an animal being tends to perform opposite movements – even without any practical 
use – as in the expressions coming from serviceable habits. Such thesis is certainly 
quite ambiguous as it attributes the emergence of an expression only to a contrary 
impulse, and not to the feeling itself: why would a pet’s display of affection be just 
the reverse of the act of attacking a prey, and not the visible part of the affection it 
feels? However, it is worth noting that Darwin also remarks in this principle the 
universality of some expressions: «[i]n these cases of the dog and cat, there is every 
reason to believe that the gestures both of hostility and affection are innate or 
inherited; for they are almost identically the same in the different races of the 
species, and in all the individuals of the same race, both young and old» (Darwin 
[1890] 2009, 59).36 The criteria for the universality of expressions are clearly stated 
and can be applied to mankind as well,37 though Darwin takes here into account 
                                                         
35 Darwin states that when a habit is established «[t]he most complex and difficult movements can 
in time be performed without the least effort or consciousness» (Darwin [1890] 2009, 30). 
36 The fact of being innate is not in contrast to their being also inherited, according to Darwin ([1890] 
2009, 63).  
37 The notion of race was at the time applied to human beings as well, and can be found quite often 
in Darwin’s study on expressions. 
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only animals, in order not to confuse the innate expressions with the culturally-
acquired ones.  
This chapter of my dissertation defines the reasons for Scheler’s criticism to 
Darwin in Sympathiebuch, mainly against the belief that the principle of antithesis 
in expression originates from intercommunication in a same community. It is not 
hard to detect where the incompatibility between Scheler’s and Darwin’s views lies. 
Scheler’s theory claims that the grammar of expressivity is universal and not 
acquired by living in a community, or, in other words, that expressivity is the 
ground for any community since it allows the intercommunication between 
members and the phenomena of sympathy. The ability to grasp expressivity pertains 
to all living beings, and the creation of any social form presupposes it, instead of 
being its cause (GW VII, 139-141). Scheler’s reasoning proves correct especially if 
applied to the Darwinian claim that certain expressions are universal, for how could 
they be recognized, for instance, by members of different species or of two 
civilizations that had never entered into contact with each other before? If 
expressions were inherited, they could easily differ from one population to another, 
and from one species to another. 
Darwin’s third and last principle is called “the principle of actions due to the 
constitution of the nervous system, independently of the will, and independently to 
a certain extent of habit”, or “principle of the direct action of the nervous system”. 
This principle holds that some movements which are recognized as expressive stem 
from the direct effect of the nervous system, differently from the two previous 
principles, which can, however, be combined with this third one to explain 
expressivity. Darwin’s examples include trembling, which can be elicited by 
several situations, like fever, excessive fatigue, but also fear, great anger and joy; 
the modifications in the rhythm of heartbeats, that can be accelerated by external 
stimuli, (but surely also by fear, rage, and so on); perspiration, respiration and 
circulation that may be strongly affected by pain, fatigue, rage. What this principle 
reveals, if read in the Schelerian anti-dualist perspective, is that the simple physical 
elements do not tell us enough to detect an expression, and that bodily feelings 
(sensations) are not subject to sharing and empathy. If we perceived only isolated 
elements, it would require an elaborated procedure to detect an expression: 
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shivering is for instance an index of fear, but also of illness, rage, so one would 
need to stop and try to discover other clues, such as paleness, frowned eyebrows, 
or wide-open eyes, and then make a deduction – that could only result from previous 
experience, therefore posing a problem to the innate character of such expressions, 
since their meaning would be acquired only culturally.  
Yet, the third principle points to two important aspects. First, expressions are 
not under the complete control of the will, given that the direct effects of the nervous 
system are not easily restrained. Darwin considers weeping as the primary 
expression of suffering both in bodily pain and emotional distress, and it is 
particularly hard to restrain tears and to prevent the associated muscles from slightly 
twitching or trembling (Darwin [1890] 2009, 160). In case of strong affections or 
pain, it is harder to prevent the emotion from being visible, than to suppress it, and 
this datum confirms the primacy of expressivity supported by Scheler.  
Expressivity is not limited to the face, but involves other visible 
manifestations such as sweating, tensing of muscles, breathing faster, etc., which 
tend to be forgotten by many theories on emotions, as it will become clear below, 
where I shall discuss Ekman’s account. Moreover, the vitality affects considered by 
Stern can well explain the universality of certain affective tones in movement that 
are discussed by Darwin as well, like the slow motion and the tendency of any 
animal’s limbs to “fall down” in sadness and to “shake off” pain by repeated 
convulsive movements in agony. Even if one denies the universality of basic 
emotions in facial expressions, it is hardly debatable that we immediately guess or 
sense that a snake is in agony and about to die from its uncoordinated, quick and 
convulsive movements, before recognizing its death when any motion ceases. 
Animation and expressivity are then shown once more to be primary, as Scheler 
argues. 
How about the universality of specific emotions and their recognizability in 
Darwin’s analysis? Emotions visible in expressions are divided by him into seven 
main categories: 1) low spirits, anxiety, grief, dejection, despair; 2) joy, high spirits, 
love, tender feelings, and devotion; 3) reflection, meditation, ill-temper, sulkiness, 
determination; 4) hatred and anger; 5) disdain, contempt, disgust, guilt, pride, 
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helplessness, patience, affirmation and negation; 6) surprise, astonishment, fear, 
horror; 7) self-attention, shame, shyness and modesty, related to blushing.  
Not all of them can be defined as innate emotions, since morality, the others’ 
judgment, the rules and habits of a specific society and the personal development 
and education of the individual may influence their emergence and visibility, as it 
happens for shame, disdain, jealousy. Nevertheless, Darwin searches for the 
universally detectable manifestations of emotions, and the seven categories are 
divided according to the mentioned criteria: for an expression to be universal, it 
must be recognizable in all cultures and from youth to old age. It is easy to 
understand, then, why Darwin includes more complex emotions like shame and 
shyness into his analysis, since they show in all cultures some shared visible 
“symptoms”, like the tendency to avoid the other’s gaze, the will of concealment, 
and blushing. Such emotions arise some years after birth, as Darwin himself 
remarks, but despite their not being present from birth, they seem to be actually 
spread among all populations. 
In the same way, the category of “sadness” is not completely developed in the 
neonatal period, since according to Darwin such emotion includes de facto a 
difference among mere pain, suffering, passionate cry, and grief, the last of which 
cannot be felt by a neonate. Yet such feelings have similar visible characters, such 
as weeping, drooping eyelids, down-turned corners of the mouth, paleness, pants 
and sighs, furrows in the forehead (the so-called grief-muscles). One could also add 
from experience that movements become slower for the loss of energy, shoulders 
stoop down, the pace slackens, and so on.38  Universally recognizable expressions 
and styles of movement seem to appear in the category of “joy”.as well. Here 
Darwin highlights more the animation than the facial features, for joy gives the 
body a special source of energy which may lead to a series of purposeless 
movements, like dancing, clapping hands, and above all laughter, which can shake 
the body when particularly strong amusement is present: these arise spontaneously 
and are not learnt through imitation, as even a blind person exhibits them (Darwin 
                                                         
38 On the variation of gait styles under the influence of some emotions, cf. the analysis by Roberta 




[1890] 2009, 207). Moreover, joy or cheerfulness affect the posture in the body 
making it more erect and the head upright, while the eyes acquire brightness and 
sparkle, the mouth corners retract, the upper lip rises in smiles and laughters, and 
the zygomatic muscles tend to contract. In a less convincing way, in the same 
chapter Darwin includes manifestations of affection and devotion which are highly 
dependent on cultural habits, and also sympathy, which seems in his description to 
be related to imagination or to a contagion of more basic emotions and expressions 
(Darwin [1890] 2009, 227). Such phenomena therefore do not pertain to the 
research on universality, and I even doubt whether they can all be considered as 
emotions.39  
It may surprise that, in the inquiry on universal expressions, the third category 
is about more complex emotions, attitudes or personality features like being 
resolute or deeply meditative, and they are not easily captured by one common 
definition. When puzzled, concentrated in a deep thought or on something difficult, 
a person frowns involuntarily, and this is true for any human being, (Darwin [1890] 
2009, 234), hence it does not depend on cultural variations. Darwin adds that the 
clearness and steadiness of the eyes allow to distinguish such countenance from 
expressions and attitudes of pain, disgust, and peevishness. Frowning is present also 
when one screams for any kind of distress, and could therefore have some similarity 
with other categories of feelings and emotions (physical pain, jealousy, fear, etc.), 
or simply might show an attempt to discern something distant or in the strong 
sunlight. Frowning is even connected with another main category, the one including 
irritability (being “ill-tempered”), sulkiness and determination, often with a certain 
degree of anger as well. However, in meditation or when being “lost in thought” – 
the third phenomenon in the category – the eyes appear vacant and one sometimes 
accompanies the act of thinking with gestures, such as raising a hand to the forehead 
or chin, just as the abovementioned scratching of one’s head when perplexed or the 
chin resting on a hand in Rodin’s statue Le Penseur. According to Darwin, such 
expressions are not universal and innate, but gestures acquired through habit. 
                                                         
39 I will investigate the terminology of sympathy and its nuances in chapter 3, and explain why 
sympathy is a feeling-function and not a feeling itself. 
80 
 
Anger and rage do not pose particular problems, as it would be 
counterintuitive not to recognize such emotions in a person whose mouth is tightly 
closed, teeth clenched together or even bare, countenance frowning and respiration 
quick. Darwin claims such countenance to be present in any culture, and so does 
Ekman, as it is for both one of the so-called basic emotions. The same applies to 
the category of surprise, astonishment, fear, horror, which includes two of the basic 
emotions considered by Ekman (surprise and fear) and involves such primary 
instincts of survival that it is not hard to believe that they are universally expressed 
in the same way. Ekman’s account is going to be discussed further. 
Nevertheless, as it concerns the category of disgust Darwin chooses again to 
mix some basic reactions – like the disgust-grimace with upper lips raised, eyes 
squinted, nose wrinkled, etc. – with more complex emotions, like disdain and 
contempt which, though sharing some of the facial features of disgust, are highly 
dependent on moral judgments, culture, and etiquette. In a metaphorical way, it is 
as if the despised person “smells offensively” (Darwin [1890] 2009, 268) or tastes 
bad (the meaning of disgust), so that we could not even stand the sight of her just 
as we do when faced with rotten food, since one of the first reactions of disgust and 
contempt is to turn away one’s gaze from the unpleasant object. In a sense, the 
whole person becomes the bearer of a possible contagion of negative values, and it 
is not uncommon in some languages to transfer disgust into the moral sphere when 
a person is morally deplorable (“mi fai schifo” in Italian, “me das asco” in Spanish, 
“tu me dégoûtes” in French, “you disgust me” in English). Some gestures might of 
course vary across cultures – like the Tibetan use of clapping hands that was 
performed in front of an English official, but only in order to shoo the demons that 
his presence carried. Yet disgust seems to be universally recognizable as a primary 
bodily reaction that makes one move away from the fetid food (the head tends to 
move back) and even spit it out (all this coupled with a grimace, the stomach-spasm, 
the impulse to vomit, etc.).   
The last category focuses on blushing as a universal expression, connected to 
shame, shyness, and modesty. Scheler himself remarked that one can directly 
perceive shame in a person who is blushing, and in fact such an expression seems 
to be universally detectable, but implies a context and subtle narrative nuances that 
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allow us to distinguish such emotion from slightly different ones like modesty and 
shyness. According to Darwin, it is an exclusively human expression, since even 
the great apes and monkeys redden just in case of passion, and even if other animals 
are claimed to exhibit signs of embarrassment or shame, those seem not related to 
the act of blushing.40 Unlike laughter or tears, blushing is not an expression that can 
be caused willingly or simulated and when one tries to hide it by a stronger self-
attention, it is most likely that it will just increase. However, ontogenetically, the 
sense of shame and embarrassment is considered to be a tardy acquisition – not an 
innate emotion – since it requires the social knowledge of being exposed to the gaze 
and the judgment of others, and this is grounded both on the awareness of social 
norms and on a formed body image, which has been claimed not to be present from 
birth. Darwin himself remarks that blushing does not seem to be present in infants 
before one year of age (Darwin [1890] 2009, 329). Moreover, although this 
phenomenon is observed and recognized as a feeling related to shame in all cultures, 
not all human beings have the tendency to blush when embarrassed. Such an 
emotion can be expressed in other ways, for instance by avoiding the gaze of others, 
by tightening up, bending the head or/and, in order to conceal it, by lowering the 
tone of the voice, or even in some specific ways that the acquaintance with that 
person makes recognizable (e.g. one might bite her nails or her lips). 
To sum up, what does such analysis lead to infer as regards the universality of 
emotions? First of all, that expressions are primary and pre-reflective 
manifestations of emotions, from which they can hardly be separated, and in many 
cases it is even harder to restrain than to express them. Consider in this respect the 
following quotation from The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals: 
 
                                                         
40 According to Masson&McCarthy (1995), animals that seem to have the capacity of feeling shame 
or embarrassment include porpoises, chimpanzees, dogs; there is as well some evidence of shame in 
the bonobos, who have been studied by anthropologist De Waal to prove the strong role of empathy 
in their social lives (De Waal 2013). 
However, even in the claim that the macaws which have bare skin on their cheeks can blush after 
falling accidentally from a perch, there is no evidence that such a reaction is due to embarrassment 
and not to fear or anger (Masson&McCarthy 1995, 333). 
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I put my face close to the thick glassplate in front of a puff-adder in the 
Zoological Gardens, with the firm determination of not starting back if 
the snake struck at me; but, as soon as the blow was struck, my 
resolution went for nothing, and I jumped a yard or two backwards with 
astonishing rapidity. My will and reason were powerless against the 
imagination of a danger which had never been experienced. (Darwin 
[1890] 2009, 40) 
 
A person who was observing the scene could have perceived Darwin’s fear in his 
wide-open eyes, his gaping mouth, and above all in his unexpected and fast jump 
backwards – which proves that expressions are not only facial, but highly visible in 
the style of movement, too.41 
According to Darwin, there are expressions that can be recognized by all 
populations and by both the younger and older representatives of mankind. Suitable 
examples are smiles and weeping, which are expressive respectively of joy and 
pain/sadness, while others, like jealousy, require the knowledge of the specific 
context and narrative to be detected. However, it has been shown that the 
correspondence between the emotion and the expression is not always univocal, as 
is the case of blushing, which is always caught as a sign of shame/embarrassment, 
but can also be absent from the expression of such feelings. Therefore, I argue that 
Scheler’s thesis is right in inferring that we directly perceive the meaning of an 
expression, even in the case of a culturally acquired habit, and that the universal 
grammar of expressivity acquires strong evidence from scientific observations, too. 
What’s more, the literature in favour of the universality of emotions does not 
distinguish between the universality of emotions and the one of expressions 
carefully enough. Does the so-called thesis of the universality of basic emotions 
involve more than universal expressions? This is not a claim for a renewed dualism 
between expressions and emotions: an expression can be the direct sign of a specific 
emotion and be immediately recognized as meaningful by people of any culture. 
                                                         
41 This seems to be a crucial point in the recognition of emotions in expressions. It has already been 
mentioned that infants develop primary forms of interaction not only thanks to what is displayed in 
the facial features, but also to the kinetic qualities that Stern calls “vitality affects” (Stern 1985). 
However, there is evidence that not only in infancy, but also in adult life kinematics, posture and 




Yet the same feeling can also be expressed in other ways or its expression might 
not be correlated directly to one single or specific basic emotion but still be 
universally detectable, as it happens in the case of shame. Together with the scarce 
focus on movement, I believe this is the shortcoming that can be remarked in 
Ekman’s theory, as I shall argue in the next section. 
 
2.3.2. Paul Ekman and the universality of basic emotions  
Being sceptical about Darwin’s claims on the universality of expressions, 
psychologist Paul Ekman started cross-cultural researches to prove that expressions 
and gestures are socially and culturally interdependent and relied on the advice of 
scholars belonging to the same “expression-relativism-school” like Margaret Mead 
and Gregory Bateson. He then began to make studies and experiments with 
photographs, videos and other relevant ways in the United States, Japan, Brazil, 
Argentina, Indonesia, the former Soviet Union, and above all with a population 
from Papua New Guinea that had no or scarce contact with other civilizations. By 
examining some videos in which people from that hidden corner of the planet were 
recorded, Ekman realised that he could recognize all their expressions, and started 
to question his previous thesis on the cultural variability: how is it possible, in fact, 
for a complete outsider to share the same “bodily grammar”, if emotions are 
differently expressed in each community? He therefore decided to verify such a 
doubt in person, and asked the tribe from Papua New Guinea to create stories that 
corresponded to the facial expressions shown in a photograph, or conversely to 
choose the picture of the emotion that fitted best in a story told to them; the results 
were impressive in their evidencing the universality of a set of emotions in human 
countenance (Ekman 2003). 
The basic emotions universally perceived in facial expressions are, according 
to Ekman, six, namely sadness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust/contempt, and 
pleasurable emotions (happiness). To define them as universally recognisable does 
not mean that they are expressed with the same intensity in each and every culture. 
However, a person from the abovementioned tribe of Papua New Guinea is able to 
recognise the meaning of a smile in a European face, as well as an American can 
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detect sadness in the facial features of a Japanese. Again, the correspondence 
between the concepts of expression and emotion is not to be taken for granted: there 
might be more universal emotions than the visible ones, or the detection of one of 
the basic emotions might happen thanks to the style of movement and the rapidity 
of a gesture. Besides, if the differences among similar expressions are only caught 
through the context, yet style, rapidity and other incidental factors might be indexes 
of universal emotions as well.42 It should be remarked here that the concept of 
emotion differs from moods like serenity, grumpiness and others, which tend to last 
longer and predispose us to experience one emotion than another but, unlike 
emotions, are not intentional. In other words, a mood does not have a proper object 
and we are not always able to understand why we are in such a state, although it 
may form a background for our intentionality (Ratcliffe 2010, 350). As Ekman 
claims, what is facially expressive is not the mood itself but rather the emotion in 
it: for instance, the visible expressions of irritability are related to the episodes of 
anger that are its cause (Ekman 1994, 57). 
As in Darwin’s account, according to Ekman an emotion is visible thanks to 
several components, which include the tone of the voice, the modification of facial 
features, and the emotional impulses to physical actions. The last one, however, 
cannot be considered as a proper signal, since it was not selected through evolution 
with the aim of conveying information (Ekman 2003, 61), and it is easier to be 
                                                         
42 For instance, a recent study by Rychlowska and colleagues (2017) supports that there are three 
types of smile that depend on the social context and express different emotions and intents: reward 
smiles, affiliative smiles and dominance smiles, which correspond respectively to the simple 
communication of positive feelings or intentions, to an encouragement for maintaining social bonds, 
and to the display and negotiation of the social status. While the first and the second are, according 
to the experiments, less distinguishable, the third one seems to have some facial expressions in 
common with disgust, anger and sensory rejection, and to be grasped more easily when compared 
with the other two. It would be interesting to investigate whether such differentiation is common to 
all humankind or culturally-dependent. However, so far participants from nine countries in North 
America, Europe, and Asia have detected the dominance smiles as clearly distinguished from other 
more negative emotions, since neutral and disgust countenances were not perceived as smiles 
(Rychlowska et al. 2017, 9). This might be the sign of a universally detectable emotion, though it is 
not among the basic ones listed by Ekman; in alternative, it could be fruitful to verify how Ekman’s 
basic emotion of contempt and the dominance smile are interrelated. 
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inhibited than the other two components, though being pre-set just like facial 
expressions for basic emotions. What remains ambiguous is how Ekman would 
consider the relation between “expression” and “signal”, since there is no 
convincing evidence that proper expressions have been evolutionarily selected for 
their purpose to transmit information, though they represent a strong advantage for 
communication and social life, and in human animals beings a considerable 
component of the emotion is displayed in the face. Consider the following statement 
by Ekman: «[t]he sadness and agony in facial and vocal expressions call for help 
from others. That social support, the caring of friends and family members, is 
healing. A person who is medicated so as not to display sadness and agony might 
receive less of that healing attention» (Ekman 2003, 88). 
If Ekman’s theory is right, when a person is in a situation of emotional distress, 
grief or sadness, we immediately recognize her feeling, despite the society of origin, 
the sexual difference or the colour of the skin. This improves our chances to 
perceive her expression as an “affordance” – in the Gibsonian sense – or, in other 
words, as a call for help. Such a person might display different degrees of 
movement: in the case of grief, she may express discomfort and unwillingly attempt 
to “shake off” the pain with a motion that is similar to physical agony, while in 
sadness she would become slow, passive and with a bent-down posture, as in 
Darwin’s description. Both emotions are inscribed under the same category owing 
to common facial features when, for instance, the inner corners of the eyebrows 
angle upward, the upper eyelids droop, the mouth is tight-lipped and the lower lip 
is pushed up, the muscles of the cheekbones tauten and there is a frowning look– 
what Darwin calls the “grief muscle”.  
In a similar way, the other emotions listed by Ekman are recognised from 
standard characteristics of the countenance – of course, the claim here is not that 
isolated physical clues need to be connected and interpreted through reasoning, but 
that experiments present a recurring set of elements whenever a specific emotion is 
detected. Therefore, in the case of anger one observes glares, which are expressions 
where the brows are lowered, and the upper eyelids raised, the lips firmly tensed or 
the jaw is tightly clenched and the teeth exposed. In surprise and fear, the eyes 
become wide open, the eyebrows are raised, and the jaw drops open (surprise) or 
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the mouth is strained, half open and the lips are stretched back toward the eyes 
(fear). In disgust and contempt, typical expressions are a wrinkling nose and raised 
upper lip and cheeks. Differently, one can recognize pleasurable emotions from 
smiles, although they vary in type and intensity, depending on the kind of positive 
emotion that is experienced (e.g. the well-known Duchenne smile which involves 
the outer part of the eyes and displays frank amusement or joy).43 Unlike Darwin, 
Ekman believes that more complex emotions like shame and guilt cannot be so 
easily distinguishable from one another and from sadness, while blushing (related 
to embarrassment) cannot be a universal expression since it does not appear in dark-
skinned people’s faces (Ekman 2003, 217). Nor does he consider jealousy an 
emotion, since there are more basic nuances connected to a specific situation. 
Similarly, envy would not display the so-called signals, therefore it would not 
pertain to the set of basic emotions which can be universally detected. But is such 
universality so universally accepted? 
Some scholars have disputed that the categories of basic emotions exhibited 
in facial expressions are the six ones individuated by Ekman, and reduce them to 
«happy, sad, fear/surprise (i.e., fast-approaching danger) and disgust/anger (i.e., 
stationary danger), which are only later more finely discriminated as six emotion 
categories» (Jack, Garrod, Schyns 2014, 191). Even if Darwin’s and Ekman’s 
categories of basic emotions and expressions need to be refined, however, the claim 
of their universality is not countered, and this supports Scheler’s theory about the 
universal grammar of expressivity. But – one might wonder – while the danger of 
a rapid movement against us is immediately perceived by any animal, and provokes 
a quick withdrawal, the peacefulness of a sunset is probably not perceived by a bat 
that is waiting for the night to go hunting. Moreover, facial expressions may be 
universal in humankind, but not so in non-human animals, partly because of 
physical differences. For instance, humans have a wider white part in their eyes, 
which implies that the direction of the gaze and the eye-expressions are more easily 
detected, they have fewer or no hairs on their faces, which makes blushing possible 
and visible.  
                                                         
43 I refer to the descriptions provided by Ekman (2003). 
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Does this invalidate Scheler’s hypothesis? The phenomenologist would reply 
that we can directly perceive the anguish in a bird that is about to die, its liveliness, 
or its weakness (Stern’s so-called vitality affects that pertain to movement; GW 
VII, 77), as well as it is possible to grasp emotions like joy in a dog that is wagging 
its tail and in a tweeting bird. (GW VII, 22). Yet, even if one restricted the 
universality of expressions to the human dimension, what would happen to such a 
metaphysical hypothesis and consequentially to expressivity-based empathy if 
expressions were only the product of cultural variability or of group membership? 
 
2.3.3 The non-universal grammar of expressivity: objections to 
an innate and universal Ausdruck 
From what has emerged in Ekman’s account, one may object that expressions 
appear as isolated images deprived of their context, almost as solid bricks that need 
some kind of glue to give rise to interaction. If I perceive the expression on your 
face directly, and you do the same and grasp it on mine, are we keeping on a merely 
observational mode? Where is the fuse that fires interaction? Are emotions between 
interacting people so radically separated and well-identifiable, or are they mutually 
evolving, inter-changing, movement- and context-dependent, and related to culture 
as well? The claim that expressions are not universal but involve a set of rules and 
habits within a group still challenges Ekman’s theory of basic emotions and, 
although Scheler’s thesis of the primacy of expressivity-perception is not affected 
– the emotion is caught, its elements are not “read” or “summed up” (GW VII, 256-
257) – , the validity of his grammar of expressivity is certainly challenged. A further 
step is to dig deeper and try to understand why emotions are claimed to be the 
product of social learning and, above all, of social interaction The stress, emphasis 
on the universality of Ausdruck might in fact be misinterpreted as “expressions are 
simply innate and unchangeable”, whether there is intercommunication or not, 
attunement or misattunement, whether a person is present or not, while actually an 
emotion becomes visible on our faces without the society playing a role in it. 
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The cultural relativity of emotions involves several different elements: one of 
them is the familiarity with the expressions of the same group, which can influence 
a person to be more or less ready to detect the emotions they reveal. For instance, 
Elfenbein&Amba (2003) analysed how accurate and quick the Chinese located in 
China and the ones in the United States, Chinese Americans and non-Asian 
Americans were in individuating emotions in Chinese and Americans, which turned 
out to be dependent on the frequency of their exposure to the group. The same 
happened with Tibetans living in China and Africans living in the United States 
when they were asked to detect the emotions of a person of the host society. 
However, since the participants were after all able to detect the correct meaning of 
expressions, this study only shows that cultures may influence some different 
nuances in the display of emotions, yet they do not affect the universality claim.  
Other scholars claim more radically and explicitly that the six basic emotions 
are not universal: variations are observed in facial muscles in the representation of 
emotional intensity and of the temporal dynamics connected to basic emotions (Jack 
et al. 2012). Again, the equivalence between basic emotions and basic expressions 
is not to be taken for granted, in fact some researchers claim that «facial expressions 
of emotion are culture speciﬁc, refuting the notion that human emotion is 
universally represented by the same set of six distinct facial expression signals» 
(Jack et al. 2012, 7242). For instance, East Asians show and recognize specific signs 
of emotional intensity, like fear, disgust, and anger, mainly in the eyes only – but 
the same scholars acknowledge that this datum is already mirrored in the literature 
about the restrained expressivity of Asian habits (Matsumoto et al. 1998, Ekman 
2003). Jack and his colleagues’ claim that traditional investigations do not consider 
some emotions particularly important for Asian cultures, such as shame, pride and 
guilt, is not to be overlooked, but, on the other hand, such feelings may simply 
correspond to universal expressions and not to basic emotions – which, I have 
argued, are not always equivalent. 
Parkinson, Fisher and Manstead (2005) question if cultural variability clashes 
with the claim that basic emotions and basic emotion expressions exist. I state that 
they are right to dispute  the definition of basic emotions: first, it is not clear whether 
there are four or six emotions under such label (see above on Jack, Garrod, Schyns 
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2014); second, other expressions, like blushing, are universally shown and 
recognized, though pertaining to a more complex emotion and it is possible to avoid 
the tricky definition of “basic emotions” by referring instead to “universal 
expressions”; third, the excessive focus on the facial expressions of basic emotions 
makes them appear as something completely isolated from the context, interaction 
and the consequent creation of emotional responses to the observed expression. It 
is worth noting in Parkinson and his colleagues’ work that they do not dismiss the 
universality of biological constraints and of some evolutionary pressure in them, 
but they also argue that «the evidence strongly suggests that pronounced cultural 
variations exist not only in how emotions are represented but also in the ways that 
people experience, express, and regulate them. Further, many of these differences 
seem to relate closely to corresponding differences in cultural beliefs and concerns» 
(Parkinson, Fisher and Manstead 2005, 83-84).  
For instance, the differentiation between more collectivistic and more 
individualistic societies, like the Japanese and the American ones, proves that the 
Japanese give lower ratings to the intensity of facial expressions than people from 
Western countries (Ekman et al. 1987; Matsumoto 1989), and this can be related to 
the collectivistic tendency to suppress the display of emotions in order not to 
damage social bonds. This also explains the difference in rating the experienced 
intensity of an emotion, higher in the Japanese, and in the perceived intensity of the 
emotion in an expression, higher in the Americans (Matsumoto, Kasri, and Kooken 
1999). While «in individualistic cultures (…) emotions are important not as 
indicators of social position and relation but in their own right and for their own 
sake, because they are believed to reﬂect the true and inner self» (Parkinson, Fisher 
and Manstead 2005, 67), it is as if in collectivistic cultures expressions were used 
more as gestures and had the role of social communication rather than of a personal 
spontaneous emotion. In fact, the expression that tends to appear in facial features 
has to be controlled and in some cases restrained, if that risks to compromise the 
social situation. Since the awareness of others is constantly present for members of 
such societies (Parkinson, Fisher and Manstead 2005, 68), when an expression 
manifests itself it has quite a striking efffect; then, the restrained visibility of 
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emotions becomes a habit, a quasi-automatic procedure which after some exercise 
puts a pre-reflective control over one’s own movements, attitudes and expressions.  
One further remarkable argument in Parkinson and colleagues (2005, 170 ff) 
is their focus on expressivity as a dynamic element in interaction, the assumption 
that when one sees an emotion displayed in the behaviour of another, she responds 
consequently. As it happens for infants and the phenomena of attunement and 
misattunement described above, the emotional tone is sometimes maintained and 
the expressions matched, even leading to mimicry, thus proving the tendency to 
adopt an expression similar to the one of the person in front of us (e.g. I see you 
laughing out loud for a joke and I start smiling too).44 However, a coherent response 
in interaction could also be the display of distress by a child that is first in a 
condition of emotional attunement and all of a sudden has to deal with her mother’s 
still face (Murray&Trevarthen 1985, cf. above). Parkison and colleagues are right 
to point out that an expression is never merely or passively received, but provokes 
a return expression which depends on the person we have in front of us, on the 
context, on her personal narratives, and so on.  
For, as universal as the language of expressivity can be, it does not concern 
isolated snapshots deprived of their specific style of movement, situation, 
modification in dynamical interaction and even in a specific culture. Howbeit, I do 
consider such arguments useful to enrich the individuations of some slight nuances 
that constitute expressivity, versus a limited vision of the universal grammar that 
would reduce expression to rigid categories of basic emotions, perceivable by all 
human beings and from birth to old age. First of all, universally perceived 
expressions may include more complex emotions, like shame and, even when 
connected to a cultural habit or a narrative we are acquainted with in many cases 
we do not need any reasoning to perceive their meaning directly. Finally, in the 
notion of expressivity I mean to establish a difference among more or less visible 
emotions, their expressions as their spontaneous bodily part, and gestures. 
                                                         
44 Such an example may also be seen as a case of emotional contagion, a notion that I am going to 
inquire about further in the next chapter. 
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2.3.4 The lexicon of expressivity: a proposal to distinguish 
among visible emotions, expressions and gestures 
As Scheler, Darwin and Ekman pointed out in their different ways, there are 
emotions that affect our expressive behaviour universally. When a person is sad – 
and she does not voluntarily control her movements – the emotion becomes visible 
in the slowness of her gait, in her bent shoulders, furrowed eyebrows and so on. In 
the same way, one would no doubt start running away if a person moved against 
her with a grimace and holding a knife. To mention non-basic emotions as well, one 
would immediately recognise a child’s shyness or shame by her blushing, trying to 
hide behind her mother, talking in a low voice or not at all. I do not mean to carry 
on the discussion on basic emotions only, since that there are other ones which are 
similarly visible, shared by all the human beings and deserving further 
consideration, although they may not be innate, as in the case of shame. In this 
sense, to adopt the notion of “universal expressions” instead of the limiting concept 
of “basic emotions” could help to acknowledge Scheler’s metaphysical claim on 
the universal grammar.  
In contrast with such visible expressions that are meaningful even with scarce 
knowledge of the context, there are other ones more difficult to grasp in the mere 
visible features and I find Darwin’s question about the difficulty of painting the 
feeling of jealousy very cogent. He writes: 
[a] man may have his mind filled with the blackest hatred or suspicion, 
or be corroded with envy or jealousy; but as these feelings do not at 
once lead to action, and as they commonly last for some time, they are 
not shown by any outward sign, excepting that a man in this state 
assuredly does not appear cheerful or good-tempered. If indeed these 
feelings break out into overt acts, rage takes their place, and will be 
plainly exhibited. Painters can hardly portray suspicion, jealousy, envy, 
&c, except by the aid of accessories which tell the tale; and poets use 
such vague and fanciful expressions as “green-eyed jealousy.” (Darwin 
[1890] 2009, 83) 
 
Darwin also points out that jealousy is hard to grasp without the aid of other 
expressions (e.g. rage), and especially without the aid of some narrative. That is to 
say, there is no proper universal expression of jealousy. Here is an example from 
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu. If, instead of paper and ink, Proust had had 
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oil colours and a canvas, how would he have represented the deep jealousy that 
Swann feels for Odette? He could have painted a scene in which a man is holding 
the lady’s hand, and a second man is watching the two people with a grimace and a 
frown, or is looking at them with sadness displayed on his face. But the mere faces 
are not enough to let us interpret the emotion: first of all, such scene is already a 
narrative and not just a facial expression, and second, an external person could also 
read the jealous observer as a brother worried about his sister in love with a non-
reliable man, or as a moralist upset by the loosening of the proper social rules 
between men and women. Similarly, if we imagine we are in Proust’s novel and 
follow Swann during his first episode of jealousy but we know absolutely nothing 
of the previous events, what we see can be described more or less as follows: he 
walks restlessly through the city, particularly keen on looking inside cafés. He 
displays apprehension, because he frowns, darts searching gazes everywhere, and, 
as if in strong pain and agony, he cannot stay still. Such behaviour clearly shows 
the concern of a person who is looking for something or somebody. Yet, without 
knowing the narrative that is worrying him so much, we could easily misunderstand 
it as a parent’s desperate attempt to find his lost child – and paternal affection is 
quite different from the feeling of jealousy that we would immediately detect in 
Swann if we were a friend of his or if we had been at the party with him and 
observed the way he had looked for Odette before.  
It is undeniable that jealousy is a universal emotion, at least in humankind, 
although its reasons and above all its expressions depend highly on cultural 
variations.45 Certainly, its manifestation is related to other emotions such as anger 
or sadness, and it is not as easily detectable as the other two. A person, in fact, might 
show few visible signs, even hard to be grasped by someone who is observing the 
situation unacquainted with the narrative. Does such a case alter a Schelerian 
perspective on the universality of expressivity, and its direct perception as primary? 
Jealousy is an example of differentiation between more and less visible emotions, 
but does not question that some expressions are recognized universally and 
                                                         
45 Cf. for instance the well-known controversy between Mead ([1928] 2001), who claims to have 
found in the Samoas a culture with little jealousy, and Freeman (1983), who contradicts her results 
by showing the violent and possessive attitudes of the same population.  
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immediately. Moreover, such an expressivity-grasping does not imply that all the 
person is displayed in expressivity and given to the gaze of others. Scheler himself 
states that there are spheres of the other that it is not possible to grasp: together with 
the exclusion of others’ bodily sensations from what can be caught through the 
various forms of sympathy, he states that the noetic acts of a person cannot be 
understood by her mere expressions (GW VII, 110). More simply, when we observe 
Rodin’s statue of the thinker, we most likely perceive its meditative expression, but 
we do not grasp what he is thinking about. To understand such contents, the 
language is also needed, therefore the other can conceal them, too.46 Besides, 
empathy as expressivity-grasping goes as far as the vital and psychic egos are 
involved, but, according to Scheler, in order to unravel the personal dimension an 
act of love is required (GW VII, 110).  
To sum up, the first concepts to be distinguished are the more from the less 
visible emotions, and universal emotions from universal expressions. The role of 
culture has also been mentioned as contributing to the difference of expressions 
from one society to another; in this regard, we are exiting the field of spontaneous 
and universal expressions and entering the one of gestures. If we go back to 
Scheler’s statement about what we are acquainted with directly in expressivity, the 
last example mentioned is the person who is making a plea with her hands, or the 
threat seen in a menacing fist (GW VII, 254). A gesture can be distinguished from 
a spontaneous expression for its communicative intent – that is, an expression does 
tell something about the affective state in which a person is, but it emerges with no 
purpose to make that feeling visible, while a gesture has the function of carrying a 
message, even when it becomes habitual and pre-reflective.  
While spontaneous expressions are universal and in most cases innate, 
gestures are usually culturally related. As Guido Cusinato asserts, the process of 
anthropogenetic individuation – i.e. the process of formation (Bildung) of a person 
– is connected to the one of expressivity, that is, if a human being undergoes a 
primary individuation through the lived body, a secondary one through her culture 
                                                         
46 Dan Zahavi (2014, 119ff) also highlights this aspect in Scheler, contra any theory of the 
transparency of the person in empathy. 
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and social role, and a third one through the specific, personal ordo amoris, her 
expressivity changes accordingly. For instance, even if each civilization displays 
common features in expressing fear, a specific culture can adopt a particular 
variation, which is im-personal even though not universal. On the third level, the 
one of the personality, the expression acquires a unique tone that corresponds to 
that specific person only (Cusinato 2017b, 246-249). Such a claim does not clash 
with the universality of expressivity, as all living beings come from the same 
expressive root of the lived body. It rather implies that, starting from such a shared 
ground, the “metabolism” of emotions acquires a progressive degree of 
individuation, and, we could say, it ranges from spontaneous expressivity to 
gestures, which show intents of communication in the social world. Moreover, it is 
plausible that more complex levels of meaning are present in expressivity and 
therefore directly perceivable, as when we are habitually acquainted with that 
specific person,47 or pertain to the same community. 
As regards this last case, let us consider for instance Ryle’s ([1968] 2009) 
famous distinction between a twitch and a wink: if one adopts a merely physical 
description of single bodily movements, such as the contraction of the external 
corner of one eye, when one eyelid closes while the other one remains open, there 
is no difference between the two movements. As Durt (2017, 71-72) rightly 
remarks, both are observable behaviours, but in order to tell the difference between 
a movement that arises involuntarily and the other one that is meant to signal 
something, we need another level of description that entails significance. This does 
not imply that to understand the meaning of a wink, one has to think reflectively 
and propositionally. Just as we become immediately aware of the possibility to 
move forward when in front of a green traffic light in the right context (Durt 2017), 
anyone who already knows the function of a wink perceives in it a higher level of 
significance that displays intimacy, conspiracy, a tacit indication of a shared 
knowledge, or even flirtation – the meaning depending on the specific situation. 
This example is suitable to show that gestures are culturally-related and that culture 
influences perception: while a westerner detects a shared intention in a wink, in 
                                                         
47 On narratives and the narrative competency that shapes the perception of singular persons, cf. for 
instance Hutto (2007) and Gallagher (2006). 
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Asian countries and India it is considered impolite (Smit, Snoeks, Tiemes 2012). 
Gestures acquire meaning through the sharing of common rules, culture, habits – 
so a wink would imply nothing more than a disturbance in the eye like a twitch if 
there was no agreed communicative content in it. Even when the meaning of 
gestures is perceived directly as a consequence of shared acquaintance, this cannot 
be said to be “spontaneous” in the universal and innate sense of expressions, 
because also involuntary gestures arise more from the habit of a communicative 
intent than as the innate visible part of an emotion. 
Therefore, in the lexicon of expressivity, three notions should be kept distinct, 
namely the more or less visible emotions, gestures, and the universal expressions, 
most of which refer to what Scheler theorizes to be the “universal grammar” and 
Darwin claims to be the only ones deserving the rank of true expressions. In this 
way, if any human being is able to identify the joy of a person living in totally 
different societies, this does not affect the fact that, even when perceiving a 
culturally-related gesture as meaningful, it is still a case of direct perception and not 
a Cartesian judgment. However, if so far the notion of direct perception has been 
taken for granted in order to explain the importance of expressivity and lay the 
foundations of the notion of empathy, it is now time to discuss such intertwined 
aspects and to analyse the primacy of value-ception. 
 
2.4 Other-perception and value-ception: understanding 
empathy through affective grasping 
In the Sympathie-Buch, Scheler not only refers to the direct perception of an 
emotion in expressivity, but also gives his last chapter the title “On the other ego” 
(Vom fremden Ich), and the third paragraph of it “The other-perception” (Die 
Fremdwahrnehmung). Is it possible – Scheler wonders – for us to internally 
perceive the “I” and the experience of others (GW VII, 242)? After the analysis 
carried on so far on the visibility and direct manifestation of emotions in 
expressivity, the positive answer from a Schelerian perspective can be determined 
easily; but how is the concept of “perception” to be intended as a root for the 
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empathic process? And what is the difference between the two related terms of 
Wahrnehmung and Wertnehmung, that he uses alternatively to describe a kind of 
non-passive perception in which the affective grasping or intuition precedes the 
rational knowledge? 
As Guccinelli (2016, 181) remarks, Wahrnehmen can be translated as “taking 
something to be true” and Wertnehmen as “taking something to be worthy”, which 
means that when something reaches the threshold of perception it is indeed “worth 
perceiving” because it has already been selected pre-reflectively by impulsions and 
interests. In the previous while dealing with the body schema, I discussed the 
Schelerian notion of impulsive structure (Triebstruktur) in terms of actively 
selecting stimuli from the environment according to the values that are caught by 
animals in objects or situations. For instance, a bright red strawberry is attractive, 
an unexpected movement towards us immediately breaks the threshold of 
perception and raises fear of danger or surprise, and so on. Values such as 
“inviting”, “useful”, “threatening” are part of the grasping of an object since our 
perception is far from neutral and aimed at a pure cognitive judgment, and so show 
the primacy of value-ception over a purely passive reception.48 
Values are defined by Scheler as «material qualities possessing a determinate 
order of ranks with respect to “higher” or “lower”» (GW II, 39). I will try to clarify 
this definition and its implications. First of all, even if he claims that values do not 
exist on their own, he does not ground his phenomenology in a relativistic, purely 
subjective dimension that would lead to a monadological solipsism. Values, as 
qualities, are functionalized in the things themselves, and being our perception first 
of all a value-ception, we cannot perceive anything detached from its value, just as 
we do not perceive an expression detached from its emotion. Although the order of 
values (ordo amoris) can vary from person to person, sometimes including 
illusions, as well49 values in themselves are objectively positive or negative: we 
could never say that shivering while having a flu is pleasurable, nor that 
ressentiment leads to higher values (on the contrary, it is for Scheler a perversion 
                                                         
48 Such primacy of the Wertnehmung has been widely investigated by Cusinato (1999, 2011). 
49 As he describes in The Idols of Self-Knowledge, GW III. 
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of the way we feel values).50 Being values objective and – potentially – universally 
experienceable in the entities in which they are given as qualities, they are also 
intersubjectively verifiable. An illusion as such might indeed consist in mistaking 
a lower value for a higher one, but that does not change the value’s place in the 
rank. 
There are values experienced through the personality-sphere, as well as values 
experienced with the body schema in animals and human beings. Each dimension 
has its own relevance, asceticism and hedonism represent opposite ways to focus 
on only one aspect of a human being, who is instead a “spiritual” personality 
inseparable from its lived body. Scheler’s value-rank includes (from the highest to 
the lowest ones): 1) values of holiness, that can be given through the act of praying 
as much as through the feeling of humility; 2) “spiritual/mental” (gesistige) values, 
such as the aesthetic, philosophical and juridical ones; 3) life-values, that involve 
the whole organism (like the feelings of well-being, strength, relaxation, and so on) 
and can be also traced in the environment (e.g. light is better than no light); 4) 
pragmatic values, especially regarding usefulness (e.g. the perceived potential use 
of a pair of scissors in front of us); 5) sensible values (as in the pleasure of the warm 
sunlight on one’s forehead in a cold winter day). 
If Wertnehmen involves a pre-reflective dimension of the feelings and 
emotions that affect the way we perceive values in objects, our preference in a 
choice between a higher and a lower value should lead us to the higher one without 
the need of any inferential judgments. “Feeling states” (Gefühlzustände) – in the 
broadest affective sense, from the corporeal level to the experience of the highest 
values – are for Scheler bearers of values, in a hierarchy of depth that partially 
corresponds to the one of values themselves: 1) sensorial feelings (sinnliche 
Gefühle), 2) lived-body feelings (Leibgefühle) and vital feelings (Lebensgefühle), 
3) pure feelings of the “soul” or of the I-sphere (reine seelische Gefühle, reine 
Ichgefühle), 4) spriritual feelings or feelings of the personality (geistige Gefühle, 
Persönlichkeitgefühle). Wertnehmen implies that values are felt and not understood 
through a judgment: «Also, when I feel “something”, e.g. a certain value, then I’m 
                                                         
50 Cf. Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen (Über Ressentiment und moralisches 
Werturteil, 1912), in GW III. 
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tied to that value through its function in a closer way than I would be through 
representation» (GW II, 334). This can explain why in the Sympathie-Buch Scheler 
states that the enthusiastic lover (Liebhaber) always has to precede the man of 
knowledge (Kenner), and two years after the first edition, he devotes an essay to 
the primacy of love over knowledge, as the intentional act that truly unveils the 
world:51 love grounds knowledge, not only in the sense that affective grasping and 
interests guide our experience of the world, but also that through such an act the 
grasped object comes to its full being and value through self-revelation (GW VI, 
97). Objects are never wertfrei (‘devoid of value’ or ‘value-neutral’) and our 
perception never neutral towards them, therefore it should be clear now in what 
sense value-ception precedes perception, and why expressivity and animation are 
grasped prior to any judgment or simulation. This will become a key point in my 
discussion on empathy below.  
In order to motivate my viewpoint further, I am going to clarify now that there 
might be certain basic phenomena which catch our immediate attention because of 
primordial mechanisms, and one of those is certainly animation. However, if we 
take mechanical animation as an example, at a certain point of our life we learn 
that, when facing a car, we are not in front of a lived body capable of spontaneous 
movement. This will change the way we perceive it, erasing the “animistic” 
attribution that we had given it previously. It will most probably invite us to interact 
with it in a different way and to treat it as a machine and not as a living being. 
Moreover, if we develop a preference for a certain kind of cars, let us say old 
cabriolets with a Gatsby-period style, a certain sound typical of such cars and their 
beauty will catch our prevailing attention and make us ignore everything else 
around us. In this case, attention is polarized by an axiological unity that is 
phenomenologically given, that is, a value-unity to which the object of my attention 
belongs and that I grasp through an act of feeling (since they are fühlbare 
                                                         
51 I refer to the essay “Love and Knowledge” (Liebe und Erkenntnis) of 1915, now in GW VI. The 
difference between love and a simple reaction to a preferred value is that the former has the capacity 
to discover the values themselves. In this sense, love is a “pioneer” to affective perception; cf. GW 
II, 267, and the essay Ordo Amoris in GW X. 
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Phänomene; cf. GW II, 39). Interests select different parts and aspects of the milieu 
that literally “jump” to our eyes: they play a role in shaping the meaning of the 
contents that come to the threshold of our acts of noticing. Quoting a significant 
Schelerian example, two farmers negotiating over a farm have a different 
perception of the building that is at the same time being watched by a painter (GW 
II, 161). They have different expertise and interests, and so grasp different values 
and goods in the same location. Further on, staying with the same case, we could 
infer that if the farmer takes painting lessons, he may change the way in which he 
perceives the same environment, depending on the context, on the purpose, and so 
on.52 
As it has been shown in the paragraph concerning the body schema, primary 
individuation is connected to the lived body (both in mankind and animals): through 
this, animals – human beings included – can move in the environment with little 
effort and explicit attention on the body. The Leibschema, according to Scheler, 
both produces and is modified by pre-reflective “protentional” images (Bilder) 
which anticipate the embodied experience that could come from an interaction with 
the world (GW VIII). Although the term “image” can be quite controversial, since 
it is here associated to a non-representational quality – Scheler wants to point to a 
pre-reflective tendency to interpret situations as meaningful for a possible 
interaction, already at the embodied level. And, as I will argue in the next section 
when discussing the so-called “interaction theory”, empathy typically is not a static 
situation in which an observer merely receives the feeling of another. Rather, it is 
grounded on the possibility of bodily responsiveness: expressions themselves, as 
mentioned in the case of despair and sadness, “call” for help, sharing, stepping back 
or getting closer, and so on.  
 
 
                                                         
52 The concept of values seems a suitable basis to interpret the plasticity of brains, as brain 
neurotransmitters influence and are influenced by new experiences; to infer which, Gerald Edelman 
uses the remarkably Schelerian phrase “value systems” (Edelman 1992). I discussed Scheler in 
relation to Edelman in more detail in Bruttomesso (2016). 
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2.5 Scheler’s Fremdwahrnehmung  and interaction theory 
Interaction Theory (IT) refers to a thesis in social cognition which claims, 
similarly to Scheler’s conception, that our primary contact with others happens 
through direct perception and proneness to pragmatic exchanges. As Gallagher 
explains,  
before we are in a position to theorize, simulate, explain or predict 
mental states in others, we are already in a position to interact with and 
to understand others in terms of their gestures, intentions and emotions, 
and in terms of what they see, what they do or pretend to do with 
objects, and how they act toward ourselves and others. (Gallagher 
2001b, 90-91) 
 
With reference to the language of values and affordances, Shaun Gallagher and 
Somogy Varga state that 
(…) my perception of your action is already formed in terms of how I 
might respond to your action. I see your action, not as a fact that needs 
to be interpreted in terms of your mental states, but as a situated 
opportunity or affordance for my own action in response. The intentions 
that I can see in your movements appear to me as logically or 
semantically continuous with my own, or discontinuous, in support or 
in opposition to my task, as encouraging or discouraging, as having 
potential for (further) interaction or as something I want to turn and 
walk away from. (Gallagher&Varga 2014, 189-190) 
 
To sum up, according to the authors who support the interaction theory, it involves 
five main theses:  
1) The contrast of IT versus simulation theory and theory theory. Empathy – 
although it is usually called intersubjectivity, social cognition or else – is not 
primarily a matter of inference from a set of bodily and separately detected elements 
whose meaning is given by reasoning. Nor is any prior simulation of a bodily 
movement or expression needed to understand the other’s intention or feeling.53 I 
will examine this claim further when discussing the contemporary theory theory 
and simulation theory. 
                                                         
53 The primacy of direct perception does not imply a complete dismissal of a multi-layered 
explanation of empathy, as the “pluralist” account of social cognition entails; cf. Fiebich, Gallagher, 
and Hutto (2017). 
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2) The direct perception account. According to this account, roughly, the first 
encounter with others runs through direct perception, which implies a ‘smart’ 
perception to grasp the meaning inside phenomena in an immediate way (Gallagher 
2008). In other words, according to Gallagher perception is immediately informed 
or shaped by gestaltic structures, context, meaning, emotional coloration, etc. This 
clearly echoes the Gibsonian conception of affordances and the Schelerian value-
ception. In fact, both highlight the primary attraction of perception towards what is 
most significant to that particular living being and its active role in shaping the 
phenomenological datum itself. Perception is not passive, but actively guided by 
salience, and such salience makes objects and situations “jump” up to our 
perceptual threshold as already forming gestaltic unities of meaning. 
3) The centrality of expressivity. The meaning perceived in social encounters 
is in fact the intention or emotion expressed in motion, both being intrinsic and 
visible in the structure of any movement (Gallagher&Varga 2014). Such description 
can well apply to the concept of expressivity explained above, and in particular to 
universal expressions. 
4) The importance of the context. The socially meaningful action is in fact 
perceived jointly with its context (Gallagher&Zahavi 2008), that is, situated in a 
specific social, bodily and environmental domain. At the same time, it makes our 
action depend on the other subjects involved, on the hindrances in our path, and so 
on, but also on our bodily conditions that may alter or not the action itself 
(Gallagher&Varga 2014).  
The similarity to Scheler’s view, detectable in points 4) and 2), is to be found 
especially in the Formalismus, where the bodily dimension is connected to the 
environment (Umwelt). Although it is not yet the “world” correlated to the 
personality sphere and to the secondary individuation of the person, it pertains to a 
primary individuation, the one of the Leibschema. It is experienced as a dynamic 
selection of contents that are meaningful (bedeutsam) and effective (wirksam) for 
the unity of the lived body, and becomes therefore a milieu in its practical valence, 
with positive and negative connotations (GW II, 158). Hence, interests “shape” our 
milieu: by presupposing the perception of effectiveness already in things, they 
select elements that surge to the threshold of and the objects in the milieu that 
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determine perception (with their affordances) and so give rise to a mutual dynamic 
interplay. Von Uexküll, from whom Scheler took a new conception of “Umwelt” 
and “milieu”, was the first to contest the concept of the (animal) individual’s passive 
and merely neutral perception,54 “affected” by sensations in the same way as a silver 
plate is etched by a jeweler. Scheler’s novelty consists both in the theory of values 
in perception and in the assumption that, contrary to Von Uexküll’s animal that is 
locked in its species-milieu with its advantages and disadvantages, man is capable 
of world-openness thanks to his personal sphere.55 This means that mankind can 
access new spheres of values, and also avoids any traces of determinism hidden in 
the previous conception, though without isolating it, from its pragmatic context. 
Gurwitsch’s (1979, 33) criticism to Scheler’s alleged dismissal of the context in his 
theory of the Ausdruck is proved then to be groundless (Cusinato 2017b) and close 
to interaction theory.  
5) The enactivist claim. Being one’s actions dependent also on the external 
world, they involve a mechanism of feedback. In other words, social perception is 
enactive, implicitly attentive, responsive to the affordances and changes produced 
by actions, and ready to interact correspondingly (De Jaegher 2009; De Jaegher, Di 
Paolo, Gallagher 2010).56  
There is general agreement on the importance of interaction for social 
cognition, yet a slight variation is worth mentioning here. De Jaegher (2009), 
criticizes Gallagher’s account of direct perception for not contrasting the cognitivist 
theories of intersubjectivity and poses an even more radical claim. She argues that 
social perception is not primary, but grounded on enaction itself, which implies that 
the direct experience of another’s feelings is possible thanks to skillful interaction 
with others: social interaction is the root of social understanding. The most 
                                                         
54 Cf. Von Uexküll (1909). Scheler discusses such ideas in GW II and in a review to Von Uexküll, 
now in GW XIV. 
55 On the connections between Von Uexküll’s and Scheler’s theories, cf. Cusinato (2008), Brentari 
(2015), Guccinelli (2016). 
56 As Overgaard (forthcoming) points out, there are some theoretical differences between enactivism 
and direct social perception (DSP). He argues that DSP cannot be explained without a 




interesting point of her thesis is that social cognition does not begin when a single 
individual merely observes another: a subject is no more the starting point for the 
empathic process or even for social perception. Organisms engage in a participatory 
sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007), that is, they actively produce meaning 
in what is valuable for them (values detected in the environment), and they do that 
dynamically by interaction and social coordination. 
So, the subjects are not immersed in a situation passively, but play a creative 
role: intentions and emotions vary during and through social interaction. In 
Scheler’s example of the people in front of a farm in the Formalismus, the person 
negotiating the building might change the price offer according to the other’s bodily 
language that might display irritation for the exorbitant proposal or naivety. As a 
consequence, the actions of the person who intends to buy the farm may become 
more or less aggressive, because he or she is not merely trying to grasp the seller’s   
expression in order to carry out his business, but is also having an actual reaction, 
maybe unawares.  
However, participatory sense-making entails a further assumption. «Sense is 
made by living beings in interaction with their world» (De Jaegher 2009, 538), that 
is, the world has a meaning and value not according to internal representational 
processes, but through the constant interchange of the individual with the world. In 
such engagement with the other-than-oneself, the embodied subject tends to start 
mutual coordination in expressivity and movements and even a mutual 
incorporation grounded on the extended emotions and intentions. All that gives rise 
to intercorporeality (Fuchs&De Jaegher 2009).  
I contend that the criticism of such an account contrasts the notion of the 
“passive observer”, as Fuchs and De Jaegher call it, that is incompatible with 
expressivity and value-based perception. If perception is affectively guided, it is 
incoherent to assume a neutral onlooker that does not have the slightest reaction. A 
person who sees someone in grief can hardly resist the compulsion to become sad 
herself (contagion), or to try to relieve the other’s pain (compassion). She might 
become uncomfortable if she feels the other is expecting help or comfort from her 
but does not know how to give it. Expressions carry affordances, affordances carry 
the possibility of interaction. Furthermore, it is advisable now to highlight the 
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dynamics of expressivity, that seem to have been forgotten in many accounts (see 
above): «social understanding is not realized by ‘snapshot’ activities of one 
individual’s theorising or simulating but arises in the moment-to-moment 
interaction of two subjects» (Fuchs&De Jaegher 2009, 466). Nor is it the perception 
of a series of isolated expressions. Participatory sense-making entails that the 
meaning of a situation is all but static and is constantly modified during the interplay 
itself. In Scheler’s example of the two people bargaining over the farm we find a 
relevant case, but a person crossing the road and the car that stops in front of her 
are a suitable case of interaction as well.  
I confute though the assumption that the notion of “coordination” of the 
enactive version of interaction theory can explain the primacy of direct perception, 
that the mutuality of bodily responses is the key to social understanding, and that 
perception really needs action to be effective. Does it in any case require behaviors 
to be coupled in a common system (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007), if I can 
experience the one-sided direct perception of a feeling? When I see a person in grief 
but she does not notice me, I may still feel the tendency to comfort her, or rejoice 
at her troubles if I fall a prey to what Germans call Schadenfreude. I am not a neutral 
observer, even if the fact that I perceive her feelings does not necessarily involve 
mutuality or coordination. When Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009, 470-471) 
differentiate between “coordination to” and “coordination with”, the first being one-
sided and the second entailing co-regulation, they argue that only the latter involves 
interaction, and by so doing they assume that empathy and direct perception are 
grounded on the phenomena of joint attention, dyadic coordination, 
synchronization, and so on. To state that direct perception is rooted in such a kind 
of interaction is far more radical than to claim that it is rooted in the possibility of 
interaction.57 
                                                         
57 About this topic, De Jaegher and Fuchs (2009, 482) state that «social understanding is primarily 
based on intercorporeality; it emerges from the interactive practice and coordination of the persons 
involved». This is the version defended, e.g., by Gallagher & Hutto (2008). 
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Ultimately, then, how direct is social perception, if Scheler’s theoretic frame 
is chosen to understand IT?58 I have summed up such a theory into the five main 
points of 1) The contrast of IT versus simulation theory and theory theory, 2) the 
direct perception account, 3) the centrality of expressivity, 4) the importance of the 
context, and 5) the enactivist claim.  
From a Schelerian phenomenological perspective, four of them can be related 
to the inclusion of the concept of values in the “directedness” of perception, that 
can be guided by them without a cognitive or inferential content.59 Enactivism is 
more problematic in that it conceives perception as rooted in actual interaction and 
coordination, already pertaining to the we-intentionality that I will discuss in the 
fourth chapter. In so doing, it overplays the role of empathy, which is a form of 
direct perception without the need to be two-sided.  
Value-ception entails that when perceiving an object or an expression we are 
guided by our interests and value-system into the potentialities of interaction. When 
we see a person, for instance, the range can be from sensible values (if the woman 
is attractive, “it would be pleasant to touch her arm” or, if she looks annoyed, “her 
reaction may be embarrassing) to pragmatic values (“she is of hindrance/of help to 
reach a certain object”),60 to life-values (an infant may feel pleasant relaxation and 
well-being when in the arms of her mom), to spiritual (geistige) values (such as the 
aesthetic appreciation of elegance in someone’s movements), to the values of 
holiness (e.g. the feeling of humility near a morally outstanding person). The 
                                                         
58 I take up the question from Michael&De Bruin (2015), although in a different perspective. 
59 The focus here is on the conditions which make empathy possible, so I will not enter the discussion 
on the representational content of direct perception. Cf. Overgaard (forthcoming). 
60 It would be interesting to investigate to what extent the perception of this kind of values is related 
to empathy. In the case of antisocial personality disorder (or sociopathy, as it is usually called), the 
affected persons seem in fact to be able to perceive some expressivity, since they are particularly 
successful in exploiting others in instrumental and manipulative ways to fulfil their own interests, 
profit or pleasures (DSM V, 660). In other words, others are perceived as carrying the instrumental 
values of usefulness/uselessness. However, there is no convincing evidence that, as the DSM V 
claims, individuals with antisocial personality disorders completely lack empathy, since they have 
direct perception of most expressivity and psychological states. It is also interesting that they have 
impairments in detecting expressions of fear (Marsh&Blair 2008), which might be related to their 
inability to feel any moral pressure.  
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potential interaction is part of the perception of an expression or of a gesture, but it 
does not necessarily become effective and two-sided or originate a form of dyadic 
interaction/joint attention. I may smile back at a person who smiles on a screen 
(coordination), or react with a grimace of disgust to a racist speech by the recently 
elected president of the United States (misattunement). My response comes 
automatically, yet such people have no possibility to interact with me. Moreover, 
the opportunity of interaction shapes perception, but perception cannot coincide 
with interaction perfectly. They influence each other, because we would act 
randomly without any perceptual verification. 
So far, I have examined the conditions that allow to speak of “direct 
perception”, plus  Scheler’s theory of values and without the actual-interaction 
claim. Before starting to discuss a notion of empathy grounded on the two concepts 
of expressivity and direct perception, I deem it relevant to reassess a 
psychopathological topic debated in the first chapter, namely schizophrenia. In 
addition to the dimension of the body schema, such illness shows an impairment in 
the perception of expressivity, and therefore constitutes evidence to the ordinary 
experience of other-perception. 
 
2.6 Back to schizophrenia: The impairment of expressivity and 
the solipsism of schizophrenic autism 
Imagine you suffer from a certain form of schizophrenia. You stay at the 
window, watching people that happen to be in the street below. You focus your 
gaze on two tall, dark figures wearing hats and coats, yet you do not perceive a 
dimension of animation or a particular expressivity.  You are not sure whether they 
are automatons or men, since you cannot grasp their expressive unity as human 
beings at first sight.61 You may do nothing but reduce them to a sum of 
adumbrations, in a sort of non-requested phenomenological epoché of the natural 
attitude which is the condition to make ordinary interaction with the world possible 
                                                         
61 I give here a description that derives from the well-known Cartesian example in Meditations 
(Descartes [1641] 1984, 21), in which the certainty of the figures being men and not automatons can 
only come through a judgement. I am going to analyse the bracketing of perceptual certainties that 
seems to be quite similar to the schizophrenic experience. 
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without questioning the theoretical premises of your perception:62 living beings 
have lost their immediate salience, and perception has lost its certainty. Consider 
Stanghellini’s following transcription of a schizophrenic person experiencing such 
a de-realization: 
When I watch something, I would like to see it better. While watching, 
say, a tree, I can but scan with my eye its profile and count its sides. For 
instance, a dog is seven parts. I called this counting, because for me 
everything in this way is reducible to a certain number according to its 
sides. It started as a sort of game, then it turned into a kind of obsession. 
I become aware of my eye watching an object. (Stanghellini 2006, 131) 
Instead of seeing a dog – whose motion transmits cheerfulness, playfulness, 
and so on – the patient is perceiving a Körper of which he counts the parts, as if it 
was an unanimated piece of matter. Concerning the link between corporeality, 
expressivity and sense of reality, Guido Cusinato makes a comparison between 
Scheler’s theories and Marguerite Sechehaye’s Autobiography of a Schizophrenic 
Girl. A hypothesis to interpret such a pathology is that one loses contact with the 
expressive field of reality and life, hence the capacity of direct perception of one’s 
own and others’ expressivity. This lack leads one to perceive the Leib as an 
inanimate Körper, and to interpret the expressive movements of the lived body as 
pertaining to a robot or a mechanical puppet: «through the loss of contact with the 
expressive layer of reality, even the lived body of a known person becomes a 
mechanical physical body lacking in expressivity. When Renée sees an old friend 
approaching, she sees her coming forward as a mechanical puppet» (Cusinato 
2015b, 77-78, my transl.). 
A detachment from the “lived”, gestaltic unity bears heavy consequences, not 
only limited to the perceptual dimension. If I – a hypothetical schizophrenic person 
– am not able to perceive you as an animated human being, and focus instead on 
the transcendental conditions that are behind my perception, how do I encounter 
otherness? If I am not very expressive and cannot display interest or my 
psychological states, how do we engage in interaction? Ultimately, how do I exit 
                                                         
62 Since Blankenburg (1969), one of the prevailing interpretations of such de-realization in 
schizophrenia is a form of bracketing common sense and the existence of the world, therefore an 
involuntary performance of the phenomenological reduction.  
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the solipsistic sphere in which I am confined by my lack of immediate expressivity-
grasping and the hyper-reflexivity63 on the grounds of perception? Not only the 
relationship with one’s own body schema is impaired by such schizophrenic 
symptoms (cf. the previous chapter), but also with the body schemata of other living 
beings; in other words, the patient is locked in a schizophrenic autism. 
Although autism spectrum disorder and schizophrenia are kept well distinct in 
the DSM V, many scholars with a phenomenological perspective on the 
psychopathology of schizophrenia point out its intrinsic condition of solipsism. It 
is not the mere lack of emotional resonance, but the impossibility of being in contact 
with the expressive field (Cusinato 2015b; Parnas, Bovet, and Zahavi 2002; 
Stanghellini 2003; Cutting 2012; cf. also empirical investigations on the impaired 
recognition of facial expressions by Silver, Bilker, and Goodman 2009). As Parnas, 
Bovet and Zahavi describe with reference to Minkowski’s account, «[a]utism is not 
a withdrawal to solitude (it cuts across the categories of extro- and introversion) or 
a morbid inclination to daydreaming, but a deficit in the basic, non-reflective 
attunement between the person and his world, i.e., a lack of “vital contact with 
reality”» (Parnas, Bovet and Zahavi 2002, 132). In normal experience, objects have 
affordances which are perceived directly and pre-reflectively with their meaning-
for-us, as corresponding to a higher or lower value in our value system, and as a 
unity of expression instead of a sum of single parts.  
For some schizophrenic people, on the contrary, it might even be hard to get 
a whole, gestaltic experience from isolated sensations. It is as if «he is having a 
sensation, elaborating this sensation, and structuring its parts and the context in 
which it takes place in a meaningful whole (…). A schizophrenic person is 
sometimes like the spectator of the single steps of his perceptive processes» 
(Stanghellini 2006, 130-131). If even the taste of a soup requires from the patient a 
reconstruction of its single ingredients (Stanghellini 2006, 130-131), what normally 
would be an immediate grasping is reduced to an assemblage of static, fragmented 
snapshots. Even what has been listed as the fourth characteristic of interaction 
theory and as a primary element in Scheler’s theory of expressivity, the importance 
of the context, is lacking. At the same time, while the meaning of and the adaptation 
                                                         
63 Cf. the previous chapter, especially on Sass and Parnas (2003). 
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to the specific situation and environment is normally a matter of pre-reflective 
selection thanks to the Triebstruktur and to the value-salience, in a social encounter 
the schizophrenic may manifest the need to cognitively learn the “rules” for the 
situation (Stanghellini 2006, 132), having lost the immediate contact with the 
implicit pragmatic possibility of interaction linked to social perception. Stanghellini 
claims that disorders of self-awareness and disorders in social cognition are 
connected because of the simulation routines. I contest his assumption that 
attunement would imply the capacity to simulate actions implicitly (Stanghellini 
2003, 145), and in the next chapter I will argue why the primacy of expressivity and 
of simulation to explain empathy are incompatible. I claim, however, that he is 
indeed right when he points out the importance of the objectifying attitude both 
towards the self and towards others, since the ultimate deficiency at the roots of the 
pathological condition is the loss of the dimension of being alive and of 
expressivity. If the body becomes a non-living Körper, the same happens when 
other organisms are perceived. 
For a schizophrenic person, social situations can be puzzling, unpredictable as 
in the mental experiment described at the beginning of chapter 2.2: expressions and 
movements are deprived of their intrinsic meaning, incomprehensible and need 
explicit laws to be interpreted. The pre-reflective predictions that accompany any 
perception of actions are suspended, a smile is just an aggregation of muscle 
contractions, and one never knows what is going to happen next. As a schizophrenic 
patient stated, «[i]t also occurs that in this state I get lost when I stay with the others. 
What I lack is the common thought. I have nothing to share with them. In this way, 
the others become incomprehensible and scaring» (Stanghellini 2006, 142). The 
pre-reflective knowledge that guides interpersonal relations is not present in the 
schizophrenic patient, who lacks the very perception of the meaning intrinsic to 
purposeful gestures, the implicit requests of expressions, the tacit set of social rules 
that one learns through experience and applies in social contexts without always 
revising them reflectively. 
Within a Schelerian framework, I have said that expressivity and value-
ception are compromised in schizophrenia. But does such a claim refer to all the 
five categories of values listed, namely the values of the holy, mental values, life-
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values, pragmatic values, and the sensible ones? According to psychiatrist John 
Cutting, who has both worked on schizophrenia and studied and translated some of 
Scheler’s texts, such a pathology affects the values related to impulse and 
embodiment. This is consistent with the reported experience of the patient’s loss of 
the dimensions of animation, emotions, bodily feelings and unity. They are the three 
“lowest” values, related to the feeling and expressivity of the whole body, to the 
pragmatic potential of objects and people, and to the sensorial feelings – these latter 
concerning only the self as they cannot be grasped in direct perception.  
In order to understand Cutting’s psychopathological interpretation of Scheler, 
a brief explanation is necessary. According to Scheler’s metaphysical conception 
(GW XI), there are three types of reductions that can be performed: the 
phenomenological, the Dionysian and the positive-scientific one. All the three 
presuppose the metaphysical differentiation between the dimensions of Geist and 
Drang, which correspond to the mental/spiritual and the drive-based/impulsive 
principles of what exists.64 While the scientific reduction isolates the value-level of 
utility, the Dionysian refers to the act of bracketing the geistige components in order 
to focus on the impulse-driven ones. Differently put, the phenomenological 
reduction concerns the essences (Wesenheiten), leaving aside the dranglich part 
which is associated to the impulsive structure described in the previous chapter with 
reference to GW IX. Because they pertain to the mental/spiritual principle, such 
essences are negative, being the actual impossibilities of what are instead the firstly 
given possibilities of reality. More than that, they are ineffective (wirkungslos, GW 
XI, 252). Such a definition connects to Scheler’s metaphysical idea that the Geist 
is powerless if it does not intertwine with the impulse. However, as Cutting (2009, 
150) explains, it also means that in the absence of the Drang-related dimension we 
do not perform the value-ception that pertains to our normal pre-reflective 
experience of the environment: 
 
[w]hat Scheler, however, realized, unlike Husserl, who concluded that 
the experience of an apple tree in blossom in the form of an introspected 
                                                         
64 In order to focus on the psychopathological problem under examination, I do not enter the details 
of such metaphysical theory. Cf. Cusinato (2008, 2012) for an anti-dualistic interpretation of the two 
principles as an interpenetration (Durchdringung).  
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representation in consciousness would differ not one jot from the 
experience of a real blossoming apple tree in the external world, was 
that the reduced object would be markedly different. Why? For one 
thing, the object experienced would be ‘adynamic’—a static image—
because the real events governing the fluctuating appearance—wind 
blowing the branches about, scurrying clouds affecting the pattern of 
sunlight and shade—would be put out of contention. Second, the object 
experienced would be shorn of all partisan interest: it would no longer 
be an apple tree of interest to a gardener, or fruiterer, or timber 
merchant, because all such vital, dranghaft, utility concerns are deemed 
out of the question in the reduction. (Cutting 2009, 150)65 
 
What the phenomenological reduction brackets, therefore, is the vital 
dimension, starting from its very basis of animation, salience and embodied 
expressivity, and living beings even appear as Körper. It has been shown through 
theories and reports that some schizophrenic patients perform a continuous and 
unwanted phenomenological reduction. More precisely, according to such an 
interpretation, we could rather say that they do not perform the phenomenological 
reduction but actually live in it, since they are not able to pre-reflectively access 
reality through the perception of bodily values. Contrary to a philosopher who 
practices the reduction and trains to make it become a habit, a schizophrenic patient 
is not able to switch back to the values that one brackets with the epoché. The 
schizophrenic experiences reported, which concern the objectification of living 
beings and the difficulty to predict the others’ behavior in social interaction, then 
must be seen in the light of the perceptual loss of the vital value-qualities that are 
normally present in the objects/living beings themselves.  
In those cases of schizophrenia, the social dimension, which cannot be directly 
touched if such value-ception of expressivity is impaired, disappears or becomes 
scary. There is no space where the thou and the I make their first encounter and 
enter into contact with the expressive reality of bodily emotions, animation and 
intentions (cf. the notion of aida in 1.2.2). The schizophrenic patient is confined in 
                                                         
65 I will not join here the diatribe concerning Husserl’s vs Scheler’s account. Cf. Sass (2009) that 
targets Cutting’s article for oversimplifying his criticism to Husserl. The fact that Cutting does not 
take into detailed consideration Husserl’s texts neither affects the significance of his contribution to 
a Schelerian framework for psychopathology, nor the claim that an experience deprived of the 
embodied values has similarities with the schizophrenic one. 
112 
 
her “autistic”, solipsistic world because she simply cannot access the totality of 
values that are at the disposal of a non-ill person. She has lost the affective or 
emotional opening (Durchbruch) towards the world, where the vital dimension is 
shared by all living beings (Cusinato 2018 in press, 2017, 2017b, 75-81). 
Ultimately, it impairs what in Husserlian terms would be an intersubjective world, 
and in Schelerian terms a mit-geteilt one. The lived body plays in this sense a crucial 
role for relationality, and is in turn shaped by it. As Fuchs (2015) defines it, 
schizophrenia involves disembodiment, in the three aspects of impaired basic sense 
of self, disorder in the implicit dimension of bodily governing and perception, and 
the relational bodily communicative dimension called ‘intercorporality’, which 
allows to build a shared world.66 In fact, if embodiment entails a fundamental 
condition of affectivity perceived and interacted through affordances, then 
intercorporality also involves interaffectivity, ‘mutual incorporation’ of my body 
schema with other body schemata, and implicit relational knowledge (Fuchs 2016), 
i.e. a coordinative interaction which can give rise to we-intentionality (cf. ch. 4). 
When the immediate roots of interaffectivity are disrupted, there certainly is a lack 
of expressivity-perception, which also impairs the formation of a shared situation. 
From a slightly different perspective, the extended-mind hypothesis can help 
clarify the relational aspect of schizophrenia (cf. also 4.2), for it highlights the 
connection between the lived body and the necessity for expressive contact with 
other living beings and objects. An aspect that significantly explains the 
confinement into a solipsistic condition of schizophrenic autism, is the “scaffolded 
self” (Krueger 2011; forthcoming). According to the extended mind theory, 
cognitive and emotional processes extend over our brains and bodies, and are 
scaffolded – structured or helped – by external objects (e.g. notebooks, laptops, 
agendas) as well as by others’ expressions (e.g. the occurrence of a joyful mood in 
a party through the scaffolding of people’s smiles, cheerful movements, and so 
on).67  
                                                         
66 On the notion of sharing, cf. chapter 4. 
67 For an in-depth analysis on the extended mind hypothesis and especially on extended affects, cf. 
4.2. I intend to examine the literature concerning this topic in the last chapter, since it plays a crucial 
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Krueger’s notion of ‘scaffolded self’ importantly remarks that in 
schizophrenia we do neither encounter a mere neurological disorder, nor a simple 
disturbance of ipseity. Instead, the relational dimension is profoundly at stake, that 
is, the capacity of the affective side of the self to be shaped and regulated through 
bodily and emotional engagement with others and objects. Some cases of 
schizophrenia provoke a condition where one loses the direct grip on expressivity 
and affordances that should provide affective scaffolding (e.g. someone’s smile to 
display joy and to possibly provoke the same emotion in me, or the serene quality 
of the Moonlight Sonata to acquire a peaceful state of mind). The hyperreflexivity 
which defines unworlding and derealization can also be explained as me – the 
hypothetical patient – being «forced to recalibrate my affective experience and self-
regulative strategies through explicit attention and effort» (Krueger forthcoming, 
25). The spontaneous and direct access to the dimension of expressivity, we could 
say by slightly modifying Krueger’s claim, is crucial for our sense of confidence 
and pre-reflective trust that what surrounds us will scaffold our affective 
experiences; hence the emotional impairments that occur when such an access is 
not immediate anymore. 
Now, if we compare schizophrenic autism with the SHU syndrome provoked 
by solitary confinement (cf. 1.3), there are certainly some differences, since the 
latter is induced by a form of torture and implies in some cases a sort of hyper-
animation, as in the hallucinations that see other people appearing in the walls or in 
the excessive sensitivity to external stimuli. Yet, there are also striking 
similarities.68 Both schizophrenic autism and the SHU syndrome can entail a lack 
of contact with the lived and animated dimension of one’s own and others’ body, 
and as a consequence, a condition of solipsism coming from the essential alteration 
of perceptive structures. This is consistent with an impairment of the extended 
dimension of the expressive body, for a schizophrenic or a person with the SHU 
syndrome can be unable to display affectivity and consequently to be an affective 
                                                         
role for we-intentionality, and also because I intend to focus on the discussion of schizophrenia in 
this paragraph. 
68 I am thankful to Joel Krueger for pointing out a possible connection between the relational side 
of the body schema, schizophrenic autism and the solitary-confinement condition. 
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scaffold for the transmission of emotions to others.69 In other words, not only there 
is a fracture between someone’s body and her emotions, but she is also unable to 
start an interbodily communication – even a pre-reflective one – and so feels more 
and more immersed into solipsism. Moreover, in both schizophrenia and the SHU 
syndrome there occurs a loss of contact with the gestaltic unities of objects, the 
former due to a deficit in perception, and the latter to an artificially induced 
condition. Is the loss of material stimuli and scaffolding from external objects part 
of such disorders, then? It seems to me that, according to the need for relationality 
and extension of the lived body demonstrated above, when no element comes to 
integrate and support the affects and actions of the body schema the person is 
compelled to substitute those pre-reflective scaffoldings with delusional or 
hyperreflective alternatives. 
In sum, unworlding, depersonalization and derealization seem connected to 
the relational character of our lived body, which body schema is profoundly 
affected when relational possibilities and affective scaffolding are impaired. What 
has been argued so far should prove that the encounter with another without the 
affective perception of her expressivity does not bring about the schizophrenic’s 
exit from her solipsistic sphere. We could make an inference about the other’s 
mental state by looking at her face as a sum of single snapshots, and think that “if 
a person contracts her muscles in such and such ways, it is said that she should be 
joyful”, but we cannot be certain that she is really experiencing the emotion that we 
attribute to her. Ultimately, does the premise of the direct perception of expressivity 
justify the validity of empathy as a real exit from the solipsistic sphere of other 
theories? What are the conditions that allow to distinguish it from slightly different 
social phenomena? In order to answer these questions, in the next chapter I shall 
investigate the terms used to define the concept of empathy in Scheler. I shall 
attempt to show that, even if he used the term in another sense, it is possible to read 
in it the characteristic of a minimal form of empathy, and to contrast it with similar 
phenomena that not always find a proper differentiation in the literature. I will 
                                                         
69 Cf. the notions of inter-bodily and intra-bodily resonance in Fuchs (1996), and of extended body 
in Froese&Fuchs (2012) and Fuchs (2015). 
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therefore proceed to a critical assessment of alternative theories that, according to 
a Schelerian phenomenological perspective, are limited to the egoic sphere and 





3. Back to empathy itself. Defining the concept 
In the previous chapter, I have outlined the premises for empathy, namely its 
being grounded on expressivity, which relates to the body schema, to the visibility 
of certain emotions, and to the direct perception account. From a Schelerian 
perspective, this last involves interests and values, that shape the perception we 
have of objects, living beings, and situations, and at the same time they are shaped 
by experience. I have argued that, from birth to ordinary embodied interactions in 
adult life, one is able to grasp the expressivity of others in the forms of vitality 
affects, intentions, and emotions thanks to the qualities that are displayed in the 
facial features and in movements. Such capacity, according to Scheler, is 
explainable thanks to a universal grammar of expressivity. Since Scheler makes a 
universality claim, I have entered the debate on the universality of emotions: are 
there any basic emotions (Ekman), which can be recognised by all civilizations and 
from both young and old members of the species (Darwin)? And how would they 
be related to universal expressions?  
In order to clarify this, I have supported a distinction among more and less 
visible emotions, universal expressions and gestures. In all of them, what is primary 
is the direct, pre-reflective perception of the meaning: affective perception, or in 
other words, value-ception precedes perception, if conceived as a neutral act aimed 
at a rational knowledge. The same holds true for other-perception, since Scheler 
argues that the first encounter with the other’s expressivity is a 
Fremdwahrnehmung, and would – I have claimed – share many of the assumptions 
of interaction theory (IT). I have also examined some cases of schizophrenia as 
empirical examples of an impaired direct perception of expressivity. In such 
conditions, the ill person is precluded an entire sphere of the world, and more 
radically, she is confined into a dimension of solipsism, namely schizophrenic 
autism. The reactions of others become for such people unpredictable; they do not 
even have a direct encounter with another, since they perceive living beings (and 
sometimes objects as well) as a sum of körperlich sides.  
The two concepts of expressivity and of direct perception are the grounds 
which allow one to enter into contact with alterity: without them, one would simply 
try to guess what the other is intending or feeling, since there would be no direct 
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corroboration. What is then to be included in a concept of empathy rooted in the 
lived body and its expressive possibilities? And what is the border between 
solipsism and keeping instead a differentiation between the empathising subjects? 
Although Scheler does use the term “empathy” in the a negative, I am going to 
prove that he had such a concept in mind, and that he provides a sharp 
differentiation between it and similar phenomena within of the field of sympathy. 
Moreover, I mean to prove that his account constitutes a successful alternative to 
the solipsistic biases of the theory theory and the simulation theory. 
 
3.1 A lexicon of sympathy. Scheler’s account  
The term “empathy” has been used with so many different meanings, that it is 
hard to establish its real scope. Is it a form of bodily understanding, a cognitively 
demanding task, a self-projection, or even the positive constituent of cooperation 
and the origin of morality? I will attempt to narrow its meaning – at least for what 
concerns its minimal form – by referring to Scheler’s particularly well exposed 
account in Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. Although it has been quoted by most 
contemporary phenomenologists who have studied the empathic process, there is 
still a certain confusion in interpreting his lexicon of sympathy, consequently much 
more has to be dug in it. After the highlighted theoretical grounds for empathy in 
the previous chapters, namely the lived body, expressivity, and direct perception, 
what constitutes the process itself? 
Scheler provides a precise distinction among different phenomena which are 
all present in the social sphere, yet cannot be reduced to the same process: 
Sympathieethik (the ethics of sympathy); Gefühlsansteckung (affective contagion); 
Einsfühlung (unipathy, literally “feeling as one”); Mitgefühl or mitfühlen (affective 
co-feeling); Miteinanderfühlen (reciprocal feeling with one another); Einfühlung 
([projective] empathy); Nachfühlen (affective re-feeling), also referred to as 
nachleben (re-live) or nacherleben (re-experience), this last being the concept that 







First of all, Scheler means to contrast the concept of empathy as conceived by 
the ethics that ground morality on the co-feeling (Hume, Smith). As it will be 
explained when dealing with Mitgefühl, such an intentional stance presupposes 
empathy-Nachfühlen which is blind to moral values (wertblind), since it makes it 
possible to rejoice at of another’s agony. On the one hand, the ethics of sympathy 
presuppose what they intend to prove, as they ground the higher or lower ranking 
of a value on the emotional reaction of the observer. In other words, we could say 
by the Formalismus terms that they fall prey to the subjectivism of values; for 
instance, it is morally positive only to rejoice with another’s joy which already 
possesses an ethical value. On the other hand, they break what Scheler calls “the 
rule of preference” where the spontaneous, morally positive acts are to be preferred 
to the mere reactive ones (as the co-feeling is, unlike an act of love). 
 
3.1.2 Gefühlsansteckung 
Empathy as a way of primary encounter with another has to be separated from 
the phenomenon of affective contagion, where the distinction between the subjects 
of the feeling is blurred. There is, in other words, a confusion in the sense of agency: 
someone’s suffering, cheerfulness, etc., is not given to me as her feeling, but as 
mine.70 Ansteckung, in fact, can also mean “infection” in the medical sense, and just 
as one can be infected by a disease, so she can unwillingly assume an affective state 
from others. For instance, Scheler states that if one enters a room during a party, 
she most likely assumes the cheerfulness of the surrounding environment, and she 
does not realise that her affective state has changed all of a sudden because of the 
context. In the same way, she may not understand where her sadness comes from 
and notice only afterwards that the feeling has emerged after being with a group of 
people by whose melancholic state she has involuntarily been affected. Emotional 
contagion is quite different from empathy and from what will be later clarified in 
the process of co-feeling (section 3.1.5).  
                                                         





Here there is neither affective intention towards the joy or the suffering 
of another, nor any participation to her experience. Moreover, it is 
characteristic of emotional contagion to occur just between affective 
states (Gefühlszuständen), and that it does not require at all any 
knowledge of the other’s joy. (…) There is nothing in such sorrow that 
shows its origin; through inferences and causal reasoning it becomes 
clear where it comes from. Such «contagion» does also not necessarily 
need another’s affective experiences. Moreover, the objective qualities 
of similar feelings that adhere to and are given in the objects of nature 
or of a «milieu», like the cheerfulness of a spring landscape, the 
gloominess of a rainy weather, the pitifulness of a room, can in this 
sense affect our affective states by contagion. (GW VII, 26) 
 
Here Scheler is stating that in the case of contagion there is no affective 
intentionality – as it would instead be the case if we were directed towards the 
emotion of another person in order to grasp it – this being rather a spread of affective 
states. A person who experiences such a situation is not fully aware of the origin of 
this affective stream (sense of agency), though she experiences it with a first-person 
perspective (sense of ownership). Moreover, for their being non-intentional, the 
types of affective states prone to contagion include the notion of mood, whose  
origin becomes clear only a posteriori and through reasoning (GW II, 262).71 Moods 
are not object-oriented emotions but mere affective tones in the background which 
determine the conditions of possibility for the emergence of emotions or for the 
variability of the environment salience. For instance, when in a melancholic mood, 
we may tend to perceive the degraded elements of a urban landscape with more 
intensity, or to give more importance to a negative fact than to a positive one, and 
to fall prey to sadness (as an emotion) more easily. The other’s expressivity can 
                                                         
71 Although I am not referring to what he calls “existential feelings”, cf. Ratcliffe (2010) for a good 
analysis of moods and a differentiation between experiencing an intentional emotion and being in a 
certain mood. Moods may also have an influence on the predisposition to perceive the other in a 
certain way, and to the being prone or not to enter an affective contact with her. For instance, though 
Peter Goldie criticizes the so-called empathetic perspective-shifting, his remark on the influence of 
moods on it may be extended to the openness and disposition to the direct-perceptual encounter: «If 
B is feeling irritable from drinking too much coffee and A is not, A’s attempt to perspective-shift to 
B’s psychological states may well fail for this reason; for example, if A is wondering what B will 
decide to do if he (B) sees someone queue-barging in front of him» (Goldie 2011, 311). 
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mediate contagion, but the characteristics that distinguish such a phenomenon from 
an empathic perception are basically: a) in contagion, the borders between subjects 
are blurred, since the origin of the feeling is not clear, b) there is no directionality 
towards the feeling as pertaining to the other, and c) the subject who falls prey to 
contagion unwillingly acquires the same affective state as the one she has been 
acquainted with.  
 
3.1.3 Einsfühlung 
An extreme case of emotional contagion is unipathy, or “feeling as one”. Here, 
not only the affective state is transmitted without clear awareness of its origin and 
the border between the subjects’ agencies is blurred, but there is also an actual, 
involuntary identification of one’s own individual “I” with another. One example 
is the well-known case in Lipps’ theory of empathy. If we observe an acrobat 
walking on a rope, such a bodily and affective identification occurs so that we are 
‘carried in him’. There is an affective participation in his movement, to the point 
that – according to Lipps – only the real I of the observer remains separated from 
the observed one. Scheler criticizes Lipps’ account as a case of projective empathy 
that overlooks the direct givenness of affectivity in the expressive phenomena, as it 
will become clear in the analysis of the term Einfühlung.  
Scheler takes into account a long list of other unipathic phenomena,72 such as 
the identification of the members of some tribes with the supposed animal contained 
in a totem or an ancestor or the ecstasies into which an initiate to religious mysteries 
goes, when she experiences a fusional identification with the whole realm of being, 
with a god or with life in general. Other cases are the identification of a hypnotized 
person with the hypnotizer and the pathologic, “hysteric” transmissions described 
                                                         
72 When unipathy reaches the point of a complete absorption of one ego into the other, Scheler 
distinguishes two kinds of unipathic identification, namely ‘idiopathic’ and ‘heteropathic’ (GW VII, 
29 ff). In the first mode, the ‘I’ of the other is – so to speak – absorbed in my own at the level of 
consciousness, while in the second case it is my self that is eclipsed in favor of the other, so that I 
live ‘in the other’, as if I lived through her, adopting her essential attitudes. In other words, in both 
cases the alterity (of myself or of the other) is compromised in experience, at least at the 
psychological level. Cf. also 4.1. 
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by Freud in Mass Psychology. Also, the unipathic identification of an infant in a 
game when she believes a pretended situation to be real; some cases of 
schizophrenia, in which the patient identifies for example with a historical character 
or the “genuine” (echte) unipathy of two lovers in a sexual intercourse, where they 
intend to participate in the stream of life and to forget about their individual “I”s. 
Finally, the fusion among the members of non-organized masses, where a single 
stream of affects influences all its parts,73 and last, the unipathic relation between 
mother and infant as a psycho-vital unity – although it has been shown in the first 
chapter that the theory of the undifferentiated flux does not erase the possibility of 
a bodily individuation. 
It is important to notice that, despite the negative turns that it can generate, 
like the excesses of mass enthusiasm, unipathy is what Scheler claims to be the 
fundamental metaphysical root of expressivity. It has already been explained that 
the immediate grasping of an affective meaning from all living beings is possible 
for their sharing a common grammar and pertaining to the same All-leben. All of 
them are given a “vital consciousness” – the centre of affects, instincts, vital 
impulses – and a Leibschema that constitutes the mere primary level of 
individuation, since in unipathy they are still immersed in the – psychologically – 
undifferentiated flux. Such a condition allows not only humans to establish 
embodied interaction with one another, but animals as well. Quoting here an 
example that Scheler had read in Bergson, some wasps are able to paralyze spiders, 
beetles and caterpillars by a sting, and to lay their eggs in them; it is surprising how 
those hymenoptera are as capable, as a surgeon, to detect the precise spot where to 
sting in order to paralyze the animal without killing it. It is as if they could perform 
an empathic act and detect the right regions of vulnerability.  
According to what Scheler calls the “foundational laws of empathy” (GW VII, 
105ff), unipathy grounds the phenomena of Nachfühlen and Mitgefühl, and in 
Scheler the proper border between the basic and the higher levels might prima facie 
appear problematic. Does such a claim entail that we need identification in order to 
                                                         
73 This point will be further examined when discussing the we-intentionality, in the last chapter. 
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experience empathy?74 In other words, does this foundational law imply that 
Nachfühlen-empathy is a multi-phased process, possible only after experiencing a 
state of fusion? Scheler claims explicitly that the foundation he has in mind is of a 
metaphysical kind, and this is the reason Nachfühlen and Mitgefühl are two 
originary phenomena that cannot be reduced to simpler facts of a psychogenetic 
kind, so they cannot be reduced to a developmental process from unipathy to 
empathy (GW VII, 66). The main difference between contagion/unipathy and 
empathy is that the latter is a feeling-function: it presupposes an affective 
understanding that differentiates it from a mere transmission of feeling-states like 
the abovementioned moods. It is not clear, however, where the line between 
empathy and unipathy lies in living beings that possess consciousness but only an 
embodied individuation, because the psychological “I” involved in empathy – as I 
am going to explain – would not allow them such an ability. Can we have the 
certainty that a wasp performs only an identification with the caterpillar’s organism 
through a vital centre, given that it can individuate the perfect spot where to sting 
in a different body (GW VII, 40), just as we can understand the meaningful 
movements of a dog? The wasp is able to perform a Wertnehmen, an affordance-
grasping, since it seems to individuate the precise vulnerable but non-lethal spot. 
Despite this, it cannot be said that unipathy/contagion are present in empathy: 
expressivity and its consequences on the impulsive structure, its meaningful 
dynamics, its perceived potentialities for interaction are all basic elements for the 
emergence of empathy. Yet, this in no way implies that an affective state has to be 
acquired by the empathizer in order to be understood, or that the two “I”s have first 
to identify and then differentiate. In this sense, I cannot agree with Stephen 
Darwall’s definition of emotional contagion as «[t]he most rudimentary form of 
empathy (…) as when one “catches” a feeling or emotional state from another, not 
by imaginative projection, but more directly» (Darwall 1997, 264). 
Unipathy/contagion and empathy are both immediate, and both involve pre-
reflective acquaintance with the meaning of expressivity, but the crucial point lies 
in the subjects’ differentiation. Contagion/unipathy blur the sense of agency, and in 
                                                         
74 I am thankful to Henning Nörenberg, who made me realize with a similar question the possible 
misunderstanding hidden in Scheler’s laws of foundation of the phenomena of sympathy. 
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some way the subject who undergoes them lacks the intentionality that is directed 
either towards the subject as experiencing a certain feeling, or towards the feeling 
as experienced by that subject. If I enter a room where a party is going on, I more 
or less tacitly perceive the general mood, while individual subjects are not 
targeted.75 Let’s examine now what we mean by the term “empathy” from a 
Schelerian perspective. 
 
3.1.4 Nachfühlen as “empathy” and a response to some critiques  
At a first glance, this term might misdirect us towards a simulation or imitation 
of what another feels: does it concern the need to reproduce in ourselves what the 
other is experiencing? Nachfühlen is in fact the concept that I consider as the 
Schelerian proper definition of empathy, for its being grounded on the lived body 
and the direct perception of expressivity, but also entailing something additional if 
compared to unipathy or emotional contagion, in that the subjects are individuated 
and do not lose their sense of agency. Such a term has been translated in many 
misleading ways that suggest an incorrect imitative or simulationist account of 
empathy in Scheler. The English translation of Wesen und Formen der Sympathie 
(Scheler 2008) mentions Nachfühlen as a reproduced, vicarious feeling; Owens 
(1970) uses “affective reproduction” to indicate it; Sánchez Guerrero mistakes the 
Schelerian re-feeling for the criticized projective empathy of Lipps, since he states 
that «[t]he sense of connectedness at issue here is, thus, not a matter of what 
Theodor Lipps (1905) calls projective empathy [Nachfühlen or Einfühlen]» 
(Sánchez Guerrero 2016, 6). However, Scheler contrasts an imitative interpretation 
of his concept, as he states: 
 
Imitation (Nachahmung), even as a mere «tendency», presupposes 
rather to have somehow already the other’s experience and cannot then 
explain what it should here explain. For instance, if we imitate 
(involuntarily) a gesture76 of fear or joy, the imitation is never purely 
triggered by the optic image of such gesture, but an impulse of imitation 
                                                         
75 I will come back to this point in 4.1 and 4.2. 
76 Scheler uses the term Gebärde, although I believe that spontaneous expressions and gestures 
should be kept distinct (see chapter 2). 
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always occurs if we have, first of all, already grasped the gesture as the 
expression of joy or fear. Should that grasp be possible – as Lipps thinks 
– only through a tendency of imitation and, caused by it, a reproduction 
of a joy or fear previously experienced (+ a projective empathy of what 
is in this way reproduced in others), we would move inside an evident 
circle. (GW VII, 21) 
 
According to Scheler, such a phenomenon is therefore not an imitative process 
but rather an erkennender Verhalten, that can be translated as a 
perceiving/recognizing/understanding behaviour. In fact, for an affective reaction 
to emerge in us (the co-feeling), it presupposes the acquisition of the affective 
quality at stake through unipathy – which grounds the Nachfühlen –, and then 
«some form of knowledge of the fact of the other’s experiences, of their nature and 
qualities, as well as, certainly, of the experience of the existence of others’ psychic 
essences (fremder seelicher Wesen), which is the condition of possibility for such 
knowledge» (GW VII, 19). It is worth remarking that its being an affective process 
distinguishes it from a mere Verstehen.77 Such “knowledge” is instead to be 
intended as an immediate grasp of meaning and values in perception and neither as 
an inferential judgment – that is, neither as an analogical reasoning – nor as an 
impulse of imitation.  
This implies that a) Nachfühlen presupposes a distance from ‘I’ and ‘thou’, 
since, according to Scheler, a Ich überhaupt is already given in an experience. The 
difference between an experience for me and an experience for the empathized 
person is then a pre-reflective, intuitive datum. It is well possible to grasp 
experiences in the expressive phenomena directly, and it is also a matter of internal 
perception since we perceive their lived body as the expressive field of their 
experiences. Nonetheless, it is never assumed that the other is entirely transparent 
or that her feelings are given to me in the first-personal mode; b) the quality of 
another’s feeling is affectively grasped without the need of it being transferred into 
                                                         
77 That is why Krebs (2015, 120) criticizes Peter Goldie who, in his book The Emotions, recognizes 
only the understanding (Verstehen) as a prerequisite for the real co-feeling, leaving aside 
Nachfühlen. Understanding implies, however, that we have first of all grasped a feeling affectively, 
as otherwise we would have to infer it from detached elements, and to affectively respond with the 
sharing implied by co-feeling would thus be less immediate and no more reactive. 
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us – which would be a case of emotional contagion – or the consequence that a real, 
identical feeling originates in us; c) the I-thou difference present in the phenomenon 
of Nachfühlen also means that we can perceive someone’s feeling but remain 
perfectly indifferent, therefore not participating in it at all. This is a clear reference 
to the criticism to the theories which see empathy as the morally positive origin of 
ethics. For instance, we could perceive the expressivity in someone else’s facial 
display of surprise and shame clearly, but use it for our own interests or even feel 
indifference for her condition of uneasiness – as it happens in case of the antisocial 
personality disorder, (mentioned in the previous chapter, p. 103, footnote). Scheler 
uses indeed the term “empathy” in the negative, namely for the Lippsian account of 
self-projection onto the other and his impulse of imitation. However, this is 
according to me the most appropriate definition, as he would not agree on the term 
“inter-subjectivity” that might suggest a radical split between the individuals and 
the conception of them as two already-formed, monadic entities.  
The second point (b, see above) is particularly significant to respond to Jacob’s 
criticism (2011) to the direct-perception account of empathy. In order to do that, 
Jacob bashes Zahavi’s reading of the Schelerian view, therefore it is worth 
examining the “root cause”, that is the Schelerian account itself in the light of 
Jacob’s conditions for empathy. With regard to the term “empathy”, Jacob states 
that «the word is meant to apply paradigmatically to the experience of one 
individual (the empathizer) who comes to share another’s (the target’s) affective or 
emotional experience (e.g. pain) as a result of her awareness of the other’s 
experience» (Jacob 2011, 520). But does empathy-Nachfühlen really concern the 
sharing of an affective experience, given that, from what has been argued so far, 
one could in theory respond to an agony expression with indifference, or most likely 
with a different affect? According to Jacob, it actually does. 
The scholar means to pinpoint a 5-condition based account of empathy, in 
order – he writes – to distinguish it from affective contagion, sympathy, and 
mindreading (Jacob 2011, 523). Such requirements are: a) the affectivity condition, 
which restricts empathy to affective states, and claims that both the empathizer and 
the target must experience one; b) the interpersonal similarity condition, which 
implies that both subjects must experience a similar feeling (like some kind of pain 
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or fear); c) the causal path condition, which is linked to the second one and claims 
that the empathizer is in that specific affective state because of the target’s one; d) 
the ascription condition, that concerns the appropriate attribution of a feeling to the 
target; and last, e) the caring condition, which supports that the empathizer must be 
interested in the other’s feelings. Claim e) has already been dismissed by the 
analysis of Scheler’s theory: it is possible to grasp the other’s affective state but 
respond with indifference. Moreover, the arguments carried on in the first two 
chapters should make it clear that the concept of “care” is too cognitively 
demanding to correspond to the salience of things that catch our attention according 
to our value system. For instance, we may not “care” specifically for a person who 
is drowning, but at the same time not be able to avoid the immediate, invasive “call” 
of her frantic movements, facial expression of agony, and the general contest of 
danger. 
However, the major problem concerns the claim of a similar affective state (b) 
that originates in the empathizer from her contact with the affective state of the 
target (c). Despite Jacob presupposing a self-other differentiation in point d), how 
would empathy differ from emotional contagion, if a feeling passes from one 
individual to the other, and this is the only way to know what the target is 
experiencing? If we admit a reproduction in ourselves of the other’s feeling, then it 
would require the occurrence of a real, similar feeling in us – even if it lasted just 
for some moments (GW VII, 22). This would mean that we could understand a 
person’s anguish while she’s drowning only if we experienced it ourselves, or that, 
while reading a crime novel, we empathized with the murderer’s sense of guilt and 
worry about being caught only if we assumed them in ourselves or we had 
committed a murder and recalled those same feelings. 
To explain Jacob’s proposal, we should appeal either to an affective stream 
that flows from one subject to the other and makes them acquire the same affective 
state, non-intentionally, or to a more complex process than empathy involved by 
the similarity condition. This would presuppose an identification with the other’s 
feeling, that is, a direct expressivity-grasping of what the other is experiencing. 
Such identification is however inserted after Jacob’s imitated affective state, and 
after an adequate response, which according to him corresponds to the acquisition 
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of the same feeling. However, if we take the example of grief, an expression of 
great sadness is actually more an implicit call for help than an attempt to make the 
empathizer sad in her turn. So, Jacob’s account is not only phenomenologically 
incorrect, but also a hybrid concept that resembles either emotional contagion or 
what Scheler calls co-feeling, that presupposes Nachfühlen but adds a response of 
affective participation in the other’s condition, such as co-suffering, co-rejoicing, 
and so on.78 
 
3.1.5 Mitgefühl  or mitfühlen 
In Scheler’s ‘order of foundation’ of the sympathetic phenomena, Nachfühlen 
obviously grounds the sharing of feelings in the forms of “immediate co-feeling” 
(Mit-einanderfühlen), which concerns already the emergence of a we-intentionality 
– for this reason I will investigate it in the last chapter –, and the intentional co-
feeling (Mitgefühl an etwas), like the co-rejoicing “in” another’s joy, or the co-
suffering “with” her sorrow. Moreover, unlike the previous sympathethic forms, 
co-feeling entails the intention to feel the affective condition of others (GW VII, 
24). Two distinctive acts – such as my co-suffering and another’s suffering – are 
here at stake, differently from any sense of ‘we’, as co-feeling and its presupposed 
distance between subjects are the origin of the phenomenon that we are taking into 
account. One can co-feel another’s joy for she intends it as an affective function in 
itself, distinct from her agency, and to which she can respond with an affective 
participation. Feeling as a function, distinctly from the non-intentional moods 
transmitted by contagion, is in fact intentional (GW II, 261): no matter how directly 
it can grasp values and expressivity, it still refers to an object with which we do not 
“merge” or confuse.  
Here the possibility to grasp expressivity without a clear sense of agency 
(unipathy, contagion) and the hypothetic indifference of the mere empathetic 
perception (Nachfühlen) are to be excluded, although they are both conditions for 
the emergence of Mitgefühl. Co-feeling is in fact a reaction to another’s feeling and 
to the corresponding value-attitude, which are given in the Nachfühlen. It is 
                                                         
78 For a thorough critique of Jacob’s article, cf. also Zahavi (2011). 
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however different from it, as the Nachfühlen may even be in contrast with the co-
feeling of the same affective state of the other, or in simpler words, it is possible for 
a sadist to respond with pleasure or even joy to a victim’s suffering (GW VII, 25). 
Co-feeling is also different from the empathetic phenomenon described by Jacob, 
as in no case it presupposes that the two subjects experience the same affective 
state. It is a function, which means that the feelings of the two or more people 
remain separated. A function leads to the other’s state, it does not involve an 
intention towards one’s own affective state. The other’s feeling is not transferred, 
and an identical one is not produced in the subject who co-feels. The other remains 
“other”. Although the theoretical solipsism is already contrasted efficaciously by 
the possibility of direct perception in expressivity, since subjects are not confined 
within a “mental”, “inner” world that has no windows, according to Scheler it is 
only in co-feeling that the real solipsism (Realsolipsismus) is overcome ethically, 
i.e. in its meaning of egocentricity (GW VII, 107).79 
 
3.1.6 Einfühlung , as a projective kind of empathy 
It might be bewildering that the term “empathy” has been used so far to 
translate Nachfühlen, despite Scheler’s insertion of Einfühlung – the German word 
for empathy – in his analysis of the forms of sympathy. However, I remark once 
more that the two kinds of empathy are to be kept very well distinct: Nachfühlen is 
what I mean for a phenomenological empathic process, grounded on the lived body 
and on the perception of expressivity in it, yet keeping the agencies of the subjects 
well distinct. Conversely, by Einfühlung Scheler refers only to a projective kind of 
empathy which was proposed by Lipps as an embodied impulse of imitation. Some 
hints of the criticism to Lipps’ theory and the example of the acrobat have been 
exposed in the last paragraphs, as Scheler believes that a projective account leads 
                                                         
79 By egocentricity, Scheler means «the illusion of mistaking one’s environment [Umwelt] for the 
world [Welt] itself, i.e. the deceptive givenness of one’s own environment as “the” world (…) i.e. 
the inclination to the identification of one’s own values with the Umwelt-values, and of one’s own 
Umwelt-values with the world of values» (GW VII, 69). Such egocentricity is declined into the three 
forms of solipsism, egoism, and autoeroticism, referring respectively to the grasp of the reality of 
objects, to the will and the practical attitude, and to the attitude that one keeps in love.  
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to an evident impasse which contrasts with the primacy of perception in the 
encounter of others (GW VII, 21). Only for sensorial feelings (sinnliche Gefühle), 
i.e. affective sensations (Gefühlsempfindungen), a reproduction is needed in order 
to understand and co-feel them (GW VII, 59; GW II, 408). I can, for instance, 
neither understand the pleasure of a sweet litchi fruit before I taste it, nor the 
sensorial enjoyment of a sadist who sees her victim’s suffering, or even the sensorial 
feelings of a bat hunting mosquitos. However, once this category of values has been 
excluded, it would be contradictory to apply the necessity of a simulation to the 
entire empathic domain. As it has been shown regarding unipathy, Lipps’ theory is 
not incorrect in itself, but it is misleading because it expects to explain what Scheler 
calls Nachfühlen – which presupposes a distance between the subjects, and not 
identification, as in Einsfühlung. In other words, the observer, from a Lippsian 
perspective, “feels as one” with the acrobat. 
It should also be remarked that Lipps was happening at the beginning of the 
century. He founded in fact the Akademischer Verein für Psychologie in Munich, a 
society that later hosted debates among early phenomenologists, including Scheler 
himself, who attended its meetings from 1907 on (cf. Salice 2015). A short 
clarification is necessary here to explain Lipps’ novelty, compared to the previous 
theories of empathy. By assuming a bodily resonance, Lipps meant to contrast a too 
abstract argument from analogy in social cognition. This argument claims in fact 
that we can be acquainted with the “other minds” only by the explicit, inferential 
recognition of a similarity between me (the first system) and the other’s behavior 
or physical appearance (the second system). In other words, if the other looks and 
behaves like me, then she should also be given consciousness; besides, the other’s 
affective states or intentions are explained by appealing to what I experience when 
I perform a certain behavior, like laughing when I am amused. As Scheler remarks 
(GW VII, 234), such an analogical reasoning leads to a four-layered impasse. It 
presupposes, in fact, that we have already perceived the other as a living, animated 
being, and we have knowledge of that for its expressive movements. It does not 
allow to infer the existence of another animated being, but only if something similar 
to mine is experienced, and which quality of experience is then taking place, 
pleasure, attention, a memory, etc. It is not clear how such argument would justify 
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our being able to understand the expressive movements of beings, like animals very 
different from us, such as the fear in a fish that we have already caught. Finally, it 
would lead to the logical mistake of the quaternio terminorum, to a fallacious 
syllogism in which the two “I”s are intended in two different ways – my ego and 
the other’s ego – so that, if the reasoning was correct, it would only explain the 
existence of my self or of an identical one. 
Lipps was well aware that the argument from analogy contained fallacious 
assumptions, and assessed it critically, since its Cartesian roots lead to the 
impossibility to explain the other’s unity of consciousness and her similarity to my 
consciousness: it presupposes at the same time the statement of another’s emotion 
from my experience, but an absolute difference between the two (Lipps 1907). My 
anger, for instance, would have nothing to do with yours, especially if the situations 
of occurrence were different. Although he does not use the concept of a pre-
reflective Leibschema, Lipps correctly points out that the argument from analogy is 
too cognitively demanding: if I perceive expressive movements 
(Ausdrucksbewegungen) and gestures, how can I be sure, and straight away too, that 
someone else’s expression corresponds to mine? On the contrary, I know the way 
my feeling of anger is displayed in my face because I am already acquainted with 
how it appears in other people (Lipps 1907, 699). So far, the influences on the 
Schelerian theory are quite evident in the rigorous criticism to the argument from 
analogy, in the need for finding a more direct and embodied clarification of the 
empathic encounter, and even in the claimed primacy of our encounter with others’ 
expressivity, since living beings are unities of consciousness. However, Lipps’ 
account is problematic in its appeal to an embodied tendency of simulation to 
interpret such direct understanding of other’s affective states or intentions:  
 
There is something like an impulse of imitation (Trieb der 
Nachahmung). (…) Let us take a trivial and perhaps not too personal 
example. I see someone yawning, i.e. I see occurring in his body a 
certain process which cannot be described in detail here. And now in 
myself arises inexplicably a tendency to “yawn”, i.e. to produce the 
corresponding muscular innervations, briefly, to practice the internal 
activity from which the same change develops in my body (Körper). 
Perhaps this tendency is not actualised in me; so I do not really yawn, 
either because decency forbids me to yawn or because I am sufficiently 
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in control of myself. Perhaps also the tendency in question is abolished 
by opposite tendencies of physical activity (körperlicher Betätigung), 
or it is done by counterbalancing, so that it cannot be felt at all (gar 
nicht fühlbar wird). However, apart from such counter-tendencies, the 
tendency still exists. It would otherwise be incomprehensible why 
others are brought by the perception of the yawning to the actual co-
yawning. (Lipps 1907, 716, my translation) 
 
 
Yawning is certainly a good example of a tendency of imitation: when we see 
someone yawning, it is hard not to do the same, and this is in fact “instinctive” in 
the sense that it arises spontaneously, without any explicit, cognitive control. Other 
examples of a tendency to mimicry can be quoted, like the unreflective smiling back 
when a baby smiles at us, or the involuntary going the same way as a stranger in 
the street in front of us, with the risk of bumping into each other. Yet, rather than 
an example of empathy, the case described by Lipps appears as contagion: it 
involves expressivity-grasping – the yawn is not a simple körperlich movement 
without a meaning, being perceived as a sign of sleepiness, drowsiness, and so on. 
The person who is “infected” may just have seen someone yawning, and have 
performed the same action without realizing that she was actually not sleepy before. 
In other words, as in emotional contagion, the borders of the sense of agency are 
blurred, which is what differentiates it from empathy.80 To the imitation-tendency, 
Lipps adds a tendency to display emotions through gestures, and one to co-
experience (Mit-erleben) another’s feeling. He does not deny the importance of 
expressivity for empathy since, like Scheler, he believes that the affect is directly 
present in the gesture, but wavers between a direct grasp of it and the need to take 
the same affective state (imitation, co-feeling) in order to experience its meaning. 
                                                         
80 This may be controversial: Norscia&Palagi argue that yawn contagion and «[t]he ability to share 
others’ emotions, or empathy» (2011, 1) are connected. Just as there are empathy- and emotional 
regulation-related biases due to group membership (cf. e.g. Szanto 2017), Norscia&Palagi have 
found evidence of an increased tendency to experience yawn contagion when it originates from 
people one has a strong social bond with, both in terms of the occurrence and of the frequency of 
the action. However, their ultimate claim is that empathy may be rooted in the emotional contagion 
that we experience in infancy with our closest people like caregivers (Norscia&Palagi 2011, 1), and 
not that yawning can be labelled under the concept of empathy. 
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In fact, he claims that direct perception occurs only if one has already experienced 
that particular feeling before – giving rise to a problematic conflict with the 
abovementioned evidence in infant research. With such a premise, according to 
Lipps the grasped affective state resonates with our previous experience of it and is 
automatically reproduced in us, so that we can understand what the other is going 
through. He states:  
 
[o]n the one hand, the affect is understood (hineingedacht) in the 
gesture, or conceived as being present in it, and on the other hand the 
affect is experienced in the gesture. (…) When I see the gesture, I feel 
the tendency, by virtue of the instinct of imitation, to call it into 
existence. And this is the affection which I naturally bind to this gesture. 
But this bond only exists after I have first experienced and expressed 
(geäußert) the affect. (…) A reproduced feeling of anger is then co-
given to me by the gesture of anger, immediately when I see it. For me, 
such a reproduced affect lies, or is present immediately inside it. And I 
can also express it in this way: for me, the feeling is envisaged or 
understood in it (hinein vorgestellt oder hineingedacht). (Lipps 1907, 
719, my translation) 
 
In short, according to this view empathy would require a) a previous 
experience of the feeling, b) a bond between expressivity and the relative feeling, 
but c) the presence of the empathized affect only when it is co-experienced in 
myself, therefore when I fall prey to affective contagion. It may be true that we hold 
a degree of contagion, together with empathy, which is why we tend to avoid 
collective sad situations like funerals, for we would both perceive the emotion 
(empathy) and be affected by the mood without the possibility to control it 
completely (contagion). Yet, we not always feel a tendency to imitate the 
movements bodily or to take on the feeling that we are perceiving.  Let’s think of 
our prompt lifting a baby who is about to fall – which is a reaction, and surely not 
an imitation of her action – or of our freezing at or escaping from somebody’s 
sudden attack. Let’s also imagine to watch the sadist mentioned above and to 
experience a strong sense of disgust at his satisfaction while torturing the victim. 
And in fact, if we had knowledge of the other’s feelings and intentions only through 
imitation/simulation, the options would be: a) we grasp the other as a Körper, and 
then try to imitate it in ourselves, by attempting to observe what happens in us when 
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we perform an expression. Yet we have seen that animation, intentions and feelings 
are primary when we deal with another living being, and Lipps himself refuses an 
explicit process. b) We try to remember what feelings we were experiencing in a 
similar situation, but then a new or completely extraneous condition would make it 
impossible to empathize with them (e.g. how a paralysed person experiences the 
world for a non-paralyzed one). c) We guess what the other one is experiencing by 
trying to imagine, more or less explicitly, how she might emotionally react, 
therefore we have no certainty to be right. The meaning of an expression comes 
only afterwards, and is not directly significant: the “expressive unity” is split into 
external and internal dimensions, falling again prey to a Cartesian error. 
 
If conceived as a projective kind of empathy, this concept would meet 
contradictions that do not allow to “reach” the other person properly: we would 
metaphorically run in circle trying to grasp the other’s affective state, and end up 
discovering that what we believed to be another’s feelings were nothing more than 
mine. And such a solipsistic impasse makes Lipps’ theory keep a degree of kinship 
with the argument from analogy that he intended to contrast, for although the role 
of the bodily and affective encounter is recognized as previous to any abstract 
reasoning, it still retains the problematic circularity according to which we could be 
only mediately in contact with another’s affective world. That would ultimately 
make expressivity unreliable. In the contemporary debate, such an account would 
be called simulation theory, while the cognitive version of the reasoning from 
analogy would go under the label of theory theory. Even if much has been said in 
contemporary phenomenology to contrast those two main tendencies in social 
cognition, Scheler’s account is rarely taken into consideration as a third alternative 
to contrast them, and when it is, the debates often display only a partial knowledge 
of his complete theory of empathy. To show the solipsistic biases that simulationist 
and theory-theory accounts originate, in contrast with the Schelerian view of 
empathy that has been argued, I will first present the origins of the notion of 





3.2 Alternative theories of empathy  
3.2.1 Etymological roots and origins of the concept  
Where does the conception of “reading into other minds” arise from? Even 
prior to the explicit formulation of the argument from analogy, and before the 
Cartesian split between res cogitans and res extensa, the reasons why empathy is 
so often conceived in terms of mind-reading might lie in the etymological roots of 
empathy, originally in the Greek language (empatheia) and then in German 
(Einfühlung). As a matter of fact, the two concepts involve a partial tacit dualism. 
With regard to “em-patheia”, the possibility to experience another’s emotions or 
intentions has to go through a spatial directionality of “feeling in” someone, as if 
we could transport ourselves literally “inside” her, adopt her perspective and feel 
what she feels. Inside the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition, Plato’s Ion reveals 
that a certain concept of empathy was used to define the identification of the 
audience with the rhapsode, a feeling that the rhapsode himself was able to 
recognize in them by watching their emotional reactions. If they reacted by crying, 
being appalled and astonished, it meant that he was well guiding them into the world 
of the declaimed epic poem, in which he himself had to feel part, with the 
appropriate emotional response. Aristotle’s Poetic suggested the “suffering with” a 
tragic hero by the public as it takes place in a theatrical piece; the drama leads the 
audience to a detachment from passions through a process of katharsis. Therefore, 
empathy in the ancient Greek tradition relied both on the direct perception of 
expressivity and on an implicit, affective identification that partially recalls what 
has been said about unipathy so far. 
Similarly to the Greek term, the German word contains the concept of “feeling 
in”, but it derives from the Romantic notion of universal attunement with nature 
and mankind – what Scheler would insert in the “unipathy” field. It made its first 
appearance in one of Johann Gottfried Herder’s works as hinein fühlen, to express 
that we can feel ourselves only in the others (Herder [1778] 1892, 188). Einfühlung 
was then the term coined by the philosopher of aesthetics Robert Vischer, who 
claimed that we can feel a universal sympathy for mankind through empathy with 
another human being (Vischer [1872] 1927). Here as well the notion of empathy 
has a nuance of Schelerian unipathy – for Herder conceives it as a feeling of 
135 
 
participation in the commonality of nature. Vischer’s notion has also some 
similarities with the Schelerian foundational laws of sympathy: as for Vischer 
empathy with a single human being can lead to sympathy for entire mankind, so 
can co-feeling (Mitgefühl), ground the universal love for mankind (Menschliebe, 
Humanitas) according to Scheler (Menschliebe, Humanitas) (GW VII).  
After this short analysis of the origins of the concept, it is no surprise that 
“empathy” is still a debated term, with numerous attempts to substitute it – with 
intersubjectivity, perspective-taking, and so on – and with various ambiguities that 
make it trespass onto other ‘reactive’ attitudes. The origins of the concept of 
empathy show therefore a certain connection with expressivity, though they also 
include related phenomena which have been proven not to correspond to a notion 
that sees embodied affective perception as primary, together with a preserved 
distance between subjects and with moral neutrality. Furthermore, the etymological 
roots seem to suggest an implicit spatial distinction between an inner and an outer 
dimension. This interpretation of empathy presupposes a “movement”, if it can be 
defined so, inside a person and therefore, by locating emotions, thoughts and 
intentions in the inner sphere, it sets a basic incommunicability between the mind 
and what is considered as a mere physical body.81 The embodied level is either 
overlooked or considered as a source of the process of simulation, through which 
the other’s experience is supposed to be understood. This dualism reaches its most 
famous peak in Descartes’ Second Meditation on First Philosophy. What would 
happen if we could reach the other only through a judgment, if even the perceived 
animation of living beings was only an illusion, and we could not trust our senses? 
The Cartesian metaphysical research leads him to reject any of those certainties: 
«[i]f I look out the window and see men crossing the square, as I just happen to 
have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves (…). Yet, do I see more 
than hats and coats which would conceal automatons? I judge that they are men» 
(Descartes [1641] 1984, 21). And, as seen in the previous chapter, if our normal 
perception worked in this way, with the need of a reflective inference whenever we 
                                                         
81 This results today in the so-called “invisibility thesis” (Zahavi 2014), which overlooks the primacy 
of a direct empathic encounter, as if we could grasp others’ affective states and intentions only 
through a simulation in ourselves or an explicit reasoning. 
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are in the presence of another living being, and given the related unpredictability of 
expressivity and social interactions, we would fall prey to a state of anxiety similar 
to the one described in some cases of schizophrenia.  
After Lipps – whose work has been analyzed in 3.1.3 and 3.1.6 – the role of 
embodiment starts to be taken into growing consideration and is further elaborated 
in the phenomenological movement, especially but not exclusively by Husserl, 
Stein, of course Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty. I do not intend to focus here on the 
declinations of empathy in the early phenomenology,82 as it would require a much 
broader space and would lead the reader astray from the main argument, that is a 
critical discussion with contemporary accounts of empathy. For this reason, I am 
going to skip to the theory theory and simulation theory directly, to prove their 
relation to the “indirect” ways to interpret empathy, present in the origins of the 
concept and in the reasoning from analogy.  
 
3.2.2 The theory theory 
One of the two prevailing accounts to explain empathy is the so-called theory 
theory which, as the name indicates, interprets the process in question as a cognitive 
prediction in terms of inferences. Not so far from the argument from analogy 
expounded above and partially recalling the Cartesian importance of a rational 
judgment, the theory theory explains empathy as a more or less explicit reasoning 
through which we can reach the other’s intentions and emotions. Although there 
are many different accounts under this label, we could say that the general claim is 
that the other’s mental states are only indirectly knowable through a prediction-
system that is modelled on a logical or scientific deduction from a set of contextual 
elements, previous experiences, behavior, and so on. One of the first formulations, 
in terms of a “theory of mind” (Premack&Woodruff 1978), has been exemplified 
by the well-known Maxi Test, created by Wimmer and Perner, in which children 
are asked to make a correct inference on a puppet’s thoughts in a concrete daily 
situation, by putting themselves “in its shoes”. In other words, pretending that Maxi 
(the puppet) is an animated and conscious being, children have to guess where Maxi 
                                                         
82 Two extensive analyses of this topic are by Zahavi (2011) and Jardine&Szanto (2017). 
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will look for an object that has been hidden in a certain place while it was away, a 
place that was different from the one it had seen before. According to the children, 
will Maxi look for the object in the first or the second hiding place? This test aims 
at measuring the ability to detect a false belief, using a «representation as a frame 
of reference for interpreting or anticipating the other person’s actions» 
(Wimmer&Perner 1983, 106).  
Thus, there is a ‘non-a’ situation (i.e. the object is not in the place Maxi saw 
before), but the puppet does not see that ‘non-a’, therefore it has also no reason to 
believe that ‘non-a’. Empathy would work just like a syllogism, even though it is 
hard to see this cognitive-demanding example as the basic situation that occurs in 
everyday interactions – there are much simpler cases in which there is only 
embodied interaction without so complex a narrative. It is worth remarking that this 
kind of ability does not emerge prior to 4-6 years of age: the theory theory focuses 
on mind-reading skills, and not on embodied interaction and the immediate 
attribution of meaningfulness to actions.83 In fact, it is connected to the capacity to 
formulate correct inferences on a narrative, but certainly not to affective perception. 
As Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985, 38) put it, «a theory of mind is impossible 
without the capacity to form ‘second-order representations’». 
A more recent version of TT is the one provided by Nichols&Stich (2003), who 
from the start explicitly adopt the term “mindreading” as they believe the empathic 
capacity should be regarded with awe – an aura of mysticism opposite to claiming 
the immediate grasp of some emotions in expressions. Their thesis is certainly less 
cognitively-demanding, as they support a representational account of cognition 
which does not exclude that propositional attitudes might underlie structures not 
necessarily quasi-linguistic. However, their account still relies on a cognitive theory 
of pretense as an essential capacity for empathy, clearly connected to the theory of 
mind examined above. They even envisage a split between the capacity to anticipate 
behavioral patterns and the one to detect goals. Without the notion of goal, a prey 
that sees a wild beast on the verge of attacking it would only react on a behavioral 
basis, but could not detect the intention hidden in the beast’s expressivity. And, 
beyond considering such expressivity only as a form of behaviorism, since 
                                                         
83 See also Baron-Cohen (1995) and Leslie (1991). 
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expressions would be only cues (Nichols&Stich 2003, 79), they also differentiate 
such basic, implicit predictions from mindreading, and understanding a desire from 
understanding a belief, which would emerge only after the age of three. 
Does an infant have no empathic capacity before that age then, and why should 
empathy be a cognitive skill rather than an affective-based perception? Instead of 
grasping a meaning in expressions from the very beginning of her life, why would 
an infant have an experience of others similar to the affectively detached one 
described in some cases of schizophrenia, or of patients suffering from the Möbius 
syndrome?84 The traditional differentiation between cognitive empathy and 
affective empathy tends to equate the former with affective contagion or even 
identification – i.e., with the transmission of the same feeling from the target to the 
empathizer. It is as if, in order to experience that one is grief-stricken, we would 
have to grieve ourselves. Decety and Cowell, for instance, define it so: «[t]he 
emotional component of empathy involves the capacity to share or become 
affectively aroused by others’ emotions (at least in valence, tone, and relative 
intensity). It is commonly referred to as emotion contagion, or affective resonance, 
and is independent of mindreading and perspective-taking capacities» 
(Decety&Cowell 2014, 337). Therefore, according to this view, individual 
differences would be preserved only in cognitive empathy, which can be a “rational 
choice”, an effort of imagination, a mere perspective-taking as in the Maxi test, or 
even a detached form of utilitarianism that criticizes affective empathy for being 
morally biased (Bloom 2016). I will not discuss morality here, as it has been shown 
that empathy-Nachfühlen can be successfully performed by a sadist or by a person 
affected by anti-social behaviour.  
As far as the doubts about “emotional” empathy are concerned, it has been 
argued that its differentiation from affective contagion lies in the fact that, since it 
                                                         
84 The Möbius syndrome is a rare congenital neurological disorder that, among other symptoms, 
causes facial paralysis and the impossibility to perform facial expressions. Cole (2001), who has 
analyzed patients with such a disease, shows in this sense the relation between the possibility of 
bodily expressing emotions and empathy. Not only in fact they struggle to recognize feelings in 
others, but they also report to have a less intense affective response, up to the point that they 
rationalize (“think” of) affective states rather than feel them. Cf. also Krueger (2009). 
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consists in an intentional kind of feeling-function, it can be directed towards the 
other or to a feeling as pertaining to the other: no matching of an affective state is 
required. Of course, the whole range of empathic relations is not explainable 
through embodied encounters. The importance of a reflective kind of empathy – 
which can be present in linguistic interactions, in the act of reading fiction, and so 
on – is certainly not to be dismissed, but it cannot be applied to all cases of everyday 
empathic encounters. Then, if empathy has been claimed to be first of all a feeling-
function, affective states (intentions included) do not need any reasoning to be 
grasped while, at the same time, the individuals keep a distinct identity or a distinct 
emotion. In order to anticipate “behavioural patterns”, as Nichols&Stich (2003) call 
them, an embodied affective grasping is sufficient without any pretense or a theory 
of mind; nor can empathy be reduced to the detection of false belief. For instance, 
a child could easily detect that Maxi is not looking for the chocolate in the right 
place by observing his repeated unsuccessful attempts to find it. The theory theory 
overlooks the role of direct perception, and sees emotions and intentions as invisible 
states hidden in a Cartesian-like mind.  
Ultimately, an exclusive inferential-like theory to interpret the empathic 
encounter with others leads to a solipsistic confinement that resembles the one 
described by Lisa Guenther of people in some extreme prison conditions (cf. 
chapter 1). There, one could not properly encounter lived bodies, but only Körper 
in the same manner as inanimate objects, to which a consciousness that has no 
possibility of interpersonal corroboration attributes meaning. A logical deduction, 
as in the detection of a false belief, should be grounded on the repetition of elements 
already found in previous experiences, whose meaning must be rooted in a value-
ception, unless we intend to end up in a regressus ad infinitum where I can only be 
acquainted with myself and the others become either a complete mystery or the 
shadow of my ego. On the contrary, solipsism and egocentrism can be overcome 
through a theory of empathy based on expressivity; as Scheler states,  
 
Therefore understanding (Verstehen), empathy (Nachfühlen), and co-
feeling (Mitfühlen), both as others’ states and of others’ felt values and 
value-attitudes (Wertverhalte) (a complex of pure co-feeling and of 
value-feeling), can expand our life and lead us out of the constrictions 
of our real experiencing, and can also bring about this and another real 
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experience, under the determining condition of bringing life to its 
fullness, that is given to the open heart through understanding and co-
feeling with states or values of the environment or of history. (GW VII, 
60) 
 
On the contrary, a theory that does not presuppose an originary openness towards 
expressivity leads to a solipsistic jail: 
 
According to the other theory here rejected, we would first be 
necessarily locked in the prison of our particular experiences, that are 
so different on the levels of individual, nation, and history, and all that 
we could understand and co-feel would be only a selection of this life 
actually experienced by us. (GW VII, 60) 
 
Once it has been demonstrated that the theory theory retains the same biases as the 
reasoning from analogy, a less explicit form of analogy has to be taken into account: 
the simulation theory. 
 
3.2.3 The simulation theory  
3.2.3.1 Problems in the explicit version of ST: 
incommunicability and egocentricity  
Since Lipps argued in favor of an instinctive identification with the other as 
the process that arouses empathy, the so-called simulation theory has gained 
increasing consent, nowadays especially in the cognitive sciences and in 
neuroscience. Overall, the simulation theory claims that we are able to understand 
another’s intentions or affective states through a simulation of some sort – either 
explicit or implicit – that allows us to resonate with, imitate, or neurally simulate 
with others, or even “putting ourselves into their shoes” (perspective-taking). In 
other words, the simulation theory does not necessarily coincide with the argument 
from analogy – as in many versions it is not based on an inferential structure – but 
it does keep a solipsistic drawback, due to its claim that I need to refer to my own 
feelings in order to understand the other. 
Like the theory theory, the simulation theory involves several different 
nuances present in various authors, among whom one of the best-known is Alvin 
Goldman. He grounds the empathic experience both on a theoretical stance and on 
a simulative one. In fact, according to him empathy is based on a three-phase 
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process, which involves pretended states, imagination and finally the attribution of 
them to the other person. He writes:  
 
First, the attributor creates in herself pretend states intended to match 
those of the target. In other words, the attributor attempts to put herself 
in the target’s “mental shoes”. The kinds of mental states that can be 
pretended range across the mental spectrum and include perceptions, 
desires, beliefs, hopes, plans, sensations, and emotions. The second step 
is to feed these initial pretend states into some mechanism of the 
attributor’s own psychology, e.g., a decision-making or emotion-
generating mechanism, and allow that mechanism to operate on the 
pretend states so as to generate one or more new states. (…) Third, the 
attributor assigns the output state to the target as a state the target will 
undergo (or has already undergone). (Goldman 2005, 80-81)  
 
As in the TT version by Nichols and Stich (2003), the understanding of 
affective states is based on a cognitively-demanding pretense. After this first 
step, one performs a perspective-taking, based on what could be the specific 
emotional or rational process for that specific other individual, in order to 
balance what the empathizer has generated in herself trying to match the target’s 
experience. Then, and last, one should project the resulting “mental state” onto 
the other, and find out what the target is actually experiencing. Here, no 
affective identification is at stake, i.e. the sense of agency is not blurred, as it 
happens in affective contagion instead. Although this requirement for empathy 
is respected, it is hard to see why the target’s affective state should not be simply 
guessed: how can one be sure that the simulated emotions correspond to the 
ones experienced by the other subject, if one can only “imagine” them?  And 
why would one attempt to get into the other’s same affective state – even 
supposing such an explicit process to be possible – when perception is enough 
to achieve empathy? 
Yet, here we do not face only a problem of incommunicability that 
concerns the most basic grounds of empathy. It may happen, in fact, that when 
the direct perception of expressivity is not enough in a context – e.g. for a lack 
of narrative information – or when the interaction involves more complex levels 
of communication, one is compelled to stop and use a cognitive effort in order 
to understand the other, or a simulation to imagine what the other might be 
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feeling. A simple example can help. I meet an old friend for dinner, and all of a 
sudden, she smiles embarassed, she does not look at ease, and goes away with 
an implausible excuse. I start to examine my behavior, to analyze if anything in 
it could have bothered her. I know, for instance that she becomes prickly when 
someone praises World War II partisans for her grandparents got killed in the 
“foibe” massacres in Istria. If I have not had the same experience in my family, 
I may have expressed my overall good opinion of the partisan movement. I try 
to understand how she may have felt when I said all that, according not only to 
the expressivity that she displayed at the moment, but also to her personal 
history, being well acquainted with her usual reactions. 
According to an explicit version of the simulation theory like Goldman’s, 
then, it would be possible to empathize in cases like the one just described, but 
provided you experience the same feelings in an affective sharing. It has been 
proved that this process does not individuate the roots of empathy. Is it really 
possible then to assume the other’s perspective in simulation, or is the 
expectation to take in someone else’s viewpoint rather an act of theoretical 
arrogance – an “usurpation of agency”, as Slaby calls it, and an act of 
egocentrism in Schelerian words? Goldie (2011) criticizes any “empathetic 
perspective shifting”, that defines a cognitive dimension for empathy in its 
explicit intention to reach the other’s experience. Such a process, he notices, 
would occur by assuming the other’s perspective, through an act of imagination 
that would lead us to share in ourselves the same affective state, but still keeping 
the subjects distinct, just as we read in Goldman’s theory. The risk is not only 
to face an imaginary mind created by ourselves, but to replace the other’s agency 
with ours inside the empathic relation. 
When we are in a high-level empathic relation, guessing “how it might 
feel” for another and claiming that we are adopting her perspective are two very 
different statements, not only in a terminological way. Actually, the second 
statement entails the a priori assumption of the other person’s transparency – 
which is far more radical than claiming the presence of emotions in the lived 
body. The complete background of another’s feeling cannot be entirely known, 
or the second-person perspective would become a first-personal one, with the 
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violation of the self-other differentiation requirement for empathy. While this 
happens in emotional contagion/unipathy, it is unlikely to occur in higher-order 
empathy: for Goldie (2011) that would require to overstep four conditions, 
which I sum up below: 
a) the target most likely has different intellectual abilities and emotional 
dispositions that pertain only to that specific person (differences in 
psychological dispositions);  
b) the subject might be in a certain mood or emotional state that 
intensifies what we have called the perception of certain values rather 
than others. In other words, in the example of the prickly friend, her 
negative reaction might have been intensified by her bad mood during 
that day (non-rational inﬂuences on thinking); 
c) a certain affective state could not be clear even to ourselves, as it 
happens for moods whose origin is detected only a posteriori, or for 
more complex feelings that need some time to be metabolized into the 
personal sphere (confusion);85 
d) when a person is taking a decision, usually it is because there are 
alternatives that she has to take into account, affectively and most times 
also cognitively. Her agency is complex and intertwined with so many 
variables, that it is hard for the empathizer to have knowledge of all of 
them and to predict with certainty which ones will prevail (conﬂict). 
To recap, would be an act of arrogance, and not of empathy, to reason in 
terms of “I know exactly how you feel”. Even when we perform an other-
oriented act of imagination, we can know only the other’s emotions and 
intentions visible in expressivity – which allow the elimination of the problem 
of other minds, but still do not make the whole personal sphere perceivable. 
There is a “blind spot” in such a mistaken conception of empathy, a shortcoming 
that is not only theoretical but also leads to a “usurpation of agency” (Slaby 
2014) in which we objectify the unobjectifiable – others’ affective states – and 
                                                         
85‘Metabolization’ of feelings is a concept used by Cusinato (2017b) to indicate the processing of 
chaotic affective states into more definite emotions that are meaningful in someone’s formation, and 
consequently modify her order of values. 
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impose our perspective, instead of performing the desired perspective-shifting. 
As Slaby puts it, «[a]s agents, we are in an important sense irreplaceable: fully-
ﬂedged agency is in each case essentially someone’s, there is an ineliminable 
moment of authentic ownership» (Slaby 2014, 255), so it is possible to apply 
here the Schelerian claim that solipsism, in its ethical sense, is egocentricity 
(GW VII, 107). The criticized simulationist account not only leads to a monad 
without windows and to the impossibility to reach others – if we take it to be the 
very root of empathy –, but also to a perspectival egocentricity, a substitution of 
the person’s unique agency with our own.  
The simulation theory embraces several variations. For instance, 
differently from Goldman, Stueber’s (2006) account is grounded on a quasi-
perceptual basic empathy, but is ultimately a simulationist view as it is followed 
by what he calls re-enactive empathy. It is the use of our cognitive abilities to 
imitate the thought processes of the other in order to understand the reasons of 
that rational agent and her more complex social dimension. An inadequacy of 
the mere TT is a common trait of all simulationist theories, yet there is 
disagreement concerning the possible use of reasoning, the presence of 
introspective awareness, and the reducibility of simulation to processes of 
resonance or reenactment.86 
There is however a less cognitively-demanding version of ST, that is 
mainly based on the discovery of the mirroring neural circuit and on a supposed 
resemblance with the embodied claims of phenomenology. I will next address 
Gallese’s simulationist account. 
 
3.2.3.2 The subpersonal version of ST: a critique of Gallese’s 
account 
A brain-based version of the ST is supported by Italian neuroscientist 
Vittorio Gallese. His view is grounded on the so-called “mirror neurons”, a 
neuronal system that was observed for the first time by Rizzolatti’s research 
team (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, Fogassi 1996) – of which Gallese was also 
                                                         
86 Cf. Spaulding (2016, 2017) for an extensive analysis of different kinds of simulationist accounts. 
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part – in the area F5 of the macaque premotor cortex. It is well known that the 
peculiarity of such neurons is that they fire both when we perform a meaningful 
action, and when we just observe it. Let us go back to Scheler’s description of 
quasi-automatic movements. In order to leave a room, I step as far as the door, 
I press the handle and open the door (GW III, 258). Those are all meaningful 
movements, aimed at a purpose, which are performed in a quasi-automatic way 
through our body schema. In the same way, it should become clear at once when 
another is performing such movements in order to reach the door and leave, and 
Gallese would say, the mirror-neuron system would be activated in both cases, 
implying that we immediately recognize the meaning in the perceived action 
just as we are aware of the same meaning present in ours. So why should 
Gallese’s theory pose any problems for a phenomenology of empathy, if it 
claims for an embodied other-understanding?  
Because, according to him, such neural activity is not a sign of direct, 
embodied perception but rather shows that our motor system simulates the 
action implicitly when we observe it: in other words, it supports an embodied 
simulation. Simulation here is no more a matter of explicit pretense and 
perspective-taking, nor does it maintain any kinship with the theory of mind to 
explain the emergence of other-understanding. Gallese and Goldman (1998) 
combined the explicit theory of empathy by Goldman abovementioned with the 
interpretation of mirror neurons as a neural simulation. Their main assumptions, 
then, are: a) the firing of mirror neurons generated from outside stimuli is 
functional to the attribution of a mental state to somebody, as it follows the 
schema of simulation provided by Goldman; b) the activation of the cerebral 
area connected to the mirror-system is also pragmatically aimed at planning how 
to perform that specific action, even for a subject who just observes it. 
According to this view, then, “the subject of the MN activity knows (visually) 
that the observed target is concurrently performing this very action” and such 
knowledge – since it does not produce any actual motoric execution – is 
compatible with a neural simulation. 
A few years later, Gallese theorizes what he calls the “shared manifold 
hypothesis”. It involves the definition of “shared” since it is possible for the 
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simulation to occur thanks to the similarity of our body schemata, emotions, and 
somatic sensations (Gallese 2001, 44).87 According to this hypothesis, it is 
possible to understand that the person in front of me aims at grasping a glass of 
wine, for instance, because agent and observer share the embodiment of the 
action goal, so that it is not a pure and detached observation that occurs. And 
such capacity, grounded on simulation, would be the explanation of infants’ 
ability to imitate facial gestures from birth (Gallese 2001, 41). In a way, it 
presents similarities with Scheler’s notion of a universal grammar of 
expressivity. Being based on embodiment, it presupposes – in different terms – 
a body schema which guides our quasi-automatic actions, and above all, as it 
happens for unipathy, arises from a shared ground as a metaphysical ground for 
empathy. However, according to this hypothesis expressivity, including 
meaningfulness in actions, would not be firstly perceived but understood 
through simulation, showing that Gallese adopts a neutral and wertfrei concept 
of perception. A direct perception based on values is to be excluded in his 
account, as it is rather mediated through an implicitly pretended 
emotion/intention in the self. 
In fact, Gallese’s simulationist argument for empathy is built on three 
levels: subpersonal, functional, and phenomenological. It relies on an “as if” 
system, which can be defined as subpersonal and relational, since it is based on 
the neural level and on its openness to others through an embodied simulation 
(Gallese 2007). He argues that «[a]lthough we do not overtly reproduce the 
observed action, nevertheless our motor system becomes active as if we were 
executing that very same action that we are observing. To spell it out in different 
words, action observation implies action simulation» (Gallese 2001, 36). In 
such a theoretical framework, the “as if” system constitutes the functional level, 
and it allows us to create models of others. The subpersonal level, as it is easy 
to guess, corresponds to the results of the claimed mirror-neuron matching, both 
in an expressive mode (it is me who performs the action/express an emotion) 
                                                         
87 Yet it would be hard to have any philosophical certainty about the similarity of our somatic 
sensations, if it was not for the universality of some expressivity. Let’s remember that, according to 
Scheler, it is not possible to empathize with the sensorial level of another. 
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and in the receptive mode (the other is the agent). Finally – although Gallese 
does not clearly connect it with the cerebral level – there is a phenomenological 
level, that is, we experience a sense of sharing of others’ emotions, actions and 
sensations that makes them become meaningful for us. We can so feel a sense 
of similarity with others and even a sense of being part of their same community. 
In this sense, Gallese claims to find theoretical grounds for his empirical 
evidence in phenomenology, especially in Husserl’s notions of Paarung from 
the Cartesian Meditations and Ideas II, since this concept would indicate the 
basis for an intersubjective transfer of meaning (Gallese 2003, 175). Hence, 
intercorporeity and interaction become a non-conscious neural mechanism of 
pretense. 
Gallese’s simulation theory is certainly more cognitively parsimonious 
than the TT or even than Goldman’s explicit version of ST; despite his 
reconsideration of an embodied empathy, though, the following ambiguities 
emerge. 
1) On the functional/neuronal levels: “mirror neurons” are still a 
controversial discovery in neurosciences. First of all, it is still a matter of debate 
whether there is a correspondence between the mirror system observed in the 
premotor cortex of macaques and humans: Lingnau, Gesierich, Caramazza 
(2009), for instance, dispute any evidence of mirror neurons in the human brain, 
while Rizzolatti’s group and Kilner et al. (2009) acknowledge it. 
It has even been proposed to abandon the hypothesis of purpose-detection, as to 
understand a meaning in action-observation a more complex neuronal process 
would be required (Steinhorst&Funke 2014). Csibra argues that it is doubtful 
whether mirror neurons are involved in the meaning-detection of an action 
«because (a) MNs [mirror neurons]’ activation reflects not the commencement 
but the conclusion of action interpretation, and because (b) MNs do not ‘mirror’ 
observed actions with sufficient accuracy for effective simulation» (Csibra 
2005, 1).  
2) About the problem of a ST/TT interpretation of the mirror system: 
Spaulding (2012) even argues that mirror neurons are not an index of 
simulation, but on the contrary part of an information-rich mindreading process, 
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that is, they ultimately fit better in the theory theory framework. Though 
remaining in the neural and non-conscious dimension, she claims that «there is 
some evidence that mirror neuron activity is involved in “low-level” 
mindreading, i.e., mindreading that occurs automatically and subconsciously» 
(Spaulding 2012, 519). According to this theory, mirror neurons would play no 
simulationist role or, if they did, they would in any case be involved in a larger 
non-simulating process. On the experiential level, cognition – the context, the 
specific history of the person, the learnt meaning of gestures – would 
demonstrate that no simulation could be possible without TT. Spaulding’s 
account does not prove convincing, as it claims a priori that an information-rich 
account needs to be associated with the theory theory – while in the previous 
chapters perception has been demonstrated an information-rich process on the 
pre-reflective level. Yet, it is interesting to notice that mirror neurons do not 
necessarily set in motion a simulationist process; plus, they are part of a more 
complex neural process, so the neural correlates of empathy cannot be said to 
lay only in the mirror system.  
3) On the phenomenological level: even if we accept that mirror neurons 
involve simulation – still a problematic assumption – it is not easy to justify how 
to get to a sense of motoric implicit simulation from the neural level. It would 
mean that in the Lippsian example of the acrobat we experience an embodied 
simulation ultimately caused by the activation of the same cerebral area as 
would fire also in case we were executing the action, and not merely observing 
it. Gallese tacitly raises the mirror system to the rank of consciousness, since 
the firing of some cortical areas is seen as a direct pre-reflective experience of 
simulation. Yet, there is a clear difference between “neural” (subpersonal) and 
“pre-reflective” (already phenomenological, experienced). Moreover, a weak 
point of his theory is the solipsistic side, since again we are dealing with a self-
reference in order to understand the other. It would make the comprehension of 
other kinds of expressivity difficult, e.g. to detect threat in an animal different 
from us. This «suggests that reuse, supposedly the core of simulation, still 
involves resemblance» (De Bruin&Gallagher 2012, 99), which limits our 
empathic capacity quite a lot. 
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Furthermore, it would imply a conception of our body as a “model” for the other 
ones, bodies then deprived of their individuality, as neural simulation would just 
see the other’s action or expression as something that my bodily structure could 
perform as well, forgetting the dimension of the subject who is the agent in that 
specific situation.88 It would also involve a poor concept of action/emotion-
understanding, since in this way the context neither has a place in such 
hypothesis of empathy, nor value-ception any role for the empathizer. 
One more shortcoming, pointed out by Zahavi (2012), is that, despite Gallese’s 
appeal to Husserl’s theory, he mostly limits his references to the Ideas II and 
Cartesian Meditations. Actually, Husserl exposed a more variegated account of 
empathy, with a number of differences during his life (see also Zahavi 2014). 
Without any doubt, there are some resemblances between Gallese’s view of a 
simulation based on a common embodiment and Husserl’s notions of Paarung 
and analogical transference. Husserl even criticized Scheler for taking empathy 
into account as a primitive fact that cannot be further analyzed (Hua 14/335, 
Zahavi 2012) – although he himself admits empathy to be an outer-perceptual 
act, in other words, an apperception. So, if he means to interpret mirror neurons 
as simulation based on resemblance, it seems appropriate for Gallese draw on a 
phenomenologist like Husserl rather than Scheler, since the latter grounds 
empathy as affective perception on a universal grammar of expressivity and not 
on the similarity between the lived bodies. Yet, Husserl also specifies that 
empathy does not imply seeing a mere analogue in the other or a mere sign of 
her; rather, the other becomes perceptually present as the other (Zahavi 2012, 
229). It means that through empathy I do not get acquainted with a mere 
reproduction of myself – contrary to, as already stated, what appears as a 
problem of other-anonymity in Gallese’s embodied simulation. Gallese’s 
comparison with Husserl’s notion of pairing is then only partially correct, and 
would require a broader analysis in which, in any case, simulation as the basis 
of the other-understanding would not be admitted in a Husserlian account. 
Finally, if Gallese’s reading of mirror neurons has to be compared with the 
Schelerian account, a contradiction on the problem of perception arises. In fact, 
                                                         
88 I am thankful to Roberta Guccinelli for suggesting me this direction of criticism. 
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despite claiming that the mirror system implies a simulation, he also expresses 
his theory of empathy in terms of “perception”. For instance, in Gallese (2007b) 
he states that «(…) when we see the facial expression of someone else, and this 
perception leads us to experience a particular affective state, the other’s emotion 
is constituted, experienced and therefore directly understood by means of an 
embodied simulation producing a shared body state» (9). He even seems to 
interpret mirror neurons in perceptual terms: «[s]everal studies using different 
experimental methodologies and techniques have demonstrated also in the 
human brain the existence of a mirror neuron system matching action perception 
and execution» (6), speaking moreover of «social perception» (9) and of «a 
direct form of ‘experiential understanding’» (1).  
Gallese argues the mirror system to be a significant part of empathy, and admits 
that «[e]mpathy, at difference with emotional contagion, entails the capacity to 
experience what others do experience, while being able to attribute these shared 
experiences to others and not to the self» (Gallese 2007b, 11). However, besides 
this direct-perception claim, he proposes examples of spontaneous mimicry 
(yawning, expressions of disgust), to reinforce the claim of embodied simulation 
– while it has been shown that such kinds of contagion do not correspond to the 
phenomenon of empathy, for they do not involve a feeling-function of another 
subject’s intention or affective state. So, does the primacy ultimately pertain to 
a simulation process, or to a perceptual one? If the mirror-neuron matching 
system «enables a direct grasping of the sense of the actions performed by 
others, and of the emotions and sensations they experience» (Gallese 2007b, 9), 
simulation should precede perception, according to Gallese. But how can we 
simulate something that we do not have initially perceived, and be sure that we 
are actually matching the correct affective state? For instance, even if we 
accepted the correlation between mirror neurons and experiential dimension, 
how would it be possible to implicitly simulate the act of grasping a glass to 
drink if we had not perceived it together with its meaning, first? Either 
simulation follows perception, so that the second process becomes redundant 
(Gallagher 2005, 222), or the encounter with another occurs already as first-
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personal simulation, and then the other is never reached, thus falling back into 
the problem of solipsism. 
 
Conclusion 
In the first part of the chapter, I have tried to clarify the Schelerian lexicon 
of sympathy, in order to distinguish a number of phenomena that have been 
confused with empathy in the literature. Although Scheler uses the German term 
Einfühlung as a target of his criticism – since it was the notion implied by Lipps 
to intend a kind of embodied projection into the other that entailed an instinct 
of imitation – he refers to Nachfühlen as to what constitutes the concept of 
empathy outlined so far. Namely, it is a feeling-function that presupposes 
intentionality towards the affective state or intention of another, who is 
nonetheless kept distinct from the empathizer, since it is possible to perceive the 
emotion present in an expression directly, but never from a first-personal 
perspective.  
This is what distinguishes it from affective contagion and unipathy, where, 
instead, the sense of agency is blurred up to the point of having an affective 
identification, and where non-intentional feeling-states are “infected” from one 
subject to others unwillingly. For such reasons, it has been claimed that empathy 
cannot originate from the instinct of imitation supported by Lipps, nor can it 
fulfill the isomorphism condition of Jacob’s theory, which makes empathy 
possible only if a similar affective state is experienced by the empathizer. Also, 
I have specified in what sense to intend the Schelerian foundational law that 
conceives unipathy as a metaphysical root for empathy. This, however, does not 
contradict the fact that they are two original phenomena: we do not need 
identification or contagion in order to understand the other’s expressivity. 
I have then examined the contemporary debate, that, outside 
phenomenology, remains centred on the theory theory and the simulation 
theory. TT presents not only a Cartesian assumption that loses the affective 
character of the empathic act, but also a degree of kinship with the argument 
from analogy, that, according to a Schelerian perspective, locks the subject into 
a prison of solipsism and egocentrism. If empathy started with a logical 
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reasoning, we would simply infer what the other is experiencing, without any 
certainty that we are predicting her affective state in the right way. Only 
empathy and co-feeling lead us out of such confinement, through a direct 
encounter with another. 
Problems of incommunicability and, above all, of egocentrism also affect 
the explicit version of the simulation theory, which keeps the explicit reasoning 
of the TT but asserts that one’s own self is the model for predicting the other’s 
affective state. Even if we admitted that this view can explain a higher-order 
empathy after we have posed the grounds on the embodied encounter, to 
imagine the other’s experience in no way implies assuming her perspective. In 
fact, the latter claim would be an act of theoretical arrogance or “usurpation of 
agency” (Slaby 2014), for it presupposes either the transparency of the other 
person or the imposition of our perspective upon her.  
Finally, I have considered Gallese’s subpersonal version of ST, which is 
not in striking contrast with the phenomenological view, for it takes into account 
the fundamental role of the body in empathy. Gallese maintains it is compatible 
with Husserl’s notion of pairing, but interprets the activation of the motor-
related mirror neurons as neural simulation. Eventually, I have expounded some 
objections to his version, namely 1) the dubious interpretation of mirror 
neurons, 2) the applicability of them to the TT instead of the ST, and 3) the 
incongruences on the phenomenological level, that ultimately put into question 
the interpretation of the mirror neuron system, and lead back to the 
phenomenological primacy of the direct perception of expressivity. 
In these last years, phenomenological and enactive theories have been 
increasingly building a well-structured alternative to TT and ST, as shown when 
examining the interaction theory in the previous chapter, and in the 
phenomenological proposal by Zahavi (2011). Yet, I believe that Scheler’s 
viewpoint presents an aspect that distinguishes it from other accounts. It is the 
primacy of a dimension of sharedness, in the claim of a universal grammar of 
expressivity that grounds the possibility for empathy. It has been proven that 
such an undistinguished psychological dimension does not imply a fusion, since 
embodied individuation is present from birth. Yet, it appears problematic to 
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establish any precise borders between empathy and sharing, and between 
sharing and we-intentionality, as I will attempt to clarify further on.  
There are questions to be answered, too. Can the notion of sharing 
encompass affective phenomena that do not involve intentionality, like 
contagion and unipathy? When does the sense of having an experience as a “we” 
emerge, instead? Is empathy the ground for we-intentionality or vice versa? And 
finally, what is the role played by the sharing of emotions in the Schelerian 
lexicon of sympathy? In the attempt to shed some light on the relation among 
empathy, sharing and we-intentionality, I am going to examine Scheler’s 





4. Sharing, empathy and the “we” 
We are immersed in expressivity. A simple landscape can trigger off a joyful 
mood, along with a deep sense of communion, of shared-ness we could say, with 
nature and all creatures.89 In a different way, a newborn interacts almost 
immediately after birth, and, according to a Schelerian perspective, she is able to 
do that thanks to the common, implicit grammar that all living beings share: the one 
of expressivity. When affectively involved in a mass protest, we may even forget 
our own individuality, and therefore “feel as one”, as an entity that transcends the 
single bodies and has unified will, shares the same affective states, that are 
transmitted from one to the other and spread as fast and uncontrollable as an 
avalanche. Or we may take part in a particularly touching moment like a wedding, 
and be profoundly moved though we barely know the groom and bride. We feel 
somehow “infected” by their affection and joy, identify with the two people on their 
important day, yet share such affects in an immediate way, without any involvement 
of our will.90 Such experiences can be inscribed into affective contagion and 
unipathy, the latter being for Scheler the metaphysical foundation for empathy, 
which presupposes the differentiation between the subjects. However, it has also 
been shown that a primary individuation comes from the mere fact of being a lived 
body, and so it allows interaction from birth.  
Differently from the examples of contagion and unipathy, there is a further 
level that emerges from joint attention, common purposes accomplished through 
joint actions and shared emotions. A newborn from the ninth month on usually 
                                                         
89 Paul Klee describes affective contagion and unipathy while contemplating nature: «In earlier days 
(even as a child), the beauty of landscapes was quite clear to me. A background for the soul’s moods. 
Now dangerous moments occur when Nature tries to devour me; at such times I am annihilated, but 
at peace» (Klee 1992, 122). 
90 In this chapter, I will mainly focus on the affective side of collective phenomena, such as affective 
sharing and contagion, extended emotions, and so on. I intend such an aspect to be a newly born line 
of research inside the debate on collective intentionality, and for this reason I will restrict my analysis 
to this recent topic instead of taking the whole literature into account. Cf. Schweikard&Schmid 
(2013) for a complete overview on collective intentionality. Furthermore, the affective aspect is 
crucial in Scheler’s account of ‘sharing’, as this chapter means to show.  
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displays the capacity of triadic joint attention, that is the ability to engage in an 
attentional triangle that involves an adult, an object and herself (cf. e.g. Tomasello 
2000). It can be the baby’s simple pointing a dog to her mother, after which they 
will be both focused on the third element, the dog in this case. On a more complex 
level, imagine that my friend and I are playing tennis against two other people, and 
that we share the knowledge of the game rules and the common purpose to win the 
match. We struggle to reach our goal through interaction, joint actions, and 
cooperation, and we are aware of having the same aim. As it concerns emotional 
sharing – narrower than affective sharing, which could also involve moods, as in 
contagion and unipathy – two people’s feelings are directed towards the same 
situation/object and have the same emotional nuance (grief, amusement, and so on). 
They are also implicitly aware of experiencing that particular situation together, 
which shapes the affective quality of the experience itself. For instance, I can 
experience joy in strolling in Paris with my partner, an emotional quality that comes 
from sharing that particular moment and being pre-reflectively aware that we are 
feeling the same intense emotional quality directed towards the common 
experience. It is quite different if one is there alone, and feeling happy for a sense 
of adventure and independence, or if the tour of the new city is made with a non- 
affectively meaningful person like a guide. In this second group of examples, 
differently from the phenomena of emotional contagion and unipathy, there is a 
“sense of us” (Searle [1990] 2002), also called “sense of ourness” (Sánchez 
Guerrero, 2016), which indicates two distinct subjects that are aware of the first-
person-plural character of their experience without erasing the experiential borders 
of their agency. 
Which of the two is originary, interaction or sharing? Is empathy a necessary 
condition for the emergence of a “we”, or, conversely, is the individual a product 
of the shared world from which she gradually emerges? To a certain extent, the two 
views are complementary, and Scheler’s theory can help distinguish among 






4.1 Sharing first or interaction first? Re-examining affective 
contagion and unipathy 
As the short introduction to chapter 4 suggests, I take “sharing” and “we-
intentionality” to have dissimilar nuances.91 I consider sharing as a broader 
phenomenon, that does not necessarily entail intentionality or the feeling of being 
a “we”, at least in its most basic forms. I take Schweikard and Schmid’s definition 
of collective intentionality – which I consider as a synonym of we-intentionality – 
and namely «the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, 
states of affairs, goals, or values» (Schweikard&Schmid 2013). I argue, though, that 
there are less individuated forms of affects that can be shared without concerning a 
precise intentional object, or having a clear sense of agency as a “we”. In his 
Sociology of Knowledge (GW VIII), Scheler describes the empirical relations of 
participation to another’s experience. Among what he calls “forms of transmission” 
(Übertragung), he refers explicitly to contagion as a form of sharing without 
awareness: «first of all, co-experiencing (das Mit-erleben) – without knowledge of 
co-experiencing – by virtue of “contagion”» (GW VIII, 53).92 Unipathy as an 
extreme form of contagion, as Salice (2016b) points out while analyzing Scheler’s 
                                                         
91 I partially refer to Cusinato (2017, 2018), for his idea of a need of extending the meaning of 
emotional sharing. I agree with the general purpose and with the importance of the practices of 
emotional sharing for the formation of the person. However, I intend here to restrict my analysis to 
the problem of a primacy of empathy or of sharing and argue that they can – depending on the cases 
– both be primary. In other words, I do not believe sharing to come necessarily before empathy. 
Moreover, I have pointed out the importance of a bodily individuation that precedes any fusional 
feeling, which excludes a certain interpretation of Scheler’s undifferentiated flux as a panpsychist 
theory, and as empathy being grounded on contagion and unipathy.  
92 Of course, this is to be differentiated from co-feeling (Mitgefühl) as a functional directionality 
towards the other as another (empathy requirement) that involves the intention to feel in ourselves 
her affective state (cf. the previous chapter). In the Sociology of Knowledge, Scheler is attentive in 
specifying the unaware Mit-erleben present in contagion from Mitgefühl (GW VIII, 53).  
Mit-erleben is then conceived by Scheler as a broader term that includes sharing with mutual 
awareness (Miteinanderfühlen) and more basic forms of sharing like contagion. I am aware, 
therefore, that this chapter mostly restricts the discussion on we-intentionality to its affective aspect, 
but this is meant to shed some light on a particular side of the problem which has been emerging 
only during the latest years, and that could profit from Scheler’s focus on affective sharing. 
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group forms, can be interpreted as a form of identification with another or a group, 
both in the nuances of idiopathic or heteropathic unipathy. Salice rightly highlights 
that the two forms of the life-community and the community of persons are 
differentiated first and foremost by the awareness – or not – to be part of a ‘we’, 
according to the corresponding forms of collective intentionality (cf. 4.5.3 and 
4.5.5).93 
 
Contagion and unipathy do not always bear negative consequences for the 
subject’s individuation, as it happens when we do not choose to fall prey to a bad 
mood infected by a certain situation, and we do not manage to elaborate or 
“metabolize” it further into our ordo amoris (Cusinato 2017b). As stated in the 
previous chapter, there are cases of contagion and unipathy that are listed by Scheler 
among positive experiences, like the ‘feeling-as-one’ with nature or the fusion with 
one’s partner in erotic love. In all these examples, both positive and negative, 
‘sharing without awareness’ does not necessarily lead to we-intentionality, even 
when there is a sharing of moods, affective attitudes, and so on. This may be the 
reason why simpler forms of sharing are rarely taken into account in the 
contemporary debate on we-intentionality,94 while, as a matter of fact, they form 
part of our everyday life as much as collective experiences do. They are not 
necessarily connected to the formation of the more complex collective emotions or 
to the bonding among group members (as Kelly, Iannone, and McCarty 2014 stress 
                                                         
93 Cf. the description of heteropathic unipathy by Salice: «the I can be the bearer of collective 
thoughts, volitions or emotions, believing that these are his or her thoughts, volitions or emotions, 
exclusively. In these cases, the subject does not realize that he or she is only a co-author and a co-
owner of these mental states – but still, he or she is involved in a collective mental state» (Salice 
2016b, 284). 
94 With the exceptions of Salice (2015b), who examines affective contagion in Scheler and inscribes 
it among the “forms of togetherness”, and Nörenberg (forthcoming), that includes the sensitivity to 
atmospheres into the concept of “elementary affective sharing”. Krueger (2016) mentions only 
briefly emotional contagion among the forms of shared emotions, to claim that «while we have 
similar types of emotions, they remain numerically distinct token episodes» (269). Schloßberger 
(2016) rightly points out the Schelerian distinction between the two forms of contagion/unipathy 
and Miteinanderfühlen, though he inserts both into “collective intentionality”, which I find 
misleading since the former does not entail a sense of us. 
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instead), but should be investigated in their own specific phenomenal dimension. I 
attempt to show that empathy/interaction can play a constitutive role in collective 
experiences, though it is not so obviously involved in simpler forms of sharing. 
In the previous chapter, I have differentiated Gefühlsansteckung and 
Einsfühlung from empathy: both unipathy and empathy are originary phenomena, 
so they cannot be reduced to simpler processes. Empathy-Nachfühlen presupposes 
neither affective contagion – the empathizer acquiring the same affective state as 
the target – nor unipathy – that is identification with the target up to the point of 
blurring one’s own psychological individuality. Yet, on the metaphysical level, 
Scheler’s foundational laws of sympathy assume that unipathy grounds empathy: 
the direct perception of another’s expressivity is possible because we share a 
common grammar of expressivity. And in fact, if we were born with no shared 
terrain – e.g. the value-ception of what Stern calls the vitality affects (cf. chapter 
2), i.e. the affective qualities present in movements, such as aggressiveness, 
affection, and so on – no communication would ever be possible.  
Every living being would just stay within its own monad, giving rise to 
interactions only by accident, and never to joint actions. Differently, Scheler 
conceives psychological individuality, especially the formation of a reflective sense 
of self in the infant, as a slow achievement from an “undifferentiated flux” of 
unipathy in which she is immersed. This may be consistent with a primary form of 
sharing, not a we-intentionality yet but already the affective sharing of non-
intentional feeling-states. I have already given my interpretation of Scheler’s 
connection to infant research in the first and second chapters, and argued that his 
theory of the psychologically undifferentiated flux does not contradict a primary 
embodied individuation. Yet, I have also shown that the role of others is crucial to 
the infant’s development, even in its bodily aspect. Therefore, this minimal form of 
individuation is present from birth but influenced decisively by social contacts. An 
objection to that might be Ciaunica’s (2017) claim that sharing precedes empathy, 
since the fetus engages in a primary form of tactile “togetherness” with the mother 
when in the womb. I agree with her in arguing that the caregiver’s touch plays a 
crucial role in the development of the infant’s body schema, and that one of the 
most minimal forms of social encounter is based on touch. However, Ciaunica does 
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not specify if the fetus possesses a minimal self-other differentiation, a condition 
that, as I have discussed, is present from birth (Rochat 2003, Fogel 2011, 
Meltzoff&Moore 1977, 1983, Welsh 2006; cf. also section 2.1). I do agree that a 
basic form of sharing is possible at a very early stage, yet the claim of a primary, 
embodied form of individuation is not countered by her argument. This is crucial 
to remark that the state of undifferentiation which Scheler refers to the infant is not 
to be intended as the emergence of a bodily “I” from a “we”, but rather as the slow 
formation of a psychological identity. 
The form of sharing that Scheler has in mind is unipathy, where there is a 
“feeling as one” which does not lead the members of such collective form to the 
sense of being a “we”. For instance, when listening to a charismatic leader and 
falling prey to her/his influence, we all share the same affective state without we-
intentionality, and the mood needs expressivity to infect the crowd, but this is not a 
form of empathy. 
Cusinato (2015b) takes the same way when pinpointing, from a Schelerian 
perspective, the gradual emerging of a unique and creative singularity from a shared 
background and the practices of sharing. The forms of sympathy, as I am going to 
analyse further on, give rise to different kinds of groups, the first of which – the 
mass – is originated from the primary form of sharing that unipathy is. As seen 
before, individuality consists of different levels which are connected to the order of 
values, the last of such levels being the person. In Cusinato’s interpretation, the 
person is “hungry for being born completely”, a process that she achieves only 
through the practices of sharing. In other words, a progressive individuation comes 
from a shared background, and more and more complex levels of Mit-teilung make 
each personality level flourish in a unique and creative way. Therefore, sharing is 
the ground from which we emerge as – psychological – individuals, and persons 
afterwards. That is why Cusinato (2008) refuses to use the term inter-subjectivity: 
the starting point are not two monads that encounter and form a “bridge” in order 
to have a contact, but a continuous development of individuation and formation that 
is never fully accomplished in the whole life. There are never two completely 
achieved subjects prior to the practices of sharing. 
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Similarly, for Michael (2011) “sharing” is something primary with respect to 
a we-intentionality, as he argues that it is possible to share feelings that are not 
intentional. His account of emotional sharing also includes «two classes of affective 
phenomena that are distinct from but related to emotions, that can be shared (…) in 
the same ways as emotions, and that can have similar coordinating effects within 
joint actions» (Michael 2011, 362). Such affective forms are moods and sentiments, 
intended as dispositions towards things, situations and people, that make us more 
prone to one than another emotional reaction, like the tendency to instant joy when 
we see a person we are fond of. Michael’s criteria are in fact quite minimal: «(a) x 
expresses his affective state (verbally or otherwise); (b) y perceives this expression; 
(…) criterion: (c) y’s perception of x’s expression leads to effects that function as 
coordinating factors within an interaction between x and y». Criterion (c), however, 
is typical of but not necessary for shared emotions (Michael 2011, 363), a 
characteristic that makes it suitable for the already given definition of contagion 
and unipathy. I do not agree with the expression “shared emotions” – as emotions 
are only a specific part of affects – but it is interesting to notice that, outside we-
intentionality, there are more minimal forms of sharing that can occur without 
interaction, and more extensively, without empathy. 
In a similar way, Sartre (2004) gives the example of the “queue” or “grouping” 
waiting at a bus stop. Here, it is not even possible to assume a we-intentionality, as 
there is no joint action/intention towards a common aim. The purpose to get to the 
bus door is felt by each individual, but the presence of other people is not relevant 
to reach this goal.95 Sartre deals with a «plurality of isolations: these people do not 
care about or speak to each other and, in general, they do not look at one another; 
they exist side by side alongside a bus stop» (Sartre 2004, 256). Such isolation 
                                                         
95 I do not agree with Sartre’s claim of there being a common interest (Sartre 2004, 258 or at least a 
specification needs to be made. In a queue to reach the bus door, all have the same interest, but it 
remains an individual matter: it is irrelevant whether the others fulfil their purpose or not, and there 
will be no “sense of us” (Searle [1990] 2002) either when one is waiting for or inside the bus. What 
matters is to accomplish one’s own aim: using the terminology of Sánchez Guerrero, everybody has 
the same aim individually, and alongside each other. Instead, when there is a joint purpose, 
something to be made together, all people are directed towards one goal, and joint action will allow 
the realization of it.   
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differs from individuation, since the subjects are mere numbers without a specific 
role for a common aim, there is no reciprocity, nor any empathic interaction with 
one another is necessary.  
All the same, there is some form of sharing with semi-unawareness, like in 
unipathy: just as Scheler relates unipathy to the mass group-form, Sartre states that 
the queue as a display of isolation shows «the degree of massification of the social 
ensemble» (Sartre 2004, 257). In Schelerian terms, there is a certain “feeling as 
one”, as long as the queue is distinct from the cars on the street, of from other people 
simply passing by, and as long as they move as one towards the same object. Inside 
the isolation and interchangeability of the subjects, everyone implicitly «knows that 
they exist as a finite and indeterminate plurality of which he is a part» (Sartre 2004, 
258). This is not enough for the emergence of a we-intentionality, or for the “we-
mode”, that is, for a quality of experience different from the first-personal one in its 
experiencing as a we (like in Scheler’s Miteinanderfühlen, as I will discuss later 
on). Still, it is a primitive form of sharing that does not require empathy. 
 
As I have shown, humans already display subjectivity from birth. And in fact, 
Scheler admits the body schema to be the most basic level of individuation which 
allows from the start to have embodied interactions. These last presuppose two 
distinct subjects with some sense of self, at least in the form of an embodied sense 
of self-other differentiation connected to the sense of ownership and sometimes to 
the sense of agency, too. 
Is sharing primary compared to empathy, then? Yes and no. I do not agree 
with the claim that mimicry and affective contagion are precursors of empathy, and 
direct precursors of collective emotions, as Hatfield, Carpenter and Rapson (2014) 
instead do. After all, they use different terminology to argue that interaction is based 
on contagion and mimicry, an isomorphist claim that has been proven not to be 
necessary for empathy. They give collective emotions the meaning of what Scheler 
calls “unipathy”, while I argue that in “collective” or “we”-intentionality the 
individuals’ agency ought to be preserved and not blurred like, for instance, in mass 
hysteria. I agree on a more complex level of sharing that is not limited to unipathy, 
following Sánchez Guerrero’s distinction «between a highly coordinated 
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(aggregate) pluripersonal behavior and a genuinely joint action. For one can 
certainly perform a number of actions alongside certain others, i.e. in a purely 
parallel manner, in a way that is, nevertheless, highly coordinated with certain 
actions and goals of the relevant others» (Sánchez Guerrero 2016, 80). 
The forms of unipathy are extreme cases of emotional contagion, for they 
involve non-intentional feelings like moods, and such feelings grow exponentially 
when more and more people are affected. Therefore, contagion/unipathy as a 
minimal form of sharing does not necessarily precede or follow empathy, as if 
empathy was a multi-layered process that required the acquisition of the same 
affective state and then a distance from the target. Unipathy and empathy are both 
originary phenomena, grounded on the universal grammar of expressivity. Since 
there is a bodily individuation from birth, as well as an affective embodied 
Wertnehmen, expressivity can be directly perceived without the need of acquiring 
the same affective state. Though Scheler inscribes the mother-infant relation among 
the forms of unipathy, he does not deny that the child has a certain degree of 
individuality: both the contagion of moods and empathy as a form of interaction are 
present in infancy. 
Yet, sharing can be said to be primary if we intend it as what Scheler defines 
the common metaphysical background of life. The fact of being lived bodies makes 
us share the preference for certain values rather than others, and some values seem 
to be commonly understood as meaningful. Among them, a well-being condition is 
better than pain, having some nourishment is better than being hungry, abrupt and 
fast movements mean danger, a slow pace usually indicates illness or sadness, and 
so on. Thanks to this sharing of an implicit grammar, it is possible to have the direct 
perception of affective states in empathy.  
 
4.2 Extended affects 
I have argued so far that unipathy and contagion are primary forms of sharing. 
There is in fact an involuntary transmission of feelings from one person or multitude 
of people to others, and an involuntary acquisition of it. This occurs through 
expressivity – through an implicit grasping of the affect in the expression itself. In 
this sense, a person that enters a room with people displaying a good mood chatting 
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and smiling, and with a friendly attitude, is most probably affected in a positive 
way. It is as if the good mood was not confined inside the individuals: not just 
displayed in their movements and facial features, but, more than that, “spread”. It 
is true that emotions are embodied in a non-dualistic way, but there seems to be a 
further level to be examined in such basic phenomena of sharing. If it is possible to 
share emotions and feelings, can they be defined as extended? 
The extended mind hypothesis originated from a proposal by Clark and 
Chalmers (1998), who conceived the borders of cognition not to be limited to the 
body or to the brain, but to involve the environment too (active externalism), up to 
the point of having coupled systems that play an active causal role on behavior as 
much as “internal” processes do. In other words, the extended mind hypothesis – at 
least in its first formulation – involves a parity principle, which states: «[i]f, as we 
confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done 
in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process» 
(Clark&Chalmers 1998, 8). This implies that such coupled systems are to be 
considered ontologically part of consciousness, and not only from an 
epistemological point of view, since the system would be affected from the removal 
of external components as much as of internal ones. To play such role, the external 
devices must fulfill the criterion of being reliably coupled, that is, be there any time 
the subject needs them (Clark&Chalmers 1998, 10).  
The well-known example used by Clark and Chalmers describes two 
characters, Otto and Inga, both willing to visit the Museum of Modern Art of New 
York. While Inga relies on her memory to reach the place, Otto suffers from the 
Alzheimer disease, and uses a notebook in which to write down important 
information that he can later consult when his memory fails, and that, according to 
the authors, plays for Otto the role that memory plays for Inga. They can in fact 
reach the MoMA, which was for them the trigger of action, and for both its address 
was available but not present before consulting their respective instruments. This 
makes the authors claim that in both cases the piece of information is present in a 
reliable manner to consciousness any time it is needed, and the directions were 
previously accepted on the conscious level. 
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The Otto example is as well-known as the critiques to Clark and Chalmers. 
This is in fact only the “first wave” of the extended mind hypothesis (Sutton 2010), 
which is more concerned with desires and actions and on the functional parity 
principle. The second wave focuses on integration and complementarity, giving a 
wider space to socio-cognitive practices and to the dynamicity of their processes 
(Sutton 2010, Wilson 2010). Recently, the extended mind thesis has started to 
consider the possibility that emotions are not confined inside our bodies or our 
“mental” life, and that social contacts as well as artifacts can scaffold affective 
processes or play a regulative process for emotions. Expressivity, direct perception, 
the possibility of sharing emotions/affective states, are all elements that help 
overcome the concept of affective internalism in favor of a certain version of the 
extended mind. As a consequence, a new hypothesis considers the possibility that 
affective sharing is not merely something that happens within the realm of lived 
bodies that encounter others, and inserts sharing into a true “extended emotions 
theory” (EET) (Krueger&Szanto 2016; Krueger 2014; León, Szanto, Zahavi 2017). 
And if we examine cases of emotional contagion and unipathy, we can easily 
understand it as a not always positive phenomenon, like in the episodes of emotional 
“invasion” and emotional self-alienation (Szanto 2017). 
But what kinds of affects are suitable for being extended? And in what sense 
are they extended? Krueger (2014) recognizes the universal background of 
expressivity and upholds the thesis that even such an aspect can be considered as 
extended (hypothesis of bodily extended emotions – HEBE). In fact, «the physical 
expression of an emotion—facial expressions, gestures, posture, movement, etc.—
may be part of the vehicle needed to realize its experience» (Krueger 2014, 534).  
Now, let’s reconsider the definition by Clark and Chalmers of the parity 
principle which connects to the notion of coupled systems performing an active 
causal role on behavior. In the case of feelings and emotions, we could modify the 
abovementioned quotation of Clark and Chalmers (1998, 8) as follows: “a part of 
the world – expressions – functions as a process which, were it done in our affective 
sphere, we would have no hesitation in recognizing part of the emotional process”. 
In other words, even when we do not recognize that the affect we feel is not firstly 
produced by us, expressivity can generate the corresponding affect in us – through 
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contagion or unipathy, vehiculated by an implicit affective perception of a feeling. 
Even if involuntarily, we become part of a coupled system: for instance, the other’s 
expression plays a causal role on our mood and behavior, our mood influences other 
people’s mood and behavior through expressions, and so on. 
Therefore, another way to interpret the forms of affective phenomena from a 
Schelerian perspective is to claim that they are – in Krueger’s terms – scaffolded by 
bodily expressivity and its consequent visibility. In other words, affective 
contagion, unipathy, empathy, and even emotions themselves would not occur – or 
they would be much weaker – if they were not intertwined with embodied 
expressions, as the Möbius syndrome shows (cf. previous chapter, p. 138, footnote).  
What Krueger claims about music can also be applied to affects and emotions 
vehiculated by others. Music is, according to him, an «external tool for feeling: it 
can enable the listener to cultivate, refine, and explore familiar emotional 
experiences in new ways —or even, in some cases, develop emotional experiences 
they may not otherwise have» (Krueger 2014, 538). Similarly, when we enter an 
empathic relation with another or even simply experience affective contagion and 
unipathy, we may experience some affective nuances that are new for us. In this 
sense, others “scaffold” such affects or emotions that can be shared or just 
experienced by us, and open new worlds of values or new perspectives on the same 
values. As in music, others can elevate our mood (e.g. we are often tempted to call 
friends when we feel down) or lower it (for instance by displaying grief, if we are 
susceptible to contagion in that moment). They can have a complementary role in 
triggering or performing an action, or in arising affective/emotional sharing; they 
can generate and sustain an affect. The complementary role, or integration, can be 
highlighted by a further comparison with Krueger’s description of musical 
experience: «the listener integrates with musical dynamics in a reciprocal, 
mutually-modulatory way—what we hear determines how we respond, which 
shapes what we hear, which in turn informs our further responses—and, within this 
integration, new regulative processes and forms of emotional motor control emerge 
that are unique to this integrated system» (Krueger 2014, 544). The encounter with 
others’ expressivity is affectively – not neutrally – grasped; besides, it usually 
triggers an affective and motor response, and implicitly shapes value-ception itself.  
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However, in my view, the involuntary transmission of a feeling from one 
person to another – that indicates the primary forms of sharing – also involves what 
Krueger calls the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). He 
states that «there are cases where emotions literally extend beyond the agent’s body 
in that they are partially constituted by factors and feedback external to the agent» 
(Krueger 2014, 536). Hence, the extended mind hypothesis is not limited to external 
artifacts, like the notebook for Otto, or an MP3 player with a song that “infects” us 
with a good mood. It also includes others’ expressivity. Ultimately, the extended 
mind hypothesis is consistent with the Schelerian idea of value-ception, i.e. the 
theory that sees affective perception as a primary phenomenon of grasping values 
in the world.96  
Let me clarify this point further. Two connected aspects in Krueger (2011) are 
particularly relevant in order to develop the discussion on affective and emotional 
sharing. First, expressivity viewed as material scaffolding for intentions, cognition 
and affect/emotion, from infancy on. Second, the notion of ‘we-space’ as a co-
regulated system built through social interaction and bodily communication, based 
on attentive coordination. It seems to me that there are two different layers of 
sharing involved in these two concepts, for the second is rooted in the first one, and 
adds to it the conditions of awareness of the ‘we’ and focused interaction (Krueger 
2011, 645), which are not necessarily present in the scaffolding of expressivity. In 
fact, if we reinterpret Scheler’s examples in those terms, unipathy and contagion 
occur through the unaware scaffolding of expressivity in the others’ lived bodies. 
That is to say, we can be affected by a mood because we perceive it in others’ 
expressivity but we do not realize the reason of the emergence of such a feeling in 
ourselves. As Krueger rightly highlights, extended emotions do not entail a pure 
transmission of affects received passively: they often trigger motor-expressive 
responses in me – e.g. mimicry and synchronization – so that the affect is not 
confined to my or another’s body, but becomes extended, and can expand and 
spread like Scheler describes. 
                                                         
96 Intended both as Umwelt (environment) and Welt (world), the latter of which is for Scheler a 
prerogative of the personality sphere. 
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Plus, social affordances usually appear as more salient than other kinds of 
stimuli – e.g. affordances coming from non-animated objects – and this can trigger 
a constant adjustment of actions and interactions, which constitutes – when 
involved in focused interaction – the bodily negotiation of the we-space (Krueger 
2011, 644). Since it requires active embodied engagement and attention, this we-
space corresponds already to a ‘sense of us’ (pre-reflective or reflective, depending 
on the case), an aware ‘we’ by definition absent in the ‘feeling-as-one’. More than 
an active and attentive coupling, in Einsfühlung there seems to be an encompassing 
mood or affect which is only scaffolded by others’ bodies, but not reducible to 
them.97  In this sense, the cases of schizophrenic autism and lack of expressivity-
grasping can be said to impair the layer of affective sharing, since patients in such 
a condition are precluded direct access to the lived-bodily participation which can 
originate a more or less aware form of sharing. In other words, they become isolated 
bodies, in contrast with the normal condition of extension where we are able to be 
responsively attuned with others’ affects. This is why schizophrenia is suggestively 
defined by Krueger (forthcoming) as a disturbance in the scaffolded self, and not 
only a disorder of ipseity (cf. 2.6). 
As a consequence of the notion of we-space being grounded on the scaffolding 
of expressivity, it is possible to conceive extended emotions as entailing both we-
intentionality and more basic forms of sharing in which we do not realize where the 
affective state has originated, and we mistakenly attribute it to ourselves. Again, 
my aim is not to reduce the entire notion of we-intentionality to affective and 
emotional sharing. Joint attention, for instance, is a case where we may be directed 
towards the same object or situation, while looking at it with a different affective 
attitude. In this sense, we-intentionality is not reducible to extended or shared 
affects, as it can involve more or less complex layers of rational engagement – e.g. 
we agree to paint a house together, or we are jointly focused on the house – but 
divergent emotions – you look at it with boredom for the imminent task, whereas I 
feel enthusiasm. Yet, since I have argued from a Schelerian perspective that 
affective perception precedes rational knowledge, the affective layer represents a 
                                                         
97 The notion at stake is close to the concept of atmosphere as proposed by Schmitz, which I cannot 
assess here for reasons of space and focus on the main argument. 
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crucial dimension of our reflective and pre-reflective experience, especially when 
speaking of social cognition. Whoever loses the capacity to enter directly into this 
extended layer, is inevitably precluded the interbodily/affective we-space. 
 
Another significant text for the debate on we-intentionality and extended 
affects is the one by León, Szanto and Zahavi (2017), who rightly argue that more 
importance should be given to the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis in the 
extended mind debate, since extended-emotions systems do not arise only between 
environment and subject, but also in the interpersonal domain. Here, though, there 
might be an objection to the inscription of shared affects – in the broad sense which 
also includes contagion and unipathy – in the “extended” hypothesis. I believe that 
León, Szanto and Zahavi are using the phrase “shared emotions” meaning them as 
already inscribed in the we-intentionality dimension, necessarily linked to the 
“sense of us”:  
 
the causal coupling typical of emotional contagion lacks the deeper 
constitutive synchronic and diachronic integration that is distinctive of 
shared emotions. Moreover, the feeling of togetherness characterizing 
the latter, where the other subject is experientially registered as an other 
with whom one shares an emotion, doesn’t seem to play a similar role 
in emotional contagion. In emotional contagion and other forms of 
affective crowd dynamics I am causally affected (and infected) by the 
states of somebody else and as a result come to experience the state as 
my own. I do not experience the emotion as ours, as one that we are 
having. (León, Szanto, Zahavi 2017, 5) 
 
What they claim about affective contagion – that it lacks a sense of us and a 
sense of self-other differentiation of the affective source – is experientially correct. 
However, they also presuppose that sharing necessarily entails a more complex 
form of affects, that is, emotions. Ultimately, they limit the precondition for sharing 
to the “sense of us”, not taking into account the possibility of extended affects, that 
can be spread – thus becoming shared – without us having a sense of shared-ness. I 
claim instead that subjects can be in a relationship of constitutive integration – 
forming then an extended system – without necessarily relying on the subjective 
character of one’s emotional experiences, which, according to León, Szanto and 
Zahavi (2017, 4) is extended and incorporates another individual’s emotional 
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experience as a ground for the integration. I do not mean to deny the subjective 
character of the affective experience, which, as already argued, comes from the very 
basic individuation of embodiment. My point is to avoid narrowing shared-ness to 
we-intentionality. When Scheler describes feelings growing and spreading as an 
avalanche in unipathy, he actually refers to a constitutive integration without any 
sense of us. The affect is indeed extended, in that it is displayed in the expressivity 
of some people and seen by others, who are infected by that affective state. Their 
expressivity changes accordingly and being grasped in turn contributes to the 
further growing and spreading of the feeling. 
 An objection might be that the inclusion of shared affects into the ‘extended’ 
hypothesis leads to the “token identity account” of emotional sharing. Such a 
definition is used by Brinck, Reddy and Zahavi (2017) to describe Schmid’s (2009, 
2015) claim that, in cases of shared feelings, the affect at stake is one and the same 
and many agents take part in it, until a sort of phenomenological fusion occurs.98 
Actually, it is not completely wrong, in a Schelerian perspective, to conceive 
affective contagion or unipathy as the same affective state experienced by different 
individuals, who feel as one or identify with others involuntarily. This does not 
mean that one receives it passively: one could be more prone to contagion because 
of a bad mood in that precise moment, than another individual who had good news 
shortly before and feels nothing can waste her day. Each person, in her social and 
creative dimensions, metabolizes the affect in different emotions and narrative 
experience due to the influence of culture, society, individual past events and 
feelings, and so on (Cusinato 2017b). Lastly, it is not to be denied that the basic 
individuation, the one associated to the sense of ownership of any experience, 
remains. It can be deduced, then, that the affect has the same general quality for the 
agent and the “infected people”, who also contribute to its spread. There would be 
no contagion or unipathy if each individual felt differently. Yet, the affect is 
experienced in a way that comes from the intrinsic embodied individuation and the 
further levels that include the social self and the personality sphere. The “token 
                                                         
98 Schmid often refers to the grieving parents’ case that Scheler uses in the Sympathiebuch to 
describe the notion of feeling-with-one-another (Miteinanderfühlen). I will examine this concept 
when discussing the more complex forms of sharing. 
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identity” becomes valid, if we accept that the same affect is elaborated in different 
nuances according to such levels of individuation. 
So far, I have claimed that the dimension of sharing is not to be restricted to a 
“sense of us”, but starts from the very basic forms of sympathy that are affective 
contagion and unipathy, rarely taken into account as proper forms of extended 
emotions. I have argued that such phenomena are crucial for determining the 
borderlines among them, empathy, and we-intentionality. A bond among the three 
is not denied, but emotional contagion and unipathy – in the rare cases when they 
are taken into consideration by the social ontology debate – are examined just as 
precursors or reinforcements of more complex “we” phenomena. Actually, inside 
the debate of social ontology Scheler is the bearer of a “maverick” thesis, for he 
considers the metaphysical background of empathy – the universality of 
expressivity – to be already a form of shared-ness, and therefore sharing to be a 
state of – psychological – undifferentiation from where individuation is gradually 
conquered. Plus, affective contagion and unipathy involve sharing already, without 
having to wait for the emergence of a we-intentionality, and on the 
phenomenological level they are as originary – i.e. not reducible to simpler 
phenomena – as empathy is. I am going to argue that if the we-intentionality is also 
grounded on empathy and interaction, the same cannot be held for the involuntary 
sharing of affective states. Both empathy and unipathy are based on the implicit 
recognition of expressivity, but this does not constitute a form of Nachfühlen – as 
in the case of the wasp, that recognizes the weak point where to sting a caterpillar 
without killing it. 
This point is crucial to understand the most quoted example of emotional 
sharing, the one described by Scheler in the Sympathiebuch. It is the episode of the 
grieving parents standing in front of their child’s dead body, and we abandon the 
field of unintentional affective states that are perceived as me being the agent, to 
access the often mentioned “sense of us”. Here, as well, it is debatable whether 
empathy or sharing occurs first. In fact, whether such phenomenon of co-feeling 
involves empathy first is a controversial matter, and I maintain that it does in a 
genetic sense, but that there are at the same time some characteristics that prevent 




4.3 Emotional sharing. The grieving parents and 
Miteinanderfühlen 
In the third chapter, after illustrating the forms of sympathy in Scheler’s 
theory, I have argued that Mitgefühl constitutes a further dimension than empathy-
Nachfühlen, since it is rendered possible by it but also entails a co-feeling, that is, 
the sharing of an emotion. Scheler differentiates between the simple Mitgefühl and 
Miteinanderfühlen. The first form has been said to have an intentional meaning, 
that is, the feeling-function has a precise object, but there is also the intention to 
enter another’s same affective state. Here, there is no “sense of us”. For instance, 
when I see a friend’s great joy after having gotten the job of her life, I co-feel her 
happiness and so transcend the limits of my egocentrism. Yet, in no way we could 
claim that we are experiencing such feeling in a we-mode: my friend feels her 
uncontrollable joy for being in such and such condition, but I can only understand 
and participate in her happiness from an external perspective, and indeed her 
experience is not lived as if we had both got the job. We feel joy for the same fact, 
but are clearly aware that there are two “I”s in such co-feeling.  
Differently, there is immediate Miteinanderfühlen in Scheler’s probably 
autobiographical example of the parents in front of their child’s dead body. Scheler 
writes:  
 
Father and mother stand beside their beloved child’s dead body. They 
feel «the same» suffering with-one-another (miteinander), «the same» 
grief. This does not mean: A feels this suffering and B feels that too, 
and they furthermore know that they are feeling it – no, this is feeling-
with-one-another (Miteinanderfühlen). A’s suffering will be in no way 
«given as an object» (gegenständlich), as e.g. it will be instead for their 
friend C, who joins them and and co-suffers (Mitleid… hat) «with 
them» or «with their grief». No, they feel it «with-one-another» in the 
sense of a feeling-together, experiencing-together (Miteinander-
erlebens) not only the same state of value, but also the same affective 
readiness towards it. The «sorrow» as a state of value and grieving as 
quality of the function, are here one and the same. (GW VII, 23-4) 
 
 
It is the most investigated example in the debate on collective intentionality, 
yet it displays such a rich ground for multiple discussions that it is worth spending 
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some lines to comment on it. What is Scheler telling us about the formation of a 
we-intentionality? First, that such co-feeling-with-one-another is not reducible to 
empathy. This is not a situation where one parent understands the emotional state 
of the other by his or her expressivity, and the other does the same. Empathy 
presupposes a Wertnehmen of expressivity that does not require reciprocity. It is 
perfectly possible for the target not to be aware of the other empathizing with him, 
and the empathizer does not have to share her same affective state. Empathy also 
implies a self-other distinction by which the other’s experiences is given in a non-
originary way, i.e. not in a first-personal mode as it happens for unipathy (GW VII, 
105). It should be remarked, though, that Scheler does not reject expressivity-
grasping – it is simply not mentioned – but only the objectification that would imply 
two separated psychological subjects and not a first-personal one. 
However, empathy may have allowed the emergence of such feeling-together. 
Scheler claims that empathy grounds co-feeling, and this is true for the parents who 
have a shared emotion that can originate only from a common experience, like the 
moments shared together with the child, in which interaction has played a 
fundamental role. Let us imagine that both parents remember playing in a park with 
their kid one day. They were then both attentive to their child’s expressions and 
actions, ready to intervene if he tried to run too far, or fell down, etc., and they were 
coordinating by empathic interaction in order to make him have fun. The child was 
paying attention to their expressions, too, as the affect attunement was built and 
reinforced through them. Again, it should be underlined that this does not mean 
reducing a we-experience to empathy. Yet it is hard to imagine the emergence of 
an experience in the we-mode without the individuals implicitly communicating 
intentions and emotions through expressivity, which is grasped in turn in order to 
proceed with sharing. Thanks to the previously shared experiences, «the child’s 
parents (…) are affectively bound up with one another, integrated, on multiple 
levels and time-scales», as Krueger (2016, 271) remarks. In other words, they can 
experience the Miteinanderfühlen that is instead precluded to the friend. He can 
only co-suffer with them or with their grief, but not feel-together with them the 
same state of value and the same affective readiness towards the situation, because 
he cannot experience the tragedy from the “inside”, since he is not part of the “we”. 
173 
 
The example gives also a hint about the elements of the emotions that can be 
shared. As it has been discussed while explaining Darwin’s view of expressivity, 
an expression involves typical bodily manifestations – e.g. anger is usually 
associated with a visibly tense countenance, increased speed in movements, 
accelerated heartbeat, muscular contraction, and so on. Does emotional sharing 
entail also the sharing of sensations, then? Can we co-suffer with another, if she is 
in a state of physical pain, or is emotional sharing only possible for psychological 
suffering? Scheler argues for the second option (GW VII, 24), and as seen excludes 
sensorial feelings even from empathic grasping. He claims: «[t]here is no «co-
pain». The category of sensorial feelings (…) are essentially precluded such highest 
form of co-feeling. They must become somehow «objectified» (gegenständlich). 
They induce only the co-suffering «with» and «for» the suffering of another who is 
in pain» (GW VII, 24). 
This counters one of the objections that can be applied to Miteinanderfühlen. 
Steven Connor’s criticism to the possibility of collective emotions relies on the fact 
that such a collective emotion would also require a collective body to experience it, 
as an emotion involves a set of bodily manifestations.99 However, we do not enter 
a state of physical pain ourselves when we see another suffering. We cannot even 
be sure about where and how much she is feeling her pain, whereas we can perceive 
an emotion in expressivity or share its affective quality and attitude towards a 
situation. 
If emotional sharing does not involve the sensorial component, the criticism 
by Connor collapses immediately. In the example of shame that he uses to defend 
the intrinsic embodiment of emotions, it is not the fact of blushing or sweating or 
having hammering heartbeats that allows to share the emotion. Shame would be 
shared and the sign of it, blushing, would be manifest to the people involved, not 
the other way around.100 There is no need for a collective body, when we-
                                                         
99 This argument, also criticized by Schmid (2015), was given by Connor for the History of Emotions 
annual lecture at Queen Mary, University of London, 9th October 2013. 
100 The Schelerian claim for a sharing that involves affects and emotions, but not bodily feelings, 
also resolves a weak point for which Gilbert is often criticized, that is, the phenomenological 
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intentionality is conceived as entailing a “sense of us”, with the subjects keeping 
their individuality. Plus, it is true that expressions manifest in the body, but they 
cannot be located in a precise physical spot101 – otherwise they would be mere 
sensorial feelings, like itching or a pain in the knee.  
Ultimately, does Scheler’s example concern an “identity token emotion”? 
After all, the two parents can immediately feel-together the same grief for their 
common experiences and are not external observers or compassionate friends, but 
the “we” that is concerned with the situation in a first-person-plural mode. It is “the 
same” grief, no individual external to the couple could experience it that way, for it 
would otherwise be given “as an object” and not lived in an originary mode – it 
could only be nach- or mit-felt. It is also, somehow, “extended”, as they are not just  
two people who experience their grief “in the inside”, each being merely aware of 
the other’s emotion. The we-mode changes the quality of an experience, that would 
not be the same for e.g. a single mother who has lost a son that she had raised alone. 
Her shared experiences with her child would be different and she would probably 
feel she has no one left in the whole world. Yet, such a claim by Scheler does not 
imply the unification of the two parents into one collective person: they neither 
identify with one another nor “feel as one”, and metabolize the emotion according 
to the different attitudes, culture, religion, personal narratives, past events, and so 
on. Plus, the “reciprocity” involved in the mit-einander term indicates an implicit 
(not objectified) awareness of being two, and of experiencing grief together – not 
as an “I”, then.  
Such a situation of emotional sharing and being together concerning the same 
object leads us to discuss a term that has been almost taken for granted so far: the 
notion of we-intentionality. The forms of sympathy examined so far correspond in 
Scheler’s theory to different forms of group, which lead to ask: where is the border 
                                                         
accompaniment of collective feelings, or in other words, the sharing of “feeling-sensations” (Gilbert 
2002). 
101 As Schmid (2015, 108) remarks, by distinguishing bodily experiences (shame) from experiences 
of the body (the tickling in a finger). In a similar way, Salice (2015b) asserts that, from a Schelerian 
point of view, only mental affects can be shared, and they are not localized in the body: the difference 
here is between grief and physical pain. 
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between sharing and we-intentionality? Does an increasing individuation of a 
person have a reflection on the group-forms as well?  
 
4.4 Is the concept of we-intentionality exhaustive? 
I have argued that for Scheler affective sharing begins from the levels of 
contagion and unipathy, but the concept of we-intentionality is not applicable to 
those two cases, owing to the lack of a we-awareness and of an intentional object. 
When I am infected by a mood, for instance, I do experience it as an “I” without 
realizing that I am sharing that feeling with other people; I may even happen to 
identify with them, with a temporary loss of the sense of my psychological and 
personal individuation. On the contrary, in the case of the grieving parents, there is 
not a mere feeling-alongside-each-other. There are not two emotions of grief 
running in parallel: as Scheler is very careful to remark, none of them has a simple 
understanding that the other is going through that tragic feeling as well. It is a proper 
case of we-intentionality, where a “sense of us” is present and shapes the experience 
itself in a way that is not the one of a friend empathizing or co-feeling with them. 
Though not examining in depth the contemporary debate on the concept of 
we- or collective intentionality, the aim in this chapter is to show how such an 
example can respond to the criteria that define it, and to highlight its difference 
from the minimal forms of affective sharing analyzed previously. Sánchez Guerrero 
elegantly summarizes the conditions for two or more subjects to be jointly directed 
towards the same intentional object. They have to 
 
(a) be similarly open to this object’s being, i.e. they have to share a basic 
understanding of its mode of being, and (b) be open to one another as 
subjects who share a common world and are, to this extent, candidates 
for some joint intentional act. In order to actually be intentionally 
directed towards something in a joint manner two or more individuals 
additionally have to (c) be in a particular intentional state that is directed 
towards the relevant object, where it is fundamental that (d) this 
intentional state be such that it can be argued to tacitly refer back to 
some particular ‘we’ they, in the relevant situation, jointly constitute. 
(…) Finally, (e) the fact that the participants’ intentional states refer 
back to one and the same group cannot be a matter of sheer coincidence. 
That is to say, the individuals involved must stand in a certain objective 
relationship to one another. This is a relationship that warrants the claim 
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that their understanding themselves as members of the relevant ‘we’ is 
not misleading. (Sánchez Guerrero 2016, 86)  
 
If we examine the two parents’ example in the light of such schema, a) the 
parents share the emotional response to the event, which presupposes a basic 
understanding of its mode of being (the unavoidable reality of their child’s death, 
for instance); b) they are most likely open to joint intentional acts, like the 
organization of  their child’s funeral; c) they are implicitly aware of their sharing 
the same emotion (grief) in the same situation (their child’s death and his body in 
front of them); d) as argued, they have construed a “we” through common shared 
experiences, which is not (e) a matter of coincidence, for no one else could have the 
same quality of grief, just as the relation to the child would be different for a 
relative, a friend, and so on. What is shared are both intentionality and the emotion, 
the being-directed towards the same situation in the same affective mode. This is 
not reducible to the mutual understanding of two feelings that run in parallel – 
which would be a mere “feeling alongside each other” – to contagion, unipathy, 
empathy or even Mitgefühl. 
My aim is to prove that the “being-directed towards the same situation in the 
same affective mode” is crucial in Scheler’s theory of sharing, notably in his 
hypothesis of the four group types, or “social essential unities” (sozialen 
Weseneinheiten) – mainly exposed in his Sociology of Knowledge (GW VIII) and 
Formalismus (GW II). Concerning this, Cusinato (2017b, 275-276) – building on 
Scheler’s theory – analyses a possible correlation between the forms of emotional 
sharing and the four forms of social unity. Salice (2016b) suggests to read the forms 
of sympathy and the group forms together, to compare the ‘collective person’ with 
today’s accounts in social ontology. Vendrell Ferran (2016) reads the social 
essential unities in the light of the stratification of values and affective 
intentionality. 
 
Considering the growing importance Scheler’s group forms are acquiring for 
the debates on we-intentionality, the novelties that his account brings about can be 
summed up in the three points that will be highlighted in the following analysis of 
the specific group forms. 
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1) Contagion and unipathy have been excluded from the discussion on we-
intentionality, or reduced to a reinforcing role of the “sense of us”. From a 
Schelerian point of view, sharing is instead a broader concept than we-
intentionality, as it involves a metaphysical common ground (expressivity, a priori 
knowledge of sociality) as well as forms in which subjects are not aware of the 
sharing itself. 
2) Many we-intentionality theories rightly claim that, in order to have a “we”, 
the distinction between the individuals involved must not be blurred, as in a sort of 
collective subject. Further than that, Scheler claims that the highest group form 
entails the highest level of individuation – the personal one. I am going to show 
that, despite the misleading definition of Gesamtperson, the group-form related to 
the person is all but encompassing the subjects’ individuality. 
3) The phenomenological trend in the contemporary debate claims that 
affective sharing concerns world-directed feelings (Schmid 2009), so the human 
ability to feel-towards together (Sánchez Guerrero 2016). Similarly, the joint 
attention described by Tomasello can be said to entail not only the attempt to focus 
on the same object, but also the sharing of an affective experience. I maintain that 
such claim could lead even further: whether with a particular intentional object or 
not, the affective attitude can be shared and make a difference in our relation to the 
world. From Scheler’s theory of group forms, we can deduce that the social 
essential unities imply different positioning towards the world (values and affective 
functions) and various degrees of world- and other-openness. 
 
4.5 Scheler’s Theory of the Social Essential Unities  
4.5.1 Level 0: Robinson’s  mental experiment  
Scheler’s mental experiment of Robinson points out that there is an innate 
tendency to sharing in man. Even a hypothetical Robinson Crusoe would 
experience social belonging (Gliedsein in einer Sozialeinheit miterleben)102 and feel 
                                                         
102 GW II, 511. Interestingly, after the Formalismusbuch Scheler goes back to the same example and 
characterizes it also as a proof for the originarity of the I-thou relation, moreover switching from 
Sozialeinheit to Gemeinschaft (community). Cf. GW VII, 229-230. 
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the lack of social acts only because a bond with other human beings was 
presupposed pre-reflectively. Actually, this mental experiment has undergone 
critiques of innatism and circularity in its envisaging an already-formed person 
capable of spiritual acts that should instead emerge thanks to social contacts. 
Moreover, Itard’s Mémoire (1801) and Rapport sur Victor de l'Aveyron (1806) have 
demonstrated that the consequences of an isolated life for the development of a 
human being are emotionally and cognitively more complex than the mental 
experiment described by Scheler. Yet, it is important to remark that one of Scheler’s 
basic claims is the falsity of solipsism in front of the world-openness of a nie 
abschließbar Totalität, a definition that contains the meanings of “never-locked” 
and “never finished”. In this sense, a representative lack of relationship with alterity 
would not be necessary, as it has been shown for the general theory of value-based 
perception.103 It is as if Robinson felt – pre-reflectively – the lack of an “us”, as if 
he was confined in a schizophrenic world where the basic, shared grounds of the 
interpersonal corroboration of the world do not exist. Not only the lack of a sense 
of us then, but the felt impossibility of its emergence. Later on, in the second edition 
of the Sympathiebuch, Scheler refers to an intuitive ground 
(Anschauungsgrundlage) for the lack of emotional acts related to others, such as 
love, or mental/spiritual acts that can acquire an objective sense only by means of 
possible counteracts (GW VII, 229-230). 
The recurrent statement of a human being living more in the society than in 
her own “I” is to be interpreted not only in the sense that the psychological (explicit 
self-knowledge) and then the personal individuations emerge from a state 
undifferentiated-ness, but also that «the knowledge of any man of being a member 
of a society in general (einer Gesellschaft überhaupt) is not an empirical 
knowledge, but rather an “a priori”» (GW VIII, 52). In theory, it is possible for that 
hypothetical Robinson not to have explicit self-knowledge – the reflective “cogito, 
ergo sum” – yet to feel pre-thematically the absence of any possibility of sharing.  
                                                         
103 I agree here with Cusinato’s (2010b) argument on the Robinson’s mental experiments and his 
analysis on the criticisms addressed to it. 
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According to Salice’s (2016) analysis of the internal conditions for the 
formation of a group in the different accounts of collective intentionality, most 
theories in the contemporary debate ground the emergence of a “we” either in the 
subject of a mental state or in its content, and focus excessively on intentions as the 
main key to explain how and why groups emerge. Differently, one of the original 
points in Scheler’s account is that «the constitution of a group is accompanied (if 
not: initiated) by the fact that the members share some relevant feelings» (Salice 
2016, 329).104 The next section starts with the form of group that Scheler presents 
first, and is in a way problematical for some views of we-intentionality. 
 
4.5.2 To be unaware of sharing: the herd and the mass  
I have argued above why sharing acquires for Scheler a broader meaning than 
we-intentionality, for it is applicable to unipathy and contagion, where we fall prey 
to an affective state without being able to detect that it is shared. Such states are 
described as experienced from an “I”, and not entailing a “sense of us” – yet sharing 
can occur through identification or through the unwilling participation in the mood 
in a room. For example, if we enter a place (e.g. during a party) crowded with people 
laughing, dancing, and displaying a relaxed attitude, we are most likely infected by 
the general atmosphere, to which everybody manifesting that mood contributes. We 
nevertheless perceive it in an I-mode – at least, until we focus empathically on the 
others’ expressivity as pertaining to those specific individuals. Even more evident 
is the case of unipathy, where the identification is so strong that one can 
misunderstand a feeling and believe it originates from her directly, while it is only 
a “transmission” (Übertragung). Another way of reading this phenomenon, is to 
state that feelings can be “participated”, therefore shared, even without awareness 
(without a “sense of us”).  
According to Scheler, those are the two forms of sympathy that characterize 
the essential structure of the herd – for animals – and of the crowd – for humans. In 
those kinds of group, there occurs in fact a Mit-teilung without the knowledge of 
                                                         
104 Cf. also Cusinato (2015b, 51-52). 
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co-experiencing (GW VIII, 53, GW II 515).105 Affective states, expressive 
movements and even “tradition” as a form of imitation are examples of transference 
through contagion or involuntary imitation. Not only affective states, but also 
opinions and evaluations are subject to contagion, so that the less the psychological 
and personal spheres are individuated, the more one is prone to be infected by 
others’ beliefs without explicit awareness and control. In this sense, culture can 
“spread” among the masses (GW VIII, 21).106 
Though it represents just an “essential” group form, therefore never fully 
manifested without the other forms, this unaware sharing has also a genetic aspect, 
for contagion is experienced more likely in childhood or in certain kinds of cultures, 
especially the animistic ones. Paradoxically, this indicates that, although the 
experience is in the I- and not in the we-mode, it is the least individuated social 
form. Among the three levels of individuation described – the bodily, the 
psychological and personal ones – it involves only the first. The world-openness is 
minimal – there is a more or less voluntary “imposition” of affective states, i.e. of 
ways to be more or less prone to certain intentional emotions. For instance, while 
infected by the cheerful mood of the party people, we may be more inclined to co-
feel joy, or when listening to the unpleasant or nasty speech of a politician we might 
be more prone to anger. There is a continuous interchange between individuation 
and sociality: higher social forms contribute to the individuation of a subject, while 
the more she is individuated, the more she contributes to higher forms of sharing.  
 
4.5.3 The stream of experience in the life-community 
The following group-form reaches a higher level of individuation, where 
sharing acquires awareness: it is the case of the life-community 
(Lebensgemeinschaft). This group-form entails Nacherleben and the different 
                                                         
105 On the importance of this term by Scheler for the phenomenology of alterity, cf. paragraph 12) 
Mit-Teilung der Expressivität als Grundlage der Phänomenologie der Andersheit in Cusinato 
(2015b, 66-68). 
106 A misunderstanding might easily arise here. Scheler does not hold the elimination of lower forms 
of sympathy and sharing once the higher ones manifest: all social forms should find a balance, just 
as the feeling-functions (empathy, co-feeling and so on) do not substitute one another. 
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nuances of co-experiencing, such as co-feeling, co-striving for, co-thinking, co-
judging (listed in GW II, 515). It is interesting to notice that Scheler refers here to 
Nacherleben but, immediately afterwards, he denies the understanding (Verstehen) 
that has been said to be characteristic of empathy (GW VII). This shows that he had 
not fully developed the relation between this form of sympathy and we-
intentionality. Consequently, three questions arise: why is empathy mentioned in 
this group-form; does it play any role at all; how is we-intentionality declined in the 
life-community? 
The problem taken into account in this section has  already been found in the 
parents’ example,107 in fact the form of sympathy that most characterizes the life-
community is “Miteinandererleben”, which is to be read as a general concept 
including the Miteinanderfühlen of the Nature of Sympathy.108 Again, Scheler 
remarks that such a phenomenon is not to be thought of as something that follows 
an objectification of the other’s feeling , that is, the perception of another’s affective 
state as hers, and only afterwards an act of sharing , but entails rather an identity of 
content of the co-feeling itself (GW II, 516). For instance, if my partner and I go to 
the cinema together to enjoy a movie by Lars von Trier, I do not merely empathize 
with him on experiencing a common disappointment when we are told that the film 
has been substituted by a documentary on the weapons of World War II. I knew 
that he is not interested in such kind of topic, and, more important, we had a 
common desire and tried to fulfil it together by reserving the seats, driving to the 
cinema and so on.  
Given the common background, I am not only disappointed because I hoped 
to have a good aesthetic experience while watching the movie, but also because it 
was supposed to be a shared affective experience. So, the consequent negative 
feeling is not a mere sum of empathy plus inferences on the underlying narratives, 
but is already a feeling-with-one-another. In other words, the agency between the 
subjects is not blurred as in affective contagion or identification, but I pre-
                                                         
107 To which he explicitly refers in a footnote (GW II, 516). 
108 In this I agree with Schloßberger (2016, 193), though I would be more careful with the claim that 
Scheler completely excludes empathy from this phenomenon, for there is a contradiction in his 
mentioning Nacherleben at the beginning of his exposition of the life-community. 
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reflectively know that we are both annoyed. With the due individual differences of 
bodily feelings and affective metabolization, the expression I can see on his face is 
the visible part of our emotion. 
Scheler does not exclude the ability of grasping of the other’s expressivity, but 
denies an objectification of his/her feelings as if the emotion that arises pertained 
to the other first and only afterwards to us. A friend who should happen to be at the 
cinema and see our disappointed expressions, for instance, would understand our 
feeling through empathy, but not participate in it from a we-perspective. 
A slightly different form of “we” that might give rise to questions on the 
relation between sharing and empathy should be taken into account next. It is the 
first form of awareness in sharing which arises during an infant’s development, the 
capacity of joint attention that emerges after the 9th month (Gallagher 2010, 
Tomasello 2000, 2008). As I have argued, the practices of affective sharing are 
based on the fact that we have a mileu in common – in Schelerian terms – with 
others: in this case, the affective experience starts from the attempt or the 
occurrence of heading towards the same object or event – a uniquely human 
capacity, according to Tomasello. I hereby start from Cusinato’s (2018b) idea of 
taking Tomasello into account for a theory on emotional sharing. 
Such an early form of we-intentionality could prove the relation with empathy-
Nacherleben that Scheler left unsettled in Miteinandererleben. Although an 
experience in the we-mode does not objectify the other’s feeling, the example of 
the baby and her mother stresses the need of interaction and of the child’s detection 
of her mother’s gaze turning towards the target that she intends to show her, 
hopefully while she displays an encouraging expression of interest or amusement. 
Unlike the case of the grieving parents, here the feeling-with-one-another comes 
from a top-down mode, so to speak, since it emerges from interaction. As Tomasello 
(2008) remarks, in fact, the fundamental difference between a great ape’s and an 
infant’s pointing is that the first only aims at requesting something, while the 
second one can point to the object just to share an experience. The child means not 
only to make an adult do something (behavior), but also to inform her and to 
influence her intentional states (Tomasello, Carpenter, Liszkowski 2007). This 
presupposes a former common background – according to which, the child believes 
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that seeing a dog waggling its tail is an interesting fact to be shared – and a check 
that the object has reached the other’s attention, too. Consequently, the child and 
the caregiver communicate about it in a we-mode, that could imply a smile, cheerful 
sounds, and so on. 
Such joint attention allows the child to learn how to affectively deal with the 
world through the caregiver’s response, or in other words, which value-positioning 
to adopt before she is able to perform a personality-individuation, and to establish 
an attunement with the adult (cf. chapter 1) about the world itself. Moreover, both 
are aware of their we-perspective that is not the mere A paying attention to x and B 
doing the same, because they are also monitoring each other to increase their 
sharing of affective response, a reciprocity claim that is grounded on empathy but 
not reducible to it. As in the Schelerian description of the life-community, there are 
independence between the subjects – missing in the mass group-form – and a 
feeling-with-one-another in which they are creating a common “stream of 
experience” and participating in it. But the case of the child pointing a dog to her 
mother is quite different from the one of the grieving parents. 
When an intention is not the origin of joint attention, this could arise in a 
bottom-up mode, as Tomasello (2008) argues. This may happen if an external event 
supervenes, and we know that we are all aiming to the same target, perhaps because 
what we were doing has been interrupted, or we have shared certain experiences 
and narratives in the past, as is the case of the grieving parents. Even at this stage, 
some more or less explicit perception of the other’s expressivity is hardly avoidable 
if we are to verify the actual sharing of the affective quality of the experience. Here, 
sharing does not arise from empathy: empathy only plays a role in it, for instance 
in building the common background through interaction, or in the verification of 
the other’s expression. Yet, as Scheler says, the two parents are participating in the 
same stream of experience. 
The concept of a common “stream of experience”, though, does not lead to the 
unification into a single subject that would absorb the individuals, or to an 
identification that would fall into unipathy, or even with the fusion of bodily 
sensations that are not subject to empathy or sharing, as specified before. On the 
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contrary, we read in the Formalismus, with a terminology that recalls the extended-
emotions thesis:  
[m]moreover, if we are to turn our gaze from the unitary act of 
experiencing-with-one-another (Miteinandererlebens) to the 
(objective) individuals and their experiencing, then the act (in its 
structure varying again and again) of experiencing-, hearing-, seeing-, 
thinking-, hoping-, loving- and hating-with-one-another, floats 
(schwebt) like an autonomous stream of experience 
(eigengesetzmäßiger Erlebnisstrom) between the individuals, which 
subject is the reality of the community itself. (GW II, 516) 
 
After reading these lines, it is not difficult to detect why Schmid is a strenuous 
supporter of the token-identity thesis about Scheler’s theory of we-intentionality: 
not only the same type of emotion occurs within members of a life-community, but 
the very same emotion itself. Differently from the mass, however, a form of 
solidarity (vertretbare Solidarität – representative solidarity) is possible because 
the experiences of single individuals are given, at least as individual members of 
the community. The level of individuation in such a group-form entails the 
possibility of a sense of us, though the lived experiences of a subject are intrinsically 
tied to the community and not singularized acts of a person; in fact, they «vary 
depending purely on the flowing (Ablauf) and the content of the variation of the 
common experience (Gesamterlebens)» (GW II, 516). The individual participates 
in such experiential flowing and in such solidarity not as a creatively individuated 
person, but with a representative role in the community. A reassessment of the 
Schelerian comparison shows that it is an over-singular unity of lived body that 
reveals its irreducibility to mechanisms (life-community), but still obeys to implicit 
and involuntary tendencies to prefer and postpone  which in such a community are 
manifest in customs, traditions, celebrations, etc., but not in the full responsibility 
of a subject or in a unitary will. In such tendencies, described by Scheler through 
the metaphor of the Leib, the affective attitude is shared without a creative 
metabolization. In other words, we adopt an axiological posture towards the world 
that sees us as partially individuated, but not yet as free individuals, like the infant 




4.5.4 The artificial unity of society 
Although it is inscribed by Scheler into the group-forms, in the society as a 
pure form we lose the originary we-mode that manifests itself in Miteinanderleben, 
proper of the life-community. A society (Gesellschaft) is «an artificial unity of 
single individuals (eine künstliche Einheit von Einzelnen)» (GW II, 517). Such an 
ideal form could correspond to ‘empathy’ as it is conceived by the theory of mind, 
that is, to the inference from analogy (Analogieschluß, GW II, 517). As in this 
indirect encounter with another, an abstraction is superposed on the direct contact 
with the originary dimension of expressivity. The “positive” difference in 
comparison with the life-community is that the individual can have self-knowledge 
of herself as individual (Einzelwesen), as an irreplaceable individuality, and not as 
a mere element of a group-form. However, this is not the highest form of 
individuation because, even if the subjects are kept distinct in their agency, it does 
not allow to reach the person conceived as autonomous and spiritual. As I will 
explain in 4.5.5, this characterizes the Gesamtperson instead.  
To be sure, neither the prevailing axiological modalities here nor the ones 
pertaining to the lived body as a unity are the highest of the holy or the mental 
sphere. In society, one is oriented to the sensible sphere and pursues mainly 
pleasantness (society intended as sociability) and usefulness (society as bringing 
civilization), while it is inferable from the Leib-metaphor that Scheler believed the 
life-values – which are at a higher level than the sensible and the pragmatic ones – 
to be prevailing in the life-community.109 He does not credit society with a positive 
nuance, and, as the argument from analogy indicates a solipsistic route, society 
alone puts individuals into a self-conscious isolation. Likewise, in the sociologist 
Tönnies’ ([1887] 2005) distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the 
latter keeps individuals separated despite the unifying elements. Scheler himself 
states that the prevailing sensible-relative modalities «according to their nature, do 
not gather, but rather separate» (GW II, 517-518).110 
                                                         
109 In a similar way, Vendrell Ferran (2016, 225-226) attributes the life-community a prevailing 
relation to vital values. 
110 This is the thesis about society that Scheler maintains during the Formalismus period (cf. Frings 
[1997] 2012, ch. VIII). After his intermediate period, as it is evident for instance in the Sociology of 
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According to the metaphor of the Leib, the community corresponds to the 
unity of the lived body, while the society (Gesellschaft) is tied to the reflective 
abstraction of such a dimension into the physical dimension of the body. In this 
group-form, Scheler thus separates the originary experiencing from understanding, 
the körperliche expressive gestures – which are given as leiblich in the community 
– from the experience that the other lives (GW II, 517). That is the reason why such 
an experience can only be inferred by analogy and not empathized directly. As I 
have explained in the third chapter, Scheler makes only a short reference to 
Nachfühlen while discussing the essential social unities, and places it in the 
previous group-form: it should be clear by now that the inference from analogy has 
nothing in common with the direct feeling-perception of the other’s affective states 
which is described in the Sympathiebuch.  
Just as the physical body-Körper is an abstraction of the Leib, society is not 
an originary we-mode: it is a künstliche Einheit, and necessitates a life-community 
in order to exist. As I have pointed out more than once, according to Scheler the 
individual lives more in the community than in herself, i.e. the community is 
originary (see Robinson’s mental experiment) while society is artificially 
construed.  In other words, individuals get together in a society through their sharing 
not of an emotion or an action, but of an explicitly-set commitment,111 a promise 
(Versprechen), a contract (Vertrag), or even conventions (Konventionen) and usual 
practices (Usancen). As long as the society is considered completely separated from 
the life-community, there is nothing in it that motivates its elements to experience 
something as a “gemeinsam” (GW II, 518), unless this is achieved by fiction 
(Fiktion) and authority (Gewalt), that are imposed to individuals through the 
fictional concept of a common will and the force of the majority principle. 
Therefore, the affective attitude towards one another cannot be co-responsibility 
and surely not solidarity (what Scheler calls, with an idiomatic expression, «“Einer 
für Alle” und “Alle für Einen», GW II, 518): in society, its members relate to one 
                                                         
Knowledge, he elaborates a more articulated view centered on the society as built by different forms 
of knowledge. 
111 A Schelerian view would deny the opposite claim that Margaret Gilbert supports in her works, 
as her account of collective intentionality presupposes a shared commitment.  
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another not as a “we” acting and cooperating together, but as alter-egos to be 
distrusted.  
However, as the lived-body experience is foundational for the one of the 
physical-body, and as the Miteinanderleben is a condition for the objectification of 
the other’s experience into an inference from analogy, the dimension of the life-
community is also a prerequisite for the constitution of any society. The single 
individuals inside a society must have experienced, at one time of their lives, a form 
of life-community that allowed them to recognize the meaning of a “promise” and 
a “contract”. The obligation to keep any mutual promise in a contract needs a 
foundation that cannot be a regressum ad infinitum to other contracts, and Scheler 
individuates it in the solidaristic duty to fulfil the contents of such promises as 
members of a community (GW II, 520). A contract would not be possible without 
an originary, a priori content that is desired “in common”, in other words, a joint 
commitment – a shared experience that, being in the we-form, is possible only in 
the life-community. Otherwise, «[i]t would be merely the expression and statement 
of a temporary, hypothetical readiness of the will (Willensbereitschaft) to do 
something on condition that the other does something, while she states, likewise, 
the same temporary, hypothetical readiness» (GW II, 520). 
As the analysis of society has made evident, the group-forms are not exclusive 
essences untied from one another: an individual can be the member of a society and 
at the same time of a family, a tribe, or different groups – demonstrated by the fact 
that a life-community can exist without a society. Such a specification is important 
in order to understand the social unity that Scheler considers as the highest form of 
individuation and, at the same time, of solidarity and cooperation, that is the 
Gesamtperson: to share a mutual bond and yet not to be absorbed into a tyrannical 
unity is possible because such a group-form is related to the life-community and the 
society and so carries both autonomy and solidarity to the highest level. 
 
4.5.5 Gesamtperson, the personalistic system of solidarity, the 
community of persons. The “we” of solidarity  
If it is true that a translation is never the same as the original, this problem is 
well evident for the concept of Gesamtperson, as any wrong nuance can lead to 
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crucial conceptual misunderstandings. Such a term is certainly subject to criticism 
if we translate it as “encompassing”, as if meaning an ontological overarching unity 
above single persons that absorbs them until any individual uniqueness is 
annulled.112 Even the definition of a “collective” person would be misleading and 
wrong, for it could suggest a collectivistic turn, which Scheler’s view actually 
opposes (cf. also Szanto 2016). As a matter of fact, the term is seldom used by 
Scheler himself who, after the Formalismus, substituted it, for instance with 
“personalistic system of solidarity” in the Sociology of Knowledge («der Form des 
personalistischen Solidaritätssystems», GW VIII, 33) or “group-unities of 
solidarity” in the Sympathiebuch («solidarischer Gruppeneinheiten», GW VII, 
228). In order to highlight that Scheler’s fourth group-form entails the highest form 
of individuation, I will avoid the misleading term Gesamtperson in this chapter and 
prefer “community of persons” or some synonyms. 
The unity of single, autonomous, spiritual, and individual persons generates 
the highest group-form; no doubt such a unity cannot be an ‘encompassing person’, 
since its members would otherwise lose their autonomy and individuality – and how 
can a community of persons be constituted by non-persons?  
 
Every finite person is, at this level, at the same a time a single person 
(Einzelperson) and a member of a community of persons (Glied einer 
Gesamtperson), and the fact of being like this and to experience it lies 
absolutely in the essence of a finite person (in her recognized full 
essence) (GW II, 522).  
 
This is what differentiates it from the life-community: in the personal 
community, the individual is the bearer of full responsibility towards herself and 
co-responsible for the group, while in the vital one she is only a bearer of her role-
responsibility for the communal life. In Scheler’s theorization of the fourth group 
form, the principle of interchangeable solidarity of the life-community – where the 
individuals are represented through their role as a part of the ‘we’ – is substituted 
according by the irreplaceable solidarity of an individual person that is unique and 
                                                         
112 An interpretation of Scheler that Salice (2015) is right to dismiss. 
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keeps an individual conscience (GW II, 522-523).113 In other words, the system of 
solidarity changes the status of the individual from a replaceable role/member to an 
irreplaceable person. 
Furthermore, Scheler is very explicit in pointing out that the “spiritual person” 
– here a synonym for the personal community – is dynamic and changes according 
to its individuals – i.e. it is neither a fixed substance as in the Boetian definition of 
the person as a “rationalis naturae individua substantia”, nor one experiencing the 
same relation as in the life-community, comparable to the lived body:114 
 
Since the spiritual person (geistige Person), as a concrete center of acts 
(Aktzentrum) and center of any act that she executes (Akvollzüge), 
behaves neither as an immutable substance towards its mutable 
properties and qualities, nor as a “collective” (Kollektivum) towards its 
members, and not even as a whole towards its parts that can be added 
up (summierbare), but rather as a “concrete” towards an “abstract”. 
(GW II, 526) 
 
It can be inferred from Scheler’s argument that what is shared in the 
community of persons is not a mere content as in the token-identity description and 
not only values (cf. Vendrell Ferran 2016), but, more importantly, the very posture 
as well (Stellung). Here, not only emotional sharing occurs, but, and above all, the 
sharing of a certain meta-affective attitude. This attitude implies an affective and 
ethical commitment to make the other and the community itself reach the highest 
peak of her value-possibilities. In other words, while society is ruled by a ‘contract’, 
here the subjects feel the responsibility to contribute to a mutual solidarity toward 
the other’s and the community’s personal growth. Even though such a group-form 
may sound utopian and Scheler is not necessarily accurate and convincing in 
proposing concrete examples (e.g. the church), it suggests something crucial inside 
the debate on we-intentionality. Unlike the theories that give preference to explicit 
normative judgments and systems of obligation (List&Pettit 2011) or to joint 
                                                         
113 On the differences between we-intentionality and the principle of solidarity, cf. Cusinato (2017b, 
277-279). Cf. also Salice (2016b) for an interpretation of the difference between life-community and 
personal community based on the awareness of being part of a ‘we’. 
114 On the contrary, the life-community is in such a relation to the spiritual one that the former 
constitutes, so to speak, «the communal lived-body (Gesamtleib)» of the latter (GW II, 532). 
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commitment (Gilbert 2013), the personalistic system insists on love and affective 
sharing as grounds for an absolute solidarity which exceeds rational responsibility 
and bonds. 
The personal community is ideally the highest form of other- and world-
openness, that gives each person her unique space where to flourish and perform 
the metabolization of shared feelings – to speak in Cusinato’s (2017b)115 terms – in 
her own irreplaceable manner. It also houses positive, spontaneous acts of love and 
solidarity to make the others flourish, since the personal community is responsible 
for the single person as much as she is responsible for the community. Besides, any 
ethical (sittlich) act performed by the community of persons retro-acts on the 
essence and value of its individual member, and so transforms her (GW II, 526). 
The “personalistic system of solidarity” therefore is all but collectivistic: it is 
responsible for the maximum level of individuality of its members, gives them the 
possibility to reach the greatest freedom and could not even exist if the individuals 
did not bear their own absolute, autonomous responsibility in their turn.  
To sum up the main points of the argument, a higher form of sharing is made 
possible in this fourth group-form. Cusinato (2008, 2012, 2017b) interprets the 
concepts of Mitvollzug (co-execution) and Mit-teilung (sharing) by Scheler as 
entailing the specificity individuating the person as a center of act-sharing. That is, 
the person constantly shapes itself and is shaped through acts of emotional sharing 
guided by solidarity.116 The general concept of “act” is to be kept distinct from the 
mere shared actions, for acts include internal and external perception and, inter alia, 
the consciousness of one’s own lived body, love and hate, representation, 
judgement (Urteilen) and memory (GW II, 385). All those acts have their center 
and ground in the person, that is «the concrete, essential unity of being of acts of 
different nature, that in itself (…) precedes any essential difference of acts (…). The 
                                                         
115 «Every solidaristic experience of sharing an act, an experience or an emotion corresponds 
therefore to a further birth – be it big or small – and implies a step forward into the process of 
individuation for all the persons involved» (Cusinato 2017b, 280). 
116 This thesis, which bonds together solidarity and singularity, is at the roots of Cusinato (2017b): 
«I believe that the originality of this work consists in focusing on the connection between the process 
of individuation of the singularity and the germination of desire which occurs in the solidaristic 
practices of emotional sharing» (16). 
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existence of the person “founds” (“fundiert”) all the essentially different acts» 
(GW II, 582-3).  
If the essence of an act is concrete, then it can be grasped intuitively only in 
view of the person that is the executor (Vollzieher) of such an act (GW II, 583). In 
this manner, the person opens the way to a radically new dimension, which – unlike 
functions such as empathy, co-feeling, etc. – is not related to the egoic 
individuation. At the same time, it is not a void “container” of acts, nor is it “behind” 
or “above” them: in every act, there is the whole person, who in her turn changes 
through every act, without its essence being altered as something pertaining to the 
phenomenal time. Therefore, in order to understand a person, her unique style is to 
be grasped in her acts by intuition, so that we can be open to the knowledge of her 
world. To achieve this – Scheler states – we have to co-execute her acts, or at least 
re-execute or anticipate them (Mit- oder Nachvolluzug oder Vorvollzug), which 
cannot lead to objectification (GW II, 386) otherwise the person and her style would 
be “concealed” and become transcendent immediately and absolutely. In an ideal 
personal system of solidarity, each member is encouraged to express itself 
according to her style, in a way that it is impossible to objectify her hallmark: we 
can only glimpse it through co-execution, and give her the freedom and solidarity 
to develop it. If this kind of intrinsically ethical attitude was only based on 
rationality and objectification, the personality would instead hide and conform to 
the pre-set rules of society or to the encompassing character of the life-community. 
This analysis could explain the fact that Scheler individuates three forms of 
sharing, but lists four group-forms: somehow the described co-execution of 
personal acts is to be considered as the fourth, since it is a kind of participation in 
the other’s personal sphere.117 Although Scheler states that the first person can 
                                                         
117 Salice (2016b) argues that there is a difference between the life-community and the personal one, 
where the subject remains at the level of collective intentionality, while the form of sociality is still 
Miteinandererleben. I believe, though, that the co-execution of spiritual acts and especially of the 
ones of love – as it involves the personal sphere – brings about a completely new dimension of 
sharing. Here, not only the subjects understand themselves as single units in we-intentionality, but 
there are also co-creativity leading to a non-predictable result and the possibility to start a trans-
subjective dimension that exceeds both the division of the mere “psychological” egos and the 
dependence on the unique stream of experiences.  
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emerge from the society level, she can only reach her never-ending accomplishment 
through this personal co-execution and a creative structuring of acts. A further 
development of Scheler’s reasoning highlights that any act – as well as the person 
who executes it – is unique, so its being shared by different persons gives rise to an 
unrepeatable result (Cusinato 2008). The logic of personal acts is to be open to the 
emergence of novelty, that is not the projection of an anticipating structure 
(Cusinato 2008, 206), as – metaphorically –  it happens in ‘empathy’ considered as 
a projection of one’s own simulation. In such a perspective, like in the four-hand 
creation of a work of art, the outcome remains unpredictable when two persons 
cooperate to express something. If everything was chosen and settled from the 
beginning, it would reduce the creation to the result of a mechanic procedure. In the 
same way, sharing an act of love transforms our personal sphere and opens it to 
unprecedented values and their metabolization.  
A peculiar kind of acts can be shared on this personal level. It is an “act” and 
“affective movement” that Scheler describes as active and spontaneous, then not 
linked to the ego but rather to the unobjectifiable person. It is not the affective 
perception given in functions but is rather possible only through co-execution: it is 
love (GW VII, 146-7). In the Formalismus, love is intertwined with the concept of 
full responsibility: each act of love can be considered as an affordance, since it calls 
for being requited, reciprocated. Whenever this does not happen, the person is 
responsible, that is, a ‘positive’ lack – not a mere negligence – is generated. In fact, 
«[t]he mere understanding of a love, e.g. an act of goodness towards me, implies at 
least the co-experience (Miterlebnis) that in the essence of such act lies the request 
for requited love (…). I state: the bare understanding implies this» (GW II, 524). 
The community of persons is founded upon love, in other words, each person is 
responsible for the flourishing of the others through shared acts of love. These acts 
truly make the person and her “style” become manifest to our spiritual eyes and 
reveal the highest values she can attain by her creative possibilities.  
As concrete manifestations of such a group-form, Scheler individuates the 
cultural community – on which he focuses mainly in the Sociology of Knowledge, 
for that he wishes for cooperation in a European university – and the Church, where 
the persons should be united by an act of love for God. However, more promising 
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than a religious community is the creative co-execution of the acts of a Vorbild, or 
exemplarity, not to be mistaken for norms and social models, (GW II, 558 ff, 
Vorbilder und Führer in GW X).118 Sharing at the personal level entails a positive 
axiological connotation that leaves an open space to the unique possibilities of each 
personal entity and group of persons. An interesting challenge in the we-
intentionality debates would be to go beyond the transcendental analysis of the 
shared experience, in order to engage more with the dimension of the person and 
its ethical development. This could reveal how to extract solidarity from the slightly 
utopian features of Scheler’s examples, and help applying it to actual groups – not 
only to essential unities. 
In a Schelerian perspective, the capacity to exceed egocentricity can develop 
on multiple levels. At the layer of unipathy, there is no given “other”; at the level 
of empathy, another and her feelings, intentions, and so on, are instead given in 
affective perception as hers, yet there are neither participation nor an ethical 
connotation. For Scheler, co-feeling involves the overcoming of egocentricity, but 
the experience is not participated as a “we”. In Miteinanderfühlen, the experience 
is truly given from a we-perspective, but still lacks the positive and negative 
axiological connotations related to the person in her uniqueness, a dimension that 
emerges and is co-executed creatively only in the personal community. The path 
followed in this dissertation poses the grounds for dismissing solipsism in favor of 
an intrinsically direct contact with others and argues for the intrinsic intertwinement 
between individuation and sociality. If its aim has been achieved, then the highest 
form of this dynamical process – the person and personal acts – is the consequential, 
open question to be further investigated in future works. 
 
Drawing a conclusion 
The chapter has moved from the analysis of the foundations of empathy – the 
lived body, affective perception, expressivity – to the phenomena of sharing. I have 
tried to explain why sharing is to be distinguished from the narrower concept of we-
intentionality. There are, in fact, several degrees of sharing, that start with the 
phenomena of affective contagion and unipathy (sharing without awareness), but 
                                                         
118 Cf. Cusinato (2017b, 448ff) for a relation between solidarity and exemplary testimony. 
194 
 
are still mostly ignored by the we-intentionality debate, where the discussion is 
limited to their contribution to the “sense of us”. Scheler’s interesting view of a 
“stream of experiences” has been proven to bear a correlation with the current 
debate on extended emotions. This view has led me to stress the dimension of 
shared affective experiences, and to overcome the theoretical limitation of affective 
experiences inside the lived bodies.  
I have furthermore critically assessed Scheler’s theory of the four group-
forms, namely the level zero of Robison’s felt lack of a community, then the mass, 
the life-community, the society and the community of persons. Especially in the 
example of the grieving parents and in the form of the life-community, such an 
analysis was the attempt to find a relation between empathy and sharing, a topic 
that is starting to be debated in the we-intentionality accounts nowadays. I have 
compared the example of the grieving parents to Tomasello’s description of joint 
attention, in order to argue that empathy plays a role in sharing – constitutive or not 
depending on the different situations, while the “we” entails a further dimension 
that exceeds the I-thou relation. As a matter of fact, sharing in its higher forms 
implies increasing interconnection and increasing individuality at the same time. 
As the recent criticism by Bloom has pointed out, empathy lacks a positive 
direction towards morality: it can entail biases against non-group members, or even 
be ethically neutral, as in the case of the sadist described in the Sympathiebuch. 
Then the positive moral value is to be searched out in other forms of sympathy and 
sociality, such as the co-execution of acts by persons in the personal community. 
As in the spheres of individuation of a human being pointed out by Scheler – the 
lived body, the psychological dimension, and the personality – all forms of sociality 
represent a different yet necessary way towards a continuous development. In other 
words, the hierarchy of the social forms presented is not to be intended a series of 
steps to reach the highest form, after which the lower ones are supposed to 
disappear. The community of persons takes autonomy and individuality from the 
society, solidarity and a real common unity from the life-community, all of them 
being essential for its constitution.  
To sum up, Scheler shows that the three aspects of individuation are part of 
the human being and should be analyzed from their own criteria. Ultimately, the 
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higher spheres of individuation are not possible without the contribution of others, 
from the affective-perceptual encounter with others in empathy, to the forms of 
affective and moral sharing. In fact, we are not born in a condition of solipsism, but 
in a common world, where the very conditions allowing mutual 
intercommunication – the universal grammar of expressivity – are innate and can 
be developed further in unpredictable manners. Affects, emotions, social acts, 
common efforts of solidarity are not just and fully re-elaborated in the darkness of 
a solipsistic inner space. Though preserving their private dimension in each person, 








As this dissertation comes to a close, a recap of what has been achieved may 
be useful for the reader. The main claim in it has been that a Schelerian framework 
can provide useful phenomenological instruments to clarify the often-
misinterpreted term ‘empathy’ and to resolve many theoretical impasses that arise 
in the contemporary debates on the subject.  
I have inferred in my studies that empathic relations cannot be conceived as 
mind-reading. In order to avoid a solipsistic turn where empathy would become just 
a matter of self-reference and projection onto the other, it must be acknowledged 
that the first acquaintance with the other occurs through the expressivity of our lived 
bodies. While most interdisciplinary debates focus on the neural correlates of the 
body schema (subpersonal level), the present phenomenological discussion is 
directed mostly to better-known philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, and overlooks 
Scheler’s contributions to the topic. Therefore, I have examined the literature and 
pointed out where his account is helpful to overcome either the excessive 
differentiation between body schema and body image, and any confusion between 
the two. The body schema, though, is not a transcendental structure without 
development: it is a pre-reflective dynamical structure, or in other words, it is both 
a primary individuation and the condition for interaction and affective exchange, 
whose effect is essential for its development. Once the concept has been clarified, 
I have shown that it can be applied to pathological cases like sensory neuropathy 
and schizophrenia. Although I did not aim at reducing such pathologies to an 
impairment of the body schema, and much has to be still investigated, I have shown 
that normal ‘volition’ and ordinary experience are grounded on such a structure.  
Moreover, since the body schema ranges between self-individuation and the 
influence from others, two questions have been recently and hotly debated: is the 
minimal self primary, or are we intrinsically social from the very beginning? And 
does Scheler’s theory of the undifferentiated flux mean that we are born without 
individuality? The body schema conceived as the first level of individuation is the 
negative reply to the second question.  
The concept of minimal self is undergoing a new wave of criticism, that does 
not deny it, but rather sees it as relational. The comparison between the “jail 
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example” of the Formalismus and the experiences in solitary confinement is 
problematic for the primacy of a bodily individuation. When the individual lives in 
complete isolation, even the body schema becomes de-animated and the 
experienced borders of agency blurred. In other words, even the embodied sense of 
“mineness” is put into question. This impasse has been successfully resolved in my 
thesis by stating that only the sense of agency – not the sense of ownership – of the 
body schema is impaired. 
The same bodily individuation is highlighted by some up-to-date infant 
research. However, I have opposed a misinterpretation trending towards a bodily, 
monadic solipsism by applying the primacy of the lived body not only to self-
awareness but also to other-perception. The body schema is in fact the structure that 
allows interaction and shows innate expressivity and the immediate understanding 
of it in others as well.  
I have analyzed a certain convergence between the studies of Darwin and 
Ekman and Scheler’s claim of a universal grammar of expressivity. However, 
several scholars argue in favor of the cultural dependence of expressions, but I have 
attempted to counter this posit by assuming the existence of a layer of spontaneous 
universal expressions, that are to be kept distinct from universal emotions – which 
can be more or less visible, or built on expressions of other related emotions – and 
gestures. Further reinforcement from empirical research is required to support this 
distinction and to ascertain which universal emotions are not always associated to 
universal expressivity besides jealousy, already taken into consideration. Yet, the 
verification of Scheler’s universal grammar is still essential to proceed with the 
analysis of empathy: there is a shared ground without which no interrelation would 
ever start. 
For Scheler, perception can be imbued with the grasping of different kinds of 
expressivity. My aim has been to stress that according to him, perception is first of 
all a Wertnehmen, as it is always shaped and guided by values and the individual 
value-order, from the starting embodied level up to the personal sphere. In other 
words, values shape the potentialities for our relations with others who in their turn 
shape our order of values. When such an immediate contact with values is impaired, 
the state in which we are confined is thought to be similar to schizophrenic autism. 
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In what way does expressivity affect the empathic phenomenon? If the two 
were the same, even a wasp would perform empathy towards the victims of its sting. 
Moreover, Scheler’s notion of empathy is often simply equated with the notion of 
direct perception. Even the literature and the English translation of Scheler’s Nature 
of Sympathy seems to equivocate his concept of Nachfühlen, so I have highlighted 
that it presupposes an implicit understanding of the feeling pertaining to another. 
This posit distinguishes it from unipathy, affective contagion and projective 
empathy, therefore such conception differs from the recurrent claim that the 
acquisition of another’s feeling is necessary for empathy. I have demonstrated that 
empathy as conceived by the simulation theory leads ultimately to egocentrism, for 
although empathy is not ethical yet, it is – from a Schelerian perspective – a 
consequence of the solipsistic premises that ground the simulation theory. Even 
considering an embodied simulation as a necessary root for empathy – an 
interpretation of mirror neurons that I critically discuss, though – the problem of 
understanding others would remain, if their expressivity was not perceived 
immediately. 
A further development of my discussion on empathy has been achieved by 
connecting it with the debate on we-intentionality, specifically with the notion of 
“sharing”. Most of the current debate on we-intentionality appeals to a “sense of 
us”, and there is a significant trend towards grounding such phenomenon on 
empathy and interaction. This is mostly coherent with the perspective I have argued, 
however by adopting a Schelerian viewpoint I have shown the limits of considering 
only the sense of us. In Scheler’s theory, social phenomena range from unipathy 
and contagion – “sharing without awareness”, so without a “sense of us”, made 
possible by expressivity but without empathy – to an ethical kind of sharing which 
affects the human developing process through the co-execution (Mitvollzug) of 
personal acts (Cusinato 2015b, 50; 2017, 48). Hence the need for a broader concept, 
that could include unipathy and contagion besides we-intentionality and joint 
commitment and so highlight the affective and not only the intentional dimension 
of the “we”. For that reason, the preference went to “sharing”.  
Undoubtedly a Schelerian account can bring about some novelties in the 
contemporary debate on the “we”. In addition to the two above-mentioned further 
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layers of sharing, it highlights also that the highest form of group (the community 
of persons) should entail the highest level of individuation (the person and its 
flourishing). Moreover, Scheler’s theory of the essential social unities implies 
different postures (Stellungen) towards the world and various degrees of world- and 
other-openness to be achieved through the sharing of values and affective functions. 
There are certainly limits in this research, that could be developed further. One 
them is that, being this dissertation primarily a study of Scheler’s perspective 
compared with the contemporary debates to find answers to the problem of 
empathy, the focus on the exegetical part has been deliberately limited. There is still 
much to be investigated in other texts.  
The claim that empathy lacks an ethical dimension has undergone some 
criticism. To be sure, empathy alone does not give rise to ethical feelings and 
theories, but it can be the minimal condition for them to develop, for it both involves 
anti-solipsism and a distance between the subjects which allows the other a space 
for her individuation. A solution, in this sense, is to be sought in the last section of 
the dissertation, which also poses two important questions that I would like to 
develop by further studies: how is the co-execution of personal acts to be conceived 
in we-intentionality and how should the problem of personhood be discussed in 
terms of sharing? 
One of the goals of this thesis was to arouse new attention to the complexity 
of Scheler’s theory and other current unresolved issues. A reader interested in or 
familiar with the recent debates on embodiment, empathy, emotions and we-
intentionality may find some new answers – and several new questions – on such 
topics, and realize why the encounter with others is much more immediate than 
mind-reading or the mere act of “putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes”.  
To sum up, I have shown that there are good reasons for reassessing empathy 
from an embodied perspective that entails expressivity, and provided further hints 
with the purpose to elicit answers to the still-open question of the relations between 
empathy and we-intentionality. The perspectives of I, thou and we are strictly 
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